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Abstract
Urmson famously suggested that the supererogatory acts of saints and heroes should
be separately classified within a moral theory. I support Urmson's suggestion that
supererogatory acts should form a separate category within a moral theory, but
justifying this poses a number of problems. I examine two. Firstly, there is the
pressure of requirement. Supererogatory acts are optional, yet they are good acts and
better than an act which the agent may have permissibly performed instead. Why,
therefore, are they not required? The second problem concerns the rationality of
supererogatory acts. If an agent has good reasons to support an alternative
permissible act to the supererogatory one, how can we avoid describing the
supererogatory act as irrational?
To provide a solution to these problems, 1 first establish four key characteristics of
the supererogatory act. They are optional, rational, of moral worth and better than a
permissible alternative. Unusually, I make no reference to cost in my definition, which
is intended to covers all types of supererogatory act which ordinary morality considers
supererogatory. I then examine Shelly Kagan's attack on supererogation which brings
into focus the two problems of requirement and rationality. It relies on the
consequentalist idea that maximising the overall impartial good is the only determinant
of right action. Unless some limits are imposed on maximisation, there is no room for
supererogation. Kagan argues that there are no such justifiable limits. He claims the
most plausible way of setting limits is through an appeal to cost, which is
unsuccessful.
In response, I firstly examine whether a maximising theory is of itself a bar to
supererogation. I conclude that it is not, but that a recent attempt to produce a
maximising account of supererogation is inadequate because its reliance on cost as a
necessary feature of supererogation results in supererogatory acts being classified as
irrational. I then argue that appealing either to the degree or the nature of cost
experienced by an agent can never be a successful approach to a justification of
supererogation. Alternative approaches such as limiting required action through the
concept of a 'fair shares' morality or an interpretation of supererogatory acts as
imperfect duties also prove inadequate.
My proposed solution to the problems of the pressure of requirement and rationality
is to argue that supererogatory acts fall into two types. Firstly, there are acts which
the agent considers required, but only by himself and not others. Secondly, where the
agent does not consider his act required, he considers his options to be
indeterminately ranked, so that he has reasons to perform either the supererogatory
act or any alternative permissible act. The supererogatory act is nonetheless better
than the alternative, although there are good reasons to perform both. My solution
recognises that the four characteristics of supererogatory acts are in tension.
However, it responds to the two problems by showing that supererogatory acts are
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Chapter 1 Characteristics of the supererogatory act
1.1. The historical interpretation of supererogation
The term 'supererogation' goes back to the Latin translation of St. Luke's Gospel
which deals with the final part of the story of the Good Samaritan.1 The Samaritan,
having given the robbed and injured man to the care of the inn-keeper: 'took out two
pence, and gave to the host, and said: Take care of him; and whatsoever thou shall
spend over and above, I, at my return, will repay thee'.2
What do we learn from this first usage of the term? According to the Good Samaritan
story, the supererogatory act did not consist in rescuing a mugged and injured
stranger in the street. Instead, it was the act of benevolence that followed, when the
Samaritan put the injured man up in the inn and did not seek to contain the cost of
doing that to a particular limit. His concern was that the injured man be looked after,
whatever it cost. The idea that benevolence should not be contained to limits is an
important theme in the modern philosophical discussion of supererogation.
The theological use of the term extends beyond the Samaritan example. The doctrine
of'works of supererogation' as expounded by St. Thomas of Aquinas, made reference
to two other biblical examples, which have a slightly different emphasis from the
Good Samaritan story. The first is the story in St. Matthew's Gospel which tells of the
rich young man who asks Jesus what he must do to earn eternal life. The rich man had
kept the Lord's commandments. Jesus says 'If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou
hast and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in heaven. And come and
* Taken from the entry on 'supererogation' from The Oxford Dictionary of the Chrisitian Church,
p. 1306.
- The Holy Bible (1956 Douay version) St. Luke's Gospel. Chapter 10. verse 35. 'Quodcumque
supcrerogaveris' refers to my italisiced words. All bibical references are taken from the Douay
version of The Holy Bible, published in 1956 in London by the Catholic Truth Society.
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follow me1. '1 This was too much for the young man who 'went away sad; for he had
great possessions'.
Perhaps it is enough for eternal life that the young man keep the commandments.
Jesus' recommendation is for what to do to be perfect. Thus is born the idea that
supererogation is equated with the counsels of perfection, somewhat beyond what is
necessary to enter the kingdom of heaven, but something at which we should all be
aiming, even if we do not always attain it. In this second Biblical example, we can
interpret supererogatory action as behaving in a way which is better than merely
doing what is required (in this case, keeping the Commandments).
Finally, St. Paul's counsels on marriage and celibacy were also taken to support the
concept of works of supererogation. In his letter to the Corinthians, St. Paul puts
forward the view that a celibate life is a higher good than a married life because such a
life can be fully dedicated to the works of God whereas married life involves caring
for one's partner and thus detracting from time spent in praising and working for
God.4 Nonetheless, St. Paul accepts that married life is not wrong and is certainly
better than living a dissolute life, which would involve bad actions. Better to marry
than to burn! In this third example, we see that the emphasis is on the idea that it is
not wrong to fail to live a 'saintly' life, although it is good (and preferable) to do so.
My interpretations of these Biblical examples all have features which are recognisable
in the modern philosophical debate on supererogation. Firstly, the Good Samaritan
story suggests that supererogatory action involves limitless beneficence. Secondly, the
example of the rich young man puts forward the idea that supererogatory acts carry
1
The Holy Bible (1956 Douay version), St. Matthew. Chapter 19. verses 21-22.
4 The Holy Bible (1956 Douay version), 1 Corinthians Chapter 7.
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with them some form of ideal, being the best that one can do, or at the very least
better than the minimum required. Thirdly, St. Paul's discussion of celibacy and
marriage suggests that failure to perform supererogatory acts is not wrong. There is
some flexibility or optionality with respect to supererogation. St. Paul allows that it is
not wrong to live a life that is not as perfect as it could be.
These last two features of the historical, religious discussion of supererogation
provide two characteristics of the modern, secularised supererogatory act. The first of
these characteristics is that the supererogatory act is better than the moral minimum
required. The second characteristic is that an agent cannot be blamed for failure to
perform a supererogatory act. It is not wrong not to perform a supererogatory act.
The first historical feature, where supererogatory action is linked to limitless
beneficence in the case of the Good Samaritan, provides a challenge to the moral
agent. How much good do we have to do and how much is optional?
In this chapter, I develop all of these themes, showing that the second and third
historical features are in fact key characteristics of the supererogatory act and that the
first is part of a major problem which supererogation throws up for the modern moral
theorist. I begin by outlining two problems for any theorist who wants to support the
separate classification of supererogatory acts. 1 then consider which acts ordinary
morality deems to be supererogatory, providing a provisional classification of
supererogatory acts into different types. I argue that supererogatory acts have four
key characteristics and that embodying these characteristics in a definition results in a
somewhat different picture of supererogation from that typically drawn by the modern
theorist. It is this definition that I will use throughout to examine how the two
problems I now outline can be overcome.
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1.2 Two problems concerning supererogatory acts
The modern discussion on supererogation starts with Urmson's suggestion that certain
saintly and heroic acts deserve a separate classification within a moral theory. He asks
us to imagine a soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to protect his fellow
soldiers. He sacrifices his life for them. Can we call this moral action a duty? 'Clearly
not', Urmson expects in response. His point is that the traditional classification of
moral acts is inadequate. It should allow for supererogatory acts such as those of the
soldier. Urmson states boldly:
'I have suggested that the trichotomy of duties, indifferent actions, and wrong-doing is
inadequate. There are many kinds of action that involve going beyond duty proper,
saintly and heroic actions being conspicuous examples of such kinds of action.'5
After the publication of Urmson's paper, 'Saints and Heroes', there was a flurry of
response to it, then a loss of widespread interest in the specific subject of
supererogation. When supererogation is discussed, theorists are often frustrated to
find that they have difficulty giving an account of it in their theories. They either end
up rejecting the category completely or leaving the topic only scantily discussed. This
is not just because they address the question of supererogation as a 'leftover' rather
than an important issue in its own right.6 In fact many modern writers of different
traditions acknowledge that supererogation poses serious problems for the moral
theorist.
5 Urmson (1958) p.73
(> There are some important exceptions to this. Nagel (1986) sees supererogation as a key issue in
supporting his view of morality as accepting the structure of human motivation. Hare (1981) also
sees it as supporting his view for two levels of moral thinking.
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From the utilitarian viewpoint, Hare refers to 'the problem of what are called "works
of supererogation".7 Nagel, a deontologist, talks of the 'puzzling subject of
supererogation'.8 Dancy, a particularism refers to 'the notion of supererogation
involves something quite considerable in the way of a paradox'.9 All these writers
consider that there is a problem because they recognise the strong, intuitive pull of the
optional nature of supererogation. In ordinary morality, it is important to be able to
claim that there are some good acts which we can do if we choose, but which we are
not obliged to do. Yet giving a robust account of supererogation from any of these
different moral viewpoints is difficult.
There are indeed a number of difficult problems concerning supererogation which
anyone who wants to follow Urmson and claim that supererogatory acts can form a
separate category in moral theory must overcome. I intend to deal with two of them:
1. The Problem ofRequirement: Ifan act is good, why isn't it required?
Supererogatory acts are very good. Often they are described as praiseworthy. They
certainly have moral worth. So why aren't they required? Was Urmson's soldier
merely doing his duty after all? Some think that that is how the act should be
categorised.10
If we think that Urmson was right and that the soldier's act was supererogatory then
we must explain why the act was optional. The explanation can take a number of
7 Hare (1981) p. 188
^ Nagel (1986) p. 203
9 Dancy (1988) p. 128
For example, New (1974) p. 184 claims that the hero who receives a medal in the course of doing
his duty was in fact doing just that.
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different forms. It might focus on the frailty of human motivation and suggest that
such acts are in some sense required, but that agents are excused them on account of
their being too difficult. This form of explanation results in a 'weak' form of
supererogation, where the supererogatory act carries with it some form of
requirement, but excuses are available to the average agent. At the other end of the
scale, the explanation can focus on the value of there being acts which can never be
required. Here the supererogatory act carries no sense of 'ought' with it at all. It is
truly optional. How can this be, given the act is so good? At least one of the goals of
morality is to pursue the good, so why should an agent not have to perform certain
acts that are very good, the supererogatory ones, but finds himself obliged to perform
others, namely his duties?
2. The Problem of Rationality: If there is a good reason not to perform the
supererogatory act, isn't it irrational to do it?
If a supererogatory act is optional, it suggests that there must be a good reason not to
perform the supererogatory act, so isn't it irrational to perform it? In Urmson's
example, hasn't the soldier got a good reason not to jump on the live grenade?
Certainly. He will preserve his life if he doesn't. But then, according to the problem of
rationality, if he doesn't jump on the grenade, it looks as though we shall have to call
him irrational for not being a hero.11 That does not seem to fit with our intuitions.
And because supererogatory acts are optional, the problem can be stated the other
way about. If there is a decisive reason not to perform the supererogatory act, isn't it
11 There is considerable debate over the use of the term irrationality. I am using the term 'irrational'
here in the narrow sense outlined by Scanlon (2000). p.25. One description he gives of irrationality is
when a person fails to form and act on an intention to do something even though he or she judges
there to be overwhelmingly good reason to do it. This is deemed irrational.
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irrational to perform it? Again, I suggest that we do not want to call saints and heroes
irrational.12
So how does the agent reason when he has the opportunity to perform a
supererogatory act? It does not look as though he can reason on the basis of deciding
to perform whichever act is better, because that would mean that the supererogatory
act would be required and failure to perform it would be irrational. If he chooses to
perform the morally permissible alternative to the supererogatory act, he is not in a
position to say that the reasons for performing this outweigh the supererogatory act;
otherwise the non-supererogatory act would then be required. The idea is that in that
case of supererogation the agent has a genuine option.
The answer to this moral reasoning problem is related to the first problem of
requirement. Ifwe can come up with a justification for supererogatory acts' not being
required, then we must also be able to translate this answer into a form of reasoning
which the agent uses when faced with the possibility of performing a supererogatory
act.
1.3 The consequentalist bias in the framing of the two problems
Both problems of requirement and rationality have been discussed obliquely in the
debate between consequentalists and non-consequentalists, concerning the issue of the
overdemandingness of consequentalism.13 My concern will be to address the
12 Some acts which seem to follow a supererogatory pattern may of course be considered irrational.
For example, if an agent sacrifices his interests in favour of something trivial or unusual, it may be
considered irrational or possibly even forbidden. Kagan (1989) p. 16, has the example of a man
rushing into a burning building at great risk to his life. There is a child to be saved and also a bird in
a cage. The man saves the bird in a cage. I suggest that this would be an irrational act, but not a
supererogatory one. A case of misplaced heroism, perhaps.
Writers who have shown a direct interest in supererogation include various deontic specialists,
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problems directly in the context of supererogation. However, 1 draw attention here to
what might seem to be a hidden bias in the two problems and the way I have framed
them. By suggesting that there is a pressure to perform acts which are better than
other acts (without any other features attached to the acts except that they are
'better'), and that those are the only rational acts, I might be accused of posing the
problem from the consequentalist viewpoint. Samuel Scheffler refers to this viewpoint
as the concept of 'maximizing rationality', lying at the heart of consequentalism. He
says:
'The core of this conception of rationality is the idea that if one accepts the desirability
of a certain goal being achieved, and if one has a choice between two options, one of
which is certain to accomplish the goal better than the other, then it is, ceteris
paribus, rational to choose the former over the latter.'14
Non-consequentalists will say that they are sometimes required to perform acts which
do not necessarily have a better outcome than an alternative, because the Tightness of
acts on their theory is not determined by how much good is produced. However, the
two problems arise precisely because non-consequentalists suddenly seem to adopt a
consequentalist manner of judging action in the case of the supererogatory. They
consider it especially good because of the outcome of the act, yet do not consider it
required because their method of judging right action does not rely on the amount of
good produced as a yardstick. 1 consider this point further in the next chapter when I
discuss a major consequentalist objection to supererogation.
who have followed and developed the writings of Roderick Chisholm on the subject. These include
Paul MacNamara (1986). David Heyd (1988) also produced a study of supererogation which
attempted to develop a theory of supererogation outside standard normative theories. In direct
contrast to Urmson, writers from the virtue ethics persuasion have also considered supererogatory
acts as attesting to the importance of character, rather than action, in morality; e.g. Pvbus (1982).
14 Scheffler (1982 ). quoted in Scanlon (2000) p.82. See also Foot (1985) p. 198 for a reinforcement
of the idea that it is irrational to pursue an action which will not have the best results, when such an
action is open to us.
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My aim is to discover how an account of supererogation can deal with these two
problems of requirement and rationality. I have approached the discussion from a
'theory-neutral' view, not privileging any particular moral theory whether it be
consequentalist, deontological, contractualist or virtue-based. Nonetheless,
contributions to the debate from specific viewpoints are unavoidable in my discussion.
It is also worth pointing out that Urmson in his original discussion thought that a
consequentalist theory would best handle an account of supererogation whereby
supererogatory acts formed a separate category within the theory. I put forward a
solution to the two problems in Chapter 7, part of which is a development of a
suggestion made by Urmson. In prior chapters, I consider the success or otherwise of
other accounts of supererogation. My discussion is structured around a major
objection to supererogation which 1 discuss in detail in the next chapter.
In this chapter, I shall firstly consider the scope and variety of supererogatory acts
and derive four key characteristics of supererogatory acts from my examples. I shall
then propose a definition of a supererogatory act which embodies these
characteristics. This results in a definition which is quite distinct from others in the
modern literature. Armed with this definition, I consider in the next chapter an
objection which focuses on the two problems of supererogation.
1.4 Which acts are considered supererogatory?
It is easy to call to mind a rich variety of acts which we intuitively think of as
supererogatory:
9
i) Heroic acts of rescue.
In this type of supererogatory act, the agent puts his life on the line for someone else
and the emphasis is on a single act. An example: Joe, who is not a fireman, goes into a
burning building to save a child at great personal risk. He is not required to do so. In
doing so, it is deemed that he does more than he is obliged to; he has performed a
supererogatory act. I shall be developing and referring to this example throughout and
I shall label it Joe's Rescue.
ii) Saintly acts.
These are sometimes hard to distinguish from heroic deeds. Both types of act usually
involve courage, but describing a deed as saintly rather than heroic often suggests that
we know and approve of the motive and intentions of the act as well as merely
approving of the outcome. I shall use the example of Gianna Beretta Molla, a newly
proclaimed saint of the Catholic Church. Gianna, a doctor, was due to give birth to
her fourth child when she found she had a tumour. Catholic teaching would have
permitted a hysterectomy and the consequent loss of the unborn child by appeal to the
doctrine of double effect, but Gianna chose more difficult surgery that endangered her
life but saved the life of her baby. She died a week after her healthy child was born. I
shall call the example Gianna's sacrifice.1:1




Whole lives rather than single acts are sometimes considered to be supererogatory.
They too may end in the sacrifice of the agent's life, although not necessarily. Here is
an example: Annalena Tonelli was murdered in October 2003 by a Somali gunman
after spending 30 years tending patients with tuberculosis and social rejects among the
nomadic Somalis. She worked alone and without formal support except for the
friendship of those she helped. Her life had frequently been in danger as some
traditionalists objected to her work for the stigmatised in society. Her death was
reported as a 'martyrdom' and I refer to this example as Annalena's Saintly Life.16
iv) Favours.
Less dramatic acts may also be supererogatory. My neighbour will be away from
home but is expecting a parcel. He asks me to take it in for him. It requires little effort
on my part, but we might still consider that I am not required to do it. That is why it is
a favour, not a duty. I shall refer to examples like these as small favours.
v) Acts ofmercy and forgiveness.
If we give up the right to punish someone who has wronged us, that is sometimes
seen as supererogatory. Here is an example of this type of act: Peter and Linda Biehl
were a white American couple living in South Africa. Their daughter Amy was a
passionate supporter of the anti-apartheid movement. She was shot dead by black
^ Reported in the "The Tablet" magazine, 11 October 2003 in an article 'For the love of Africa' p. 10
by Maggie Black.
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youths chanting 'One settler-one bullet'. Her parents attended the amnesty hearing of
the four young men who were serving sentences for her murder and they spoke in
favour of granting amnesty. In addition, they set up the Amy Biehl Foundation to try
to save as many black youths as they could from the violence of township ghetto life.
Their daughter's murderers now work for the foundation. I refer to this example as
the Biehl's forgiveness.17
This categorisation of supererogatory acts is roughly drawn from our intuitions. Some
theorists might want to restrict a separate classification of supererogatory acts to only
one or two of these categories, for example to only heroic and saintly acts. I shall be
arguing that it is not possible to restrict the category of supererogatory acts in this
way and that any account of supererogation must be able to deal with the variety of
supererogatory acts suggested by these intuitively-based categories. In my proposal in
the final chapter, I put forward a more formal categorisation of supererogatory acts,
but in the preliminary discussion I shall work with the intuitively-based categories.
The modern philosophical literature supports the idea that there is a wide variety of
supererogatory acts. For example, Urmson describes supererogatory acts as:
'
a range of actions which are ofmoral value and which an agent may feel called upon
to perform, but which cannot be demanded and whose omission cannot be called
wrong-doing.'18
Urmson concentrates on the supererogatory acts of the saints and heroes, not because
he believes them to be the only type of supererogatory act, but because he considers
'7 From a lecture given by Archbishop Desmond Tutu at King's College London as the third Lord
Longford Lecture and reprinted in The Tablet, 21 February 2004, pps.13/16.
18 Urmson (1958) p.67
12
them to be the most conspicuous examples of the type. He is careful to note that there
are other types of supererogatory act.19
Further support for the idea that supererogatory acts can vary in type and degree
comes from Roderick Chisholm:
'There are acts, sometimes called acts of "supererogation", which include, but are not
restricted to, the great deeds of saints and heroes, and which are such that we can say
of them: "You ought to perform them, but you don't have to." These include little acts
of kindness and small favour which, like the more magnificent deeds, go beyond the
call of duty. We might describe them as acts of "non-obligatory well-doing".'20
His very general description of supererogatory acts as 'non-obligatory well-doing'
serves to make the point that there is a category of acts which could contain a wide
variety of acts. Not just 'big' and 'small' acts such as my Joe, Gianna and small favours
examples, where big and small relate both to the outcome and the cost to the agent,
but also to acts of mercy and forgiveness, such as the Biehl's forgiveness, where the
amount ofmoral worth and cost to the agent take a different form.
The modern discussion also touches on the relationship of supererogatory acts to
dutiful acts. Strangely, it seems that we can perform a supererogatory act instead of
doing our duty.21 If 1 fail to keep my business appointment with you because I have
19 As an indication of the difficulties which arise in the discussion of supererogation, it is worth
considering this point. Why did Urmson consider the deeds of saints and heroes conspicuous
examples of supererogation? The answers may seem obvious, but they are instructive. Presumably, it
may be a matter of either the amount of good achieved or the amount of sacrifice on the part of the
agent or both. But are these restricted to supererogatory acts? Urmson specifically said that we also
use the terms 'saints' and 'heroes' of agents when they perform certain difficult duties. We may take
it, then, that the difficult duties can also be characterised in the same way, by either the amount of
good achieved or the sacrifice on the part of the agent or both. The only difference appears to be that
the supererogatory act is not required. The conclusion seems to be that the only conspicuous
characteristic of the supererogatory act as far as Urmson is concerned is that it is supererogatory!
20 Chisholm (1964) p. 152.
21 Kamm (1985) supports this view. Also Rawls (1971) p.299: 'We cannot say, for example, that
duties are lexically prior with respect to supererogatory actions, or to obligations.'
13
stopped to give blood at the site of an accident, then I am not morally in the wrong.
Indeed, I am likely to be praised despite failing to perform my duty. If it is true that
supererogatory acts can sometimes take precedence over duties, then it would seem
to be extremely important to understand more about the nature of such acts.
It is also widely accepted that supererogatory acts must also be in the right context
and have a certain motivational structure. Specifically, they must not be acts which
'right a wrong' on behalf of the agent. If I jump into a river to save the man I pushed
in only minutes before, it will not be deemed a supererogatory act, even if 1 save him
and lose my life in doing so. There are also degrees of this intuition; if I have
encouraged my young friends to embark on a risky canoeing adventure and then am
forced to save them, our intuitions waver about whether my act is supererogatory.
Some types of motive may also disqualify an otherwise supererogatory act. Urmson
suggests that any act which is motivated by 'natural affection' does not count as
supererogatory, so that a mother's sacrifice for her child does not come into this
category.
'Let us be clear that we are not now considering cases of natural affection, such as the
sacrifice made by a mother for her child; such cases may be said with some justice not
to fall under the concept ofmorality but to be admirable in some different way'.22
The example of Gianna who died for her unborn child stands out as an exception to
Urmson's stipulation on this point. (Of course, we may debate whether we consider
Gianna's act to be supererogatory. I deal with the more controversial aspects of this
saintly act later in the discussion).
Urmson (1958) p. 63. One wonders whether Urmson would have said the same for a father. See
my reference to Godwin's example, chapter 5, fn 13, for the outcry when a son's preference for his
father was disallowed as a respectable motive.
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Presumably, Urmson's famous example of a soldier throwing himself on a grenade to
save his comrades would not count as supererogatory, if the hero soldier and the
recruits he saved were 'best buddies'. Urmson's view seems to be part of the long held
tradition that moral acts may not stem from motives which are generated by emotions.
I see no reason why a theory of supererogation should have to hold a particular
position in the emotion/reason debate, but Urmson's stipulations on this point are
interesting. I suspect that what underlies Urmson's point is that if the act is motivated
by emotion then, it is suggested, this may have the effect of lessening the sacrifice to
the agent and so rendering the act not supererogatory. In other words, what underlies
this view is that cost to the agent is a necessary condition of supererogation. I shall be
discussing this important aspect of supererogatory acts in Chapter 4.
It may also be that there is a trade-off between the moral worth of the motive and the
amount of good that results from the act. IfUrmson's soldier had had fame and glory
for himself as his main motive for his act, perhaps also combined with the idea that he
might survive his feat, we do not think so well of him, but it is still hard to refuse the
label supererogatory given the outcome. But intuitively there is a cut-off point where
the motive is so evil that no outcome however good can render that agent's act
supererogatory.
According to our intuitions then, there are many different types of act which might be
considered supererogatory. Can we establish any characteristics in common?
I am going to propose that there are four key defining characteristics of the
supererogatory act. Firstly, I suggest that supererogatory acts are optional. In deontic
terms, they are permissible acts, but non-obligatory. Secondly, supererogatory acts
are better than a morally permissible alternative act available to the agent at the time.
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Thirdly, they are acts ofmoral worth. Finally, they are always rational, at least in the
sense ofbeing rationally acceptable.
I discuss each of these characteristics in turn.
1.5 The Optionality Characteristic
It is fundamental to the nature of a supererogatory act that the agent need not
perform the act. What is in debate is why this is so and to what degree this is so for
each act. Apart from my own proposal, discussed in Chapter 7, I shall be considering
three main arguments which might justify the supererogatory act as optional.
i) Cost to the agent
The first justificatory argument relates to the cost the agent pays in performing the
act. On one view, supererogatory acts may be acts that would be required but which
we are excused because of the high cost to us. So, for example, Rawls says:
'Supererogatory acts are not required, though normally they would be were it not for
the loss or risk involved for the agent himself...For while we have a natural duty to
bring about a great good, say, if we can do so relatively easily, we are released from
this duty when the cost to ourselves is considerable'.23
Intuitively this looks like an appealing way of explaining and justifying the optional
nature of a supererogatory act, but there are problems. Why do we not have to pay a
high cost in these cases, but are obliged to in some cases of duty? Urmson considered
that the terms 'saints' and 'heroes' also applied to those who were doing difficult
duties, so sometimes at least saints and heroes did not have the option to act as they
23 Rawls (1971) p. 100
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did. Also, suppose we consider acts supererogatory which either have little cost to the
agent from the onlooker's view or the agent himself does not believe that the act costs
him much. What has happened to the factor of cost here? Nonetheless, the idea that
cost takes away the pressure of requirement and makes the act optional is very
compelling in the case of certain supererogatory acts, such as my Joe, Gianna and
Annalena examples, where the lives of the agents were at risk.
In Urmson's example of a soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save the
lives of his companions, the intuition is that this type of act is undoubtedly a good act,
but not one which could have been required of the agent. It seems absurd that we
could have said to the agent before his great deed "You are morally required to give
up your life to save others". Why absurd? Because giving up one's life is not the
normal cost of performing a moral act - it is considerably beyond what we deem to be
part of acting morally.
I discuss the issue of cost in Chapter 4.
ii) Fairness
The second justificatory reason for the optional nature of supererogatory acts relates
to fairness. In his example, Urmson makes it clear that the soldier stands in no special
relationship to those whose lives he saves (except that they are his soldierly
companions); had the deed been demanded of him, he could reasonably have asked
"Why me, why not another in the group?" It might be suggested that we only have to
do our fair share morally; anything more is optional and supererogatory. There is an
obvious problem with this line ofjustification. If Joe has the opportunity to save two
children in the fire, but only saves one because he considers that that was his fair
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share, then it would be considered morally odd, to say the least. I discuss fairness in
Chapter 5.
iii) Latitude.
We might be able to justify the optional nature of supererogatory acts by establishing
some rules of latitude as to when we perform certain types of act. If we perform these
acts more often than others, we are deemed to be acting supererogatorily. Small acts
of kindness are often thought to be optional and not required. 'How kind of him' and
'He need not have bothered' are the typical response to actions of this kind. Here is an
explanation of the optional nature of supererogation which suggests that we need not
always seek to perform acts of moral worth; there is a limit to the sphere ofmorality.
If agents choose to extend that sphere by performing more moral acts, then they may
do so. We attribute them with specially good moral behaviour - we might even call
them saints if they are consistent and far-reaching enough in their performance of such
acts. There is something special about their character that enables them to reach a
level of moral performance beyond the average. There are problems with this
justification of the optionality of supererogation too.
We might expect that the optionality decreases as the cost to the agent decreases. In
other words, these smaller supererogatory acts should have more of the flavour of the
required act about them - they are in some way less supererogatory. Joe may be a
hero and rush into a burning building to save lives, but I do not consider that I am
under any obligation to do so. I do not even have to go so far as to formulate an
excuse as to why I did not act in the same way as Joe - no-one would expect me to
effect such a dangerous rescue. On the other hand, ifmy neighbour asks me to take in
parcels for him, there is a sense in which I cannot refuse to do this without some good
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excuse. If I just refused because I didn't want the bother, I could be open to moral
criticism.
And yet I might also consider taking in the parcels to be supererogatory. After all, I
have no duty to do this. It is purely a favour which may be done or not. However, we
rarely look at these smaller acts of supererogation independently of an agent's track
record. Perhaps my neighbour is the sort of person who is always doing favours for
others. I regard him as a moral examplar, certainly, but I do not feel obliged to do all
the small good deeds that he does. So it is not necessarily the case that the smaller the
cost to the agent, the more we feel obliged to perform the act. Rather, the latitude
may work across a number of such acts. Small supererogatory acts may be optional
because we do not have to do acts of moral worth at every opportunity. I discuss this
view in Chapter 6.
Here are three key lines of justification for the optional nature of supererogation.
Firstly, there is the suggestion that cost incurred by the agent may make an action
optional. Ifwe suffer that cost, then our act is supererogatory. Secondly, we may not
be required to do more than our fair share. If we do more than our fair share, then
that is supererogatory, but it is not required. Thirdly, we may not have to perform a
certain type of act on every occasion that it presents itself. If we do so, we have acted
supererogatorily.
Urmson does hint at three other justificatory lines we could take in respect of the
optional nature of supererogatory acts:
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iv) The motivational structure of the ordinary agent.
The first concerns the idea that duties must be within the capacity of the 'ordinary
man'. Ifwe demand too much from others by way of duty, then all of morality might
be in danger. Urmson says:
'The basic moral code must not be in part too far beyond the capacity of the ordinary
man on ordinary occasions, or a general breakdown of compliance with the moral
code would be an inevitable consequence; duty would be seem to be something high
and unattainable, and not for "the likes of us'".24
This is a common form of justification for the optional nature of supererogatory acts
and many discussions of supererogation finally come down to this point: namely, that
morality does and should reflect human nature, and part of that is respecting the
normal limits of human motivation. According to this line of justification,
supererogatory action is a good way of recognising that sometimes we go beyond the
normal limits of human motivation. Nagel's account of supererogation is along these
lines. He says:
'When we regard people objectively and think about how they should live, their
motivational complexity is a consideration...We can take conflict between subjective
and objective standpoint back to the objective standpoint on appeal. The result is
likely to be that at some threshold, hard to define, we will conclude that it is
unreasonable to expect people in general to sacrifice themselves and those to whom
they have close personal ties to the general good'25
Whether one plumps for this line ofjustification or a variant of it will depend partly on
whether one is a descriptive or prescriptive moralist. This division mirrors the
difference between giving an explanation of the optional nature of supererogatory
24 Urmson (1958) p.70
25 Nagel (1986) p.202
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acts and a justification. Human motivational capabilities may offer an explanation of
why there can be good acts which we cannot demand of each other, but provided
there are those who are prepared to suggest that our motivational capabilities can be
improved so as to make these acts required, not optional, then we must look for a
justification that goes beyond the story of human motivation. I shall be noting if
particular accounts of supererogation collapse into this view, but I will not be relying
on it for my proposal.
v) Moral autonomy
Urmson's second idea suggests that there is a specific value in the fact that one has
free choice with regard to certain moral acts. He says:
'Free choice of the better course of action is always preferable to action under
pressure, even when the pressure is but moral. When possible, therefore, it is better
that pressure should not be applied and that there should be encouragement and
commendation for performance rather than outright demands and censure in the event
of non-performance'.26
In recent literature, this idea has been echoed when it has been suggested that it is
important to recognise moral autonomy.27 One way of establishing that we have
moral autonomy is to have a separate classification of acts which we may do if we
choose and which may not be demanded of us. Supererogatory acts are one such type
of act. So are acts of moral indifference, which Urmson allows for elsewhere in his
discussion. It might have been suggested to Urmson that the optionality of morally
indifferent acts might be sufficient to allow his concern for free choice to be satisfied.
I do not pursue the argument concerning autonomy further.
26 Urmson (1958) p. 71
27 See Slote (1985) pp.23-34 as referenced by Kagan (1988) p.236 n.3.
21
vi) Public and private moralities.
My proposal of an account of supererogation which deals with the two problems
stated above is partly related to a third suggestion that Urmson alludes to at the end
of his paper. He suggests that there is a difference between what may be publicly
demanded of an agent and what an agent may demand of himself. I shall be
developing this idea of two aspects of morality in my solution to the two problems of
supererogation which I discuss in detail in Chapter 7.
1.6 The Betterness Characteristic
My second key characteristic of a supererogatory act concerns the relationship
between the supererogatory act and other morally permissible acts. For an act to
count as supererogatory, we take it that there is at least one alternative act which
could have been performed by the agent and which would have been morally
permissible. That act may or may not have been a duty. The supererogatory act is
deemed to be 'better' than that act.
1 have not gone so far as to suggest that the supererogatory act is the best that the
agent could perform. The Betterness characteristic has important consequences for
theories such as maximising consequentalism, where the obligatory act coincides with
the best that agent can do, thus apparently leaving no room for the supererogatory. I
discuss a form ofmaximising consequentalism which looks as though it may account
for supererogation in Chapter 3 .
The supererogatory act might be better than the permissible alternative in five
different ways:
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i) An extension of duty.
Firstly, it might represent quantitively more of the same sort of good that was the
minimum required by the agent. The supererogatory act is an extension of a duty.
If an agent undertakes her duty and then continues with the same action or type of
action that was necessary to fulfil her duty, then we think of this continued action as
supererogatory. It was 'beyond duty', although of a similar nature to the duty. The act
need be nothing dramatic. Perhaps I volunteer to help out at the church sale. I have
the book stall to take care of. I do that and I help put everything away at the end.
The difficulty here is twofold; firstly, there is the problem of justifying within the
moral theory why a duty should stop at a certain point and beyond that point should
be considered supererogatory; secondly, there is the problem about the definition of
duty. Can we conceptually distinguish between that which fulfils our duty and that
which is supererogatory without making some reference to another factor such as
'cost to the agent'? I deal with this problem in Chapter 7.
ii) Strict superiority of one type ofgood.
Secondly, the supererogatory act might be better than the alternative because it
promotes a type of good which the theory recognises as always of higher value than
that promoted by the alternative act. Many examples of supererogatory acts involve
the promotion of an impartial good, where the agent may have permissibly pursued an
act which was of a partial nature. Annalena could have stayed at home and pursued
her career as a lawyer and teacher. Instead she sought to help strangers in a difficult
and dangerous part of the world. On this view, promoting the impartial good is
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always better than promoting a partial good, even though the latter is permissible. I
consider this view further in Chapter 5.
iii) Better outcome on a single act basis.
Thirdly, the supererogatory act might be better than the morally permissible
alternative because of the outcome of the act. This is not quite the same as the second
point, where a distinction is made according to the type of good that is promoted.
Here what counts is how goods, in the shape of the outcome of the act are given a
precedence on that particular occasion. If I cook Christmas lunch for the homeless
rather than my family, then normal rules of precedence say that such an act produces a
better outcome, although cooking lunch for my family is perfectly permissible. This
view of the Betterness characteristic relies heavily on the interpretation of the single
act. I consider it further in Chapter 6.
iv) Better than a moral holiday.
Fourthly, the morally permissible alternative act to a supererogatory act might be a
morally indifferent act with no moral worth at all. Choosing to perform a moral act on
the occasion when one could have permissibly done nothing moral at all might be
deemed supererogatory. This relies on the idea that there is moral free space, or the
possibility of a moral 'holiday', something that will have to be justified for these types
of supererogatory act to be so classified.
v) Supererogatory acts embody a special type of good, not found in other types of
morally good acts.
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Finally, we might consider that the moral worth involved in the supererogatory act is
quite different from, and better than that found in the performance of duties in virtue
of it being promoted voluntarily. The very fact of its being supererogatory makes it
better than the morally permissible alternative. This view if often held by those who
consider that actions performed out of duty or obligation are fundamentally different
in nature from those which are performed out of love or friendship. For example,
McGoldrick holds to the view that there is something important about the purely
voluntary nature of supererogatory acts. She claims that heroes and saints are often
acting out of love and benevolence and are in a sense 'giving a gift' of love. She
suggests that a morality where the supererogatory is obligatory would be
impoverished:
'..it is undeniably true that some such acts are the product of nothing more than
foolhardiness in the case of the heroic, and a perverted sense of servility in the case of
the saintly. But some, and these are the cases which elicit our admiration and praise,
are inspired by something more like unselfish love and benevolence. Acting out of
love and unselfishness is itself a virtue; and there is more virtue in doing what is not
required of us than there is doing what is really more than our duty'.28
Problems with this type of view are familiar. Is the moral worth different simply
because bringing it about demands a particularly high sacrifice from the agent9
(McGoldrick does indeed think that supererogatory acts are distinguished by the high
level of sacrifice required by the agent). Or is it a type of moral worth that never
forms part of a required act? I think that this view relies heavily on the idea that cost
or sacrifice is an important part of the supererogatory act and whilst I pursue this
point, I do not consider further the idea that the mere voluntariness of the
supererogatory act is the key determinant of its superior moral worth.
28 McGoldrick (1984) p.528
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I discuss how a supererogatory act might be considered to be better than an
alternative permissible act in my proposal in Chapter 7.
1.7 The Moral Worth Characteristic
In all cases of supererogation we consider that the good that results from a
supererogatory act must have some specific moral value. Precisely what counts as a
moral value is of course up to the theorist to determine. The most commonly used
examples suggest that the moral value of supererogatory acts is related to the well
being of others; the heroic examples relate to saving people's lives; the smaller acts
relate to doing good for others. If the good that results from an otherwise
supererogatory act has a value which is considered to fall outside the sphere of
ordinary morality, such as personal accomplishment as its end or natural affection as
its motive, it disqualifies it from being supererogatory. What is in contention is what
counts as a moral value, but what does not appear to be contentious is that a
supererogatory act is a moral one.
Paradigm supererogatory acts in the modern philosophical literature involve doing
good for others, because beneficence is an important value in our modern culture. In
earlier times, a life of abstinence or some manifestation of self-abnegation was often
taken to be a sign of saintliness or great moral worth. Many of the early saints were
considered saintly precisely because of their extraordinary manifestations of
self-mortification. For example, the desert ascetics such as St. Antony suffered hunger
and exposure to wild beasts for long periods of time. So in these cases,
supererogation did not depend on the promotion of other-regarding values over and
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above self-interested values.29 I shall be suggesting that an account of supererogation
must take account of a variety of moral values and not just beneficence.
1.8 The Rationality Characteristic.
I suggest that supererogatory acts are usually rational, at least in the sense of being
rationally acceptable. Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that they are less rational
than other moral acts. Here I make use of Nagel's distinction between the rationally
required and the rationally acceptable. A rationally required act has sufficiently strong
reasons in favour of it to make it so, but a rationally acceptable act has enough
reasons both for and against it so that although the act is not rationally required, it
would be not be irrational to perform it either. It is what Nagel terms rational in a
weak sense; that is, rationally acceptable. "'0
This distinction between the rationally required and the rationally acceptable is
important for my proposed solutions to the two problems of supererogation and I
shall return to it in Chapter 7.
1.9 My definition of a supererogatory act
I propose to work with a definition of supererogation which incorporates all four key
characteristics. A supererogatory act is one which is:
29 Unless we want to interpret all such cases as manifesting love of God above ourselves.
30 Nagel (1986) p.200
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(i) permissible
(ii) of positive moral worth and better than an alternative permissible act
(iii) optional, where optional means both that:
there is at least one other morally permissible act open to the agent
and that:
the supererogatory act is not part of a fulfilment of a duty
(iv) a rationally acceptable act
My definition tells us a more than a basic definition of the supererogatory act such as
one which states that it is act which is beyond the call of duty. In proposing it, I am
aiming to provide a definition which fits all varieties of supererogatory acts from the
saintly and heroic to small favours and acts ofmercy and forgiveness. So it should be
able to be applied to Joe's Rescue as well as to the Biehl's forgiveness. It is quite
distinct from many modern definitions in the literature in three main respects.
Firstly, it does not refer to the sacrifice or cost incurred by the agent in performing the
act. I specifically reject the suggestion that cost is a justification for the optional
nature of supererogatory acts and discuss it fully in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, this is a
popular feature of many definitions as we saw earlier in Rawls' definition. Further,
here is Nagel on supererogation:
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'Supererogatory virtue is shown by exceptional sacrifice for the benefit of others.
Such acts are praiseworthy and are not regarded as irrational, but they are not thought
to be either morally or rationally required'.31
On these cost-based definitions, volunteering to take my neighbour's parcels in for
him scarcely seems supererogatory. It might be mildly inconvenient at most for me,
but it certainly does not involve a significant amount of risk taking or sacrifice on my
part. Of course, these definitions do sit well with our understanding of examples such
as Joe's Rescue or Gianna's Sacrifice.32 But what about Annalena? There was every
indication in a review of her life that she enjoyed the way of life she had chosen. We,
the onlookers, might consider it to be a sacrifice to depart from the comforts of the
developed world for Somalia, but she may have thought it no sacrifice at all.
Secondly, my definition does not refer to praise and blame. I consider that
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are not specific to supererogatory acts. The
performance of duties can also be praiseworthy. Nonetheless, they figure frequently in
definitions, often as a substitute for moral worth. For example, Gregory Mellema has
the following definition:
'The concept of supererogation is standardly defined as follows. An act is
supererogatory if and only if (1) the performance of the act fulfils no moral duty or
obligation, (2) the performance of the act is, nevertheless, morally praiseworthy, and
(3) the omission of the act is not morally blameworthy'.33
'Praiseworthy' and 'blameworthy' in this definition are being used for different
purposes. To say that failure to perform a supererogatory act is not blameworthy is to
distinguish it from a duty, because it is blameworthy to fail to perform a duty.
31 ibid. p. 203
At least as far as a sketched outline of the examples goes. It is always possible to develop even
these examples so that the degree of sacrifice for the agent is minimal.
33 Mellema G. (1991) p.91
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However, it is also not blameworthy to fail to perform a forbidden act and morally
indifferent ones too. In calling the performance of the act 'praiseworthy', Mellema
seems to take it as given that every act of moral worth will merit moral praise. Could
there be some supererogatory acts which did not merit moral praise? Although this
goes against the intuitions, imagine that Joe is a self-seeking publicist who gets a thrill
from seeing his name in the newspapers. His intention is to save the children in the
fire, but his motivation is to be a local hero. If we knew that, would it disqualify his
act from the category of the supererogatory? Opinions will differ, but I would at least
like to leave open the possibility that some supererogatory acts are not necessarily
praiseworthy and so I shall avoid these terms in my definition.
Thirdly, my definition does not specify the nature of the moral worth that is involved
in a supererogatory act, whereas Nagel, for example, seems to limit it to acts of
altruism. So does David Heyd, who incorporates the following condition into his
definition:
'An act is supererogatory if and only if...it is done voluntarily for the sake of someone
else's good, and is thus meritorious'.34
My examples could all be interpreted as acts of altruism. Perhaps acts of forgiveness
and mercy are the best candidates for supererogatory acts which are not altruistic,
although my example of the Biehls does in fact show that their particular act of
forgiveness manifested itself in acts of altruism towards the individuals and the part of
society responsible for their daughter's murder.
However, consider another possible example of a supererogatory act, one that is
perhaps not very intuitive. If developing one's talents is a duty, then developing one's
34 Heyd (1989) p. 117
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talent to a greater degree than normal might be considered supererogatory. Take the
example of Evelyn Glennie, the Scottish percussionist. She has been profoundly deaf
since childhood, yet with a great musical gift, which she has now developed to the
extent of being a musician with worldwide recognition. Given her difficulties, she
need not have worked as hard as she has done in the furtherance of her talents and we
might consider her efforts in this regard as supererogatory. Yet they are not altruistic.
Thus, I am unwilling to narrow my definition of supererogation to altruistic acts.
My definition does however embody all four key characteristics. The Optionality
characteristic is expressed by stating that a supererogatory act must be permissible
and not forbidden (Condition i) and that such an act it is not a duty and that there is a
permissible alternative (Condition iii). The Betterness characteristic is expressed by
Condition ii). Conditions ii) and iv) are simple statements of the Moral Worth and
Rationality characteristics respectively.
In the following chapters, I shall see whether the four characteristics can be
sustained, bearing in mind both that I want to hold on to the key characteristics
thrown up by our intuitions, and that I want the definition to be applicable across the
range of supererogatory acts. In addition, I must be able to offer a justification as to
how acts so defined can form a separate class within moral theory. In attempting to
provide a justificatory account of supererogation, I expose the considerable tensions
which exist between the different characteristics; tensions which are encapsulated in
the two problems which I raised at the beginning of this chapter.
Firstly, there is the problem of requirement. If supererogatory acts are so good why
are they not required? What justification can be given for supererogatory acts to be
optional rather than required? The first problem emphasises the tension that exists
between the Betterness and Optionality characteristics. Secondly, there is the problem
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of rationality. What kind ofmoral reasoning process could there be that allows an act
which is better than another to be optional without either the supererogatory act itself
or its omission being irrational? The second problem focuses on the tension that exists
between the characteristics of Rationality and Optionality. In the next chapter, I
consider a forceful objection to supererogation which stresses the difficulties of the
two problems.
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Chapter 2 A Major Objection to Supererogation
2.1 Rejecting the Optionality and Rationality Characteristics
Supererogatory acts are especially good. We might expect them to be given pride of
place in a moral theory. Not everyone welcomes the idea of supererogation, however.
Some theorists find the idea of the moral saint damaging to the institution of morality
as a whole, or even plain repellent.1 Others think that supererogatory acts are really
required acts and they are only optional because most of us are weak-willed and
prone to lose the motivation to do the right thing when the going gets hard.
Shelly Kagan has mounted a comprehensive attack on all optional acts in morality
which addresses this last point.2 Supererogatory acts are an important class of
optional acts, although Kagan never once uses the term 'supererogation' in the work I
consider here. I am going to use his account as the 'model' consequentalist attack on
supererogation and I shall discuss it in detail in this chapter. Where Kagan uses the
term 'options', I shall normally refer to supererogatory acts.
Kagan directly addresses the two problems of supererogation that I have raised in the
previous chapter. The first problem concerned the pressure of requirement brought
about by very good acts. It embodies the tension that exists between the Optionality
and Betterness characteristics of the supererogatory act. If an act is very good, or
even merely better than an alternative permissible act, then it is puzzling that the act is
optional and not required. If an agent treats such an act as optional, he has to justify
why he does not perform it. Such is the pressure of requirement brought about by acts
which are better than other permissible acts. Kagan is a maximising consequentalist
and so his claim is that if an act is very good to the extent of being the best that we
1 See especially Wolf (1982) and Baron (1987). I refer to Wolfs views briefly in Chapter 3 and
Baron's in Chapter 6.
2 Most notably in Kagan (1989), which is the work I draw on for this chapter.
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can do, then we are required to perform it. It is not optional. If an act is not the best
that we can do, then it is forbidden. He argues that any attempt to justify why agents
might treat such acts as optional are doomed to failure.
The second problem I raised concerned the rationality of supererogatory acts and the
process ofmoral reasoning surrounding them. The problem can be stated like this: if
there are good reasons to perform act A, rather than act B, then it is rational that an
agent perform act A and irrational that he perform B. Optional acts such as
supererogatory acts appear to have a structure such that there are good reasons to
perform act A and good reasons to perform act B. Yet in the case of supererogation,
we assume that one act, say act A, is better than act B, according to the Betterness
characteristic. This would seem to generate morally decisive reasons in favour of
performing act A. How then, can it be rational to perform act B? There is tension
between the Optionality and Rationality characteristics. Kagan's claim is that no
reasoning structure can be found which supports optional acts such as supererogatory
acts. If one act is better than another, which appears to be true in the case of
supererogation, then Kagan states that this will provide a morally decisive reason to
perform it. In my terminology, he is claiming that no form of reasoning structure can
be found to support an act which has both the Betterness and Optionality
characteristics.
In this chapter, I discuss Kagan's argument against supererogation in detail. I first
outline the argument, then examine critically the key steps in it. In further chapters, I
shall refer back to Kagan's argument and consider its success in relation to other
accounts of supererogation.
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2.2 Kagan's argument against options in morality
Kagan's argument proceeds by attacking ordinary morality. He claims that it is
inconsistent because the followers of such a morality believe both that they always
have a reason to promote the overall good and that they have moral options. They are
therefore exposed to the two problems stated above and Kagan's claim is that there is
no way for ordinary moralists to resolve these problems. These problems must be
resolved, however, if we are to give an account of supererogation. Kagan's project is
to expose the inconsistency in ordinary morality and thus show that the more
demanding morality of a rigorous consequentalist is the most plausible position to
hold. The dramatis personae in his account are the moderate, the extremist and the
minimalist and they are distinguished as follows:
The moderate is an upholder of ordinary morality and he defends the idea of
supererogatory acts in morality; that is, he believes that supererogatory acts can be
deontically distinguished from other types of act, so that they merit separate
classification. The moderate occupies a position between the minimalist who thinks
there are few if any required acts, and the extremist, who thinks moral acts are either
required or forbidden. The extremist's morality may turn out to be very demanding
compared with that of the moderate or minimalist, but Kagan thinks this is the only
defensible moral position.
In common with the extremist, but unlike the minimalist, the moderate always has a
pro tanto reason to maximise the overall good. A pro tcinto reason is one which has
weight, according to Kagan, but 'nonetheless may be outweighed by other
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considerations'.-' Without this reason, the moderate would not be able to explain how
many of the obligatory acts in ordinary morality come to be required. This is because
ordinary morality frequently demands that we act in such a way that we promote the
overall good.
There are four key steps in Kagan's argument against the moderate's position. Firstly,
we are required to maximise the overall good, which is an impartial good. Secondly,
everyone always has a pro tanto reason to maximise the overall good. To allow for
the possibility of supererogatory acts, the moderate needs some countervailing
considerations to balance against this pro tanto reason. Next, Kagan suggests that
these countervailing considerations are inevitably linked to what he calls an 'appeal to
cost'. The appeal to cost means that a moral agent can consider an act optional that
would otherwise be required because it demands too much of him. Kagan argues that
appealing to cost is the only explanation that the moderate can give for sometimes
viewing the demands of the pro tanto reason as optional. Finally, Kagan claims that in
order to support this appeal to cost, the moderate must establish that there is a set of
moral goods which is separate from the goods which make up the overall good. The
overall good is impartial and the goods which make up the overall good are objective
in that sense. The goods which the moderate needs to establish to tell his justificatory
story of overdemanding cost are therefore subjective, according to Kagan. These
subjective goods will produce agent-relative reasons4 which will compete with the pro
tanto reason which stems from the objective overall good. These two types of reason
will then generate options in ordinary morality.
-■>
J Kagan (1989) p. 17. Kagan is careful both to distinguish the pro tanto reason from the prima facie
reason and also to claim that in his use of the latter term W.D. Ross was actually mistaken. Ross, too,
should have referred to pro tanto duties, according to Kagan.
4 I discuss agent-relative reasons below at 2.8.
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To summarise, Kagan claims that appealing to cost, interpreted as the loss of certain
subjective goods, is the only argument available to the moderate if he wants to justify
supererogatory acts. It fails, he argues, because the moderate cannot show why the
sort of goods he classifies as subjective are not encompassed by the overall good.
Further, says Kagan, even if the moderate could adequately demonstrate this, it would
not in itself be enough to generate options. The moderate would have to explain how
the existence of agent-relative reasons, which are reasons which stem from these
subjective goods, would not generate requirements, rather than optional acts such as
supererogatory acts. This is because Kagan does not think that the moderate can
come up with a form ofmoral reasoning that will offer an option.
I disagree with Kagan on two counts. Firstly, I claim that the moderate does not have
to appeal to cost to justify the optionality of supererogatory acts. Indeed, I shall argue
in Chapter 4 that an appeal to cost fails to provide adequate justification for the
optional nature of supererogatory acts.5 Secondly, following from this first point, the
moderate does not need to demonstrate the existence of subjective goods which are
separate from the goods represented in the overall good.
My proposal for the solution to the two problems of pressure of requirement and
moral reasoning is in two parts. Firstly, it relies not on an appeal to cost to facilitate
the optionality of supererogation but on the existence of indeterminate rankings in our
moral reasoning process. Secondly, I suggest that in some cases of supererogation
there is a dual aspect in operation, whereby the agent sees his act as required but the
onlooker sees it as optional. In this second part of the proposal, I am appealing to a
distinction between a subjective and objective view ofmorality in the sense that there
5 In arguing that the appeal to cost does not justify the optionalify of supererogatory acts. I find
myself in agreement with Kagan, but my reasons for saying that the appeal to cost fails are
completely different from his. as I make clear in Chapter 4.
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is a difference between how the agent and the onlooker judge the act deontically.
However, I shall argue that this is not the same subjective/objective distinction that
Kagan argues against when discussing the composition of the overall good.
Kagan's argument against supererogation therefore relies on four separate points.
Firstly, there is the claim that maximisation of the overall good is a determinant of
moral requirement. This bears directly on the first problem I have noted, that of the
pressure of requirement. Unless some way can be found to limit the maximising
requirement, we must always do our best and there will be no room for
supererogation. Secondly, and in relation to limiting requirement, Kagan suggests that
the only argument that can be run to limit the requirement of maximisation is based on
an appeal to cost. Thirdly, for the moderate to make an appeal to cost, he needs to
establish certain goods which stand outside the overall good and which will generate
subjective or agent-relative reasons. These subjective reasons will be weighed against
the objective reasons which are generated from the impartial overall good. Fourthly,
there seems to be no way in which even these two types of distinct reason can be
structured so as to generate an option, rather than a requirement. This relates directly
to my second problem of rationality.
With regard to maximisation, both Kagan's moderate and 1 are arguing in favour of a
plausible justification of the Optionality characteristic, so it might seem that we cannot
be maximisers if we also want to sustain the Betterness characteristic. If it is always
required that we do the best act that we can, and that failure to do so is forbidden,
then there appears to be no place for optional moral acts. In other words, if
maximising the overall good determines which acts are morally required, then no
maximising consequentalist could offer an accommodating account of supererogatory
acts. Kagan is clear about this. His opening claim is that 'morality requires that you
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perform.... that act which can reasonably be expected to lead to the best consequences
overall'.0 I shall call it his maximising principle.
It is perfectly legitimate, of course, to disagree with this claim as the sole claim in
morality and add other claims depending on the view ofmorality that one might hold.
This might be a morality which requires attainment of personal moral perfection
through doing one's duty, perhaps constructed along Kantian lines. Or we might be
required to lead the best life we possibly can, where morality is construed as a
composite of living well and doing right. Kagan suggests however, that if we agree
with his maximising principle in any shape or form and with whatever modification,
then we will have to accept some uncomfortable adjustments to our view of morality.
I concede that the moderate sometimes accepts the maximising principle and uses the
pro tanto reason as a decisive reason in moral reasoning, although 1 shall be offering a
different interpretation of it. That concession is all that Kagan needs to progress with
his argument.
Kagan then interprets his maximising principle to give the extremist's position in
morality. According to the extremist, there is no end to what we may be called on to
sacrifice in the name of morality in order that we contribute to the overall good. We
can see from this interpretation of the extremist position that there will be no logical
space for supererogation in this theory. There will be no room for the Betterness
characteristic, as the agent must always do his best. Acts considered supererogatory
by ordinary morality may well be required acts7. This leads to some uncomfortable
examples - just what the extremist wants! Gianna Molla gave up her life to save the
6 Kagan(1989) p. 1
7 Some may even be forbidden, if they fail to maximise and are simply better than an alterntative
that is permissible in morality, but not the best. Or they may maximise a type of good that does not
comply with the nature of the good in Kagan's theory.
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life of her unborn child, when she might have saved her own life. On Kagan's view, if
it will contribute to the overall good that Gianna should give up her life to save the
life of her unborn child, then she must do so. If she had not done this, then she would
have fallen short of moral demands. In doing so, she was no saint, as the Catholic
Church decreed, but instead she was merely acting in compliance with moral
demands. The maximising principle might seem to be enough in itself to render
supererogation an impossibility in a theory. However, an attempt has been made to
show that maximising consequentalism can accommodate supererogation. I discuss
this and other aspects ofmaximisation which bear on supererogation in Chapter 3.
In this chapter, I shall discuss Kagan's arguments in respect of the remaining three
points. Firstly, I address the appeal to cost. I then consider the nature of the overall
good. Finally, I discuss Kagan's view of the reasoning process.
2.3 How does the moderate's 'appeal to cost' work?
Kagan does not think that appealing to cost to the agent can justify the existence of
supererogatory acts. I agree that cost cannot justify the optional nature of
supererogatory acts. This is an unusual position to take for someone who supports the
separate classification of supererogatory acts as ultimately many definitions of
supererogation rely on cost as an explanation and justification for why the act is not
required. For example, in Chapter 1, 1 referred to the definitions of supererogatory
acts given by Nagel and Rawls, both of whom suggested that supererogatory acts
would be required were it not for the extreme cost incurred by the agent in
performing them. I give my reasons for rejecting cost as a justification in Chapter 4.
My reasons for rejecting the appeal to cost are quite different from Kagan's, however.
Here I outline Kagan's arguments for rejecting the appeal.
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Kagan thinks that an appeal to cost is at the bottom of every attempt to justify
supererogatory acts in the moderate's morality. He demonstrates that other arguments
to support options ultimately collapse into an appeal to cost.8 According to Kagan,
the moderate appeals to the cost of performing what would otherwise be a required
act and so he makes it optional. 'Cost' means that if the agent performed that act he
would suffer the loss of some kind of value or good. This would be a subjective good
- subjective in the sense that it falls outside the overall good. The moderate
acknowledges that we fail to do acts which would otherwise be required because they
are too demanding. They are demanding precisely because they force him to give up
some kind of good.
Kagan is right to suggest that the appeal to cost is a very plausible story. However,
his argument depends on its being the only argument that the moderate can run. Here
is an example he gives to demonstrate that:
'For at some point the moderate is going to have to fend off the minimalist's claim that
agents are never required to promote the good-even when it takes no sacrifice to do
so. The moderate may not believe that I am required to devote myself to famine relief;
but he does believe that 1 am required to save the drowning child. Thus he must point
to some relevant difference which allows options to be grounded in the former case
but not the latter. And it is difficult to see how anything other than the difference in
cost to the agent could be plausibly suggested.' 9
The moderate's position is that if he can effect the rescue of the drowning child easily
he is required to do it. Saving lives is a good thing and we ought to do it if we can.
We can save plenty of lives by devoting ourselves to famine relief, but this is not quite
so easy. I have to commit myself to a particular way of life, give up my creature
comforts, my career ambitions and other goods which I may value. So the moderate
In particular. Kagan considers and rejects the possibility that the existence of rights could allow for
options. Kagan (1989) pp.219-230.
9 Kagan (1989) p. 3 84
41
says that this set of acts, whilst desirable, is not required, because it would involve the
loss of too many and too much of these subjective goods. In other words, it is
optional because it costs too much. I agree with Kagan that this sort of example lends
credibility to the appeal to cost, but 1 disagree that it conclusively demonstrates that
there is no other story the moderate can tell about why such acts might be optional.10
I discuss this further in Chapter 4.
What counts as cost? Kagan gives a comprehensive picture ofwhat constitutes costs,
saying that 'money, time, effort and life itself can be consumed in the course of my
reacting in an optimal manner'.11
I suggest that the moderate might want to be more careful in distinguishing between
these types of cost. He might claim that it is a very different matter to be asked to
give your life in pursuit of the greater good, rather than some, or perhaps even a great
deal, of your money. Kagan will not allow that type of distinction, regarding all
sacrifice as a matter of degree, although it is perhaps telling that he does not explicitly
discuss cases where an agent would be required to give his life or his body parts in the
pursuit of the general good. Instead his examples focus on the financial or 'comfort'
aspect of cost. It would have been good to see Kagan attempt to make his argument
work if he discussed cases where agents had to give up their lives or the lives of their
children in pursuit of the overall good.12
My arguments in favour of supererogation are not designed to show that every example of a
supererogatory act in ordinary morality can be justified as such. Some may well turn out to be
reuqired. There arc particular difficulties justifying the optional nature of acts which aid strangers. I
discuss these in Chapter 5. However, my arguments are based on the claim that moral theory should
be able to support a wide variety of supererogatory acts.
11 Kagan (1989) p.232
'2 Peter Unger (1996) does attempt this.
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In these extreme cases where the sacrifice of the agent's life is at stake, some
utilitarians have recourse to the argument of disutility, where it is argued that
requiring agents to give up their lives or body parts can never be justified because it
would undermine the institution of morality to such a degree that the promotion of
greater good would be under threat. Utilitarians of a stronger stomach might be
tempted by the adoption of certain metaethical propositions about the nature of
persons, so that they would argue we should be more willing than we are to
contemplate the sacrifice of our life in the pursuit of the greater good.11 Nonetheless,
we should mark the fact that Kagan does not make much of the distinction between
the cost of giving one's life and the cost of giving up a substantial part of one's wealth.
Even if this is a distinction worth preserving, it still leaves a considerable job to do in
explaining what the justification is for types of supererogatory act which do not
require such a sacrifice. It is true, after all, as Kagan claims, that cost in one form or
other is the most common source of justification used by ordinary morality for all
types of supererogatory acts, not just the saintly and heroic kind .
Having established that it is the agent's interests which are at stake in the appeal to
cost, Kagan then raises the question as to whether interests should incorporate only
the agent's self-interest or be broadened to include his other interests (which might
include the welfare of others, as he correctly notes). This seems right. Joe might not
only refuse to go into the burning building because he is concerned about the loss of
his own life and limb, but he might also consider the effect that losing his life or
suffering serious injury would have on his family. So the interests that make up the
appeal to cost are very wide.
1 ^
For example. Derek Parfrt suggests that his particular conception of personal identity makes it
easier for him to understand how much he must do for others. See Parfit (1984) p. 281
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Kagan shows next that not only must the appeal to cost be wide in that it covers all
kinds of interest, it must also extend to very low levels of cost such that it becomes
implausible. This is where the appeal to cost becomes a problem. Using my examples,
Joe could appeal to the significant cost of life and limb if he declines to go into the
burning building to effect a rescue. However, I could also plausibly appeal to the cost
of missing my lecture if I refuse to take in my neighbour's parcels whilst he is away,
even ifmissing the lecture does not significantly affect my career or lower my quality
of life. The cost here appears to be quite insignificant, yet enough for the moderate to
use it as an excuse not to perform a good act.
What happens when there is no discernible loss of a good to which the moderate can
appeal? Some moderates allow acts to be optional, just because the moderate wants
to do nothing in particular instead. If I feel like lazing around the house instead of
doing some work for charity then, Kagan suggests, many moderates think that
acceptable. Kagan claims that the moderate has to dig deep in the barrel of
justification and come up with a story about infringement of moral autonomy to
preserve this type of option. He says:
'...moral autonomy is simply a matter of whether a given reaction is permitted or
forbidden. But this means that talk of moral autonomy cannot explain or justify
options: such talk is simply an alternative way of referring to the exact same facts that
we are already referring to when we speak of the existence of options in the first
place.'14
I agree with him that the appeal to autonomy is unsatisfactory. Kagan is right to signal
that the moderate's appeal to cost is in trouble where the level of cost has dropped to
be so small that it is apparently insignificant. In his rejection of an appeal to moral
autonomy, he appears to not to allow the moderate the possibility of time off from
14 Kagan (1989) p.237
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morality - a moral holiday. But his position here is not clear and, since moral holidays
allow an opportunity for supererogation, I discuss the point in more detail.
2.4 Is Kagan's moderate allowed a moral holiday?
Supererogation can occur in the context where the agent has to choose between acts
of contrasting moral value. If he chooses the act with greater moral value, the act has
the Betterness characteristic and he has acted supererogatorily. Secondly, it can occur
in the case where he can choose between performing an act of moral worth and
performing an act with no moral worth at all. If he chooses the act of moral worth,
then the act still has the Betterness characteristic, because it has greater moral value
than the non-moral alternative act, which has none.
There are two aspects to the appeal to cost, then. The first takes place entirely within
morality, where the options are between two acts each of which has some moral
value. The second type of appeal to cost recognises that there is a limit to morality
and that there are other goods which can be pursued outside morality and sometimes
instead of moral goods. Here the moderate is concerned with generating an option
between an act which promotes moral worth and which if performed will be
supererogatory and an act which has no moral value at all. He therefore must appeal
to the cost of performing a moral act as opposed to a non-moral act.
Moderates usually do want to claim that they have the option of acting morally or
non-morally on certain occasions. Sometimes this is when the cost of acting morally is
low, as in the case of small favours. The opportunity is not confined to acts of small
moral worth, however. Joe, who takes the option of entering a burning building and
performing a supererogatory act of saving lives, might have quite permissibly
continued on his way in pursuit or some non-moral good or no particular good at all.
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At first, it appears that Kagan cannot allow a moral holiday for two reasons. Firstly,
when there is something moral that can be done, then it must be done, because it
promotes the greater good. Secondly, on Kagan's view the opportunity to do moral
good is always with us, as he explicitly rejects the distinction between harming and
not aiding. I will not repeat his arguments here as they are familiar in the more general
discussion about the distinction about doing and allowing. Suffice to say that given
the extent of world poverty, there is always something we can be doing to alleviate
the suffering of others and therefore, on Kagan's view, there is always something
moral we are required to do.
If this starts to sound excessive and far too demanding for the moderate, then it suits
Kagan's story of the extremist well. 'Why do you think they're called extremists?'1:>, he
asks, and it is difficult to know whether this is tongue in cheek or not! But on two
occasions Kagan gives us reason to think that we might take a break from morality.
Firstly, when discussing the value of personal relationships, he considers that it might
not make the agent the most effective at promoting the greater good if he were
promoting the good all the time:
'..it may be that we mistakenly think of the agent who is in pursuit of the good as
frantically running around, pushing himself in every direction, until he drops from
exhaustion. Such a person would have no time to establish genuine relationships, and
no room in his life for love or friendship. But most likely such a person would not
actually be making his greatest possible contribution to the good either. In contrast,
an individual who shapes and carries out a life plan with an eye to promoting the good




This is a surprising lapse from Kagan, who is otherwise relentless in his argument.
Allowing for the adoption of a 'life plan' surely gives the moderate a window of
opportunity for options and particularly supererogation. It would mean that the agent
who performs a supererogatory act is the one who is the most productive at
promoting the greater good. On this view, the difference between the saint and the
ordinary good guy is that the saint is just better at conserving his moral energy. He
has a more efficient life plan, so he can fit in more moral acts than average.17 Many
moderates would be happy to say that they do indeed promote the greater good, but
that they need to live in a certain way to be able to achieve their maximum moral
performance. Just talking with friends, resting after working hard... breaks from moral
action need not be fantastically luxurious or self-serving to serve their purpose of
refuelling the engine ofmorality.
Secondly, Kagan sees the nature of the good as principally welfarist, despite not
wanting to give a specific content to the overall good. If problems such as world
poverty were rectified in an ideal world, then Kagan suggests that it would be
desirable for agents to lead the lives that they choose without the ever-present
maximising principle operating in respect of one dominant good. Supererogatory acts
might be possible in an ideal world, where some agents would choose to promote the
overall good (whose content might now be of a somewhat different form) on more
occasions than others.
17
Kagan might respond to this allowance of a moral holiday by saying that his arguments
nonetheless show that the moderate is still required to do much more than the moderate would want
to do. But it is important to remember that Kagan wants to show that it is impossible to set limits on
requirements and if the moderate can limit what he has to do by appealing to a wider life plan then
this weakens Kagan's argument. It effectively allows a two-level type of utilitarianism.
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I suggest that Kagan's approach to moral holidays offers the moderate an opportunity
for supererogation, but they would not allow for the full variety of supererogatory
acts that we see in ordinary morality.
Kagan's attack on the moderate's appeal to cost centres on the point that the moderate
cannot put a limit on the degree of cost that he wants to use to justify the failure to
perform supererogatory acts. The moderate wants to use the cost of giving up his life
at one end of the scale and yet appears to have to use cost as a justification for failure
to perform supererogatory acts which have very little or no cost involved at the other
end of the scale. Two aspects of Kagan's attack on the appeal to cost could be
challenged. Firstly, a case could be made for distinguishing the cost of giving up one's
life from all other costs. Secondly, the case for a moral holiday could be developed. If
these challenges were successful, then certain types of supererogatory act might be
allowable on Kagan's theory. I discuss the appeal to cost in Chapter 4.
I now turn to the third plank in Kagan's argument against the moderate, which
concerns the nature and the structure of the overall good.
2.5 The nature of the overall good
Kagan's overall good is comprehensive. It includes all goods that an agent might
value; not just the self-interest of the agent, but all his interests. It also includes each
and everyone's individual well-being. However, the impartial nature of the overall
good means that sometimes some of the goods which make up the overall good must
be sacrificed either in favour of other component goods or in favour of a greater
amount of the same good.
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Kagan frequently uses examples to show that the extremist values all the same types
of goods that the moderate does. However, the extremist must give these goods up in
favour of the well-being of others if there is a choice. Given the state of world
poverty, the extremist must give up the valued pursuit of art, good food, leisure and
numerous other goods which Kagan allows to be part of the overall good, in order to
promote the basic well-being of others. In other words, there is an implicit
master-value in Kagan's overall good which is used as the common scale against
which all the component goods must be measured to see how great is their
contribution.
If goods of the same kind are up for comparison, then Kagan's agent must act so that
he promotes the maximum value of that good. This is true even in the case of
individual well-being. In Kagan's example where only two lives may be saved out of
three, Nahman is the unfortunate who is left to sink so that others can be saved.
Kagan suggests that the moderate thinks that Nahman's well-being matters in its own
right and the moderate objects that the 'overall good' of saving two lives out of three
is somehow distinct and alien from the concrete fact of Nahman's well-being. In other
words, the moderate thinks that Nahman's well-being constitutes another good, or
part of the good which is not encompassed by the overall good. Kagan sets out the
moderate's position as follows:
'The good is something separate and potentially opposed to Nahman: forced to
choose between the two, the sceptical moderate proclaims that his allegiance is to
Nahman himself, rather than to the abstract objective good; to answer otherwise
would be to view Nahman as of importance only because his well-being potentially
helps to realise the good.'18
18 Kagan (1989) p. 58
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Kagan claims that this is a mischaracterization of his conception of the good as
instrumentalist. Contrary to the moderate's fears, Nahman's well being:
'is no mere instrument to the realisation of the good - it is the very stuff of which the
good consists. The overall good is not some distinct and separable goal, for the sake
ofwhich one promotes the welfare of individual persons. On the contrary, the overall
good simply is the overall well-being of individual persons. (At least this is so in large
part; there may well be other components to the good as well, for example, equitable
distribution of well-being. But the point remains that the overall good is not
something distinct from the presence of the various goods - and the absence of the
various evils - ofwhich it consists)'.19
Good news for Nahman, then! He dies with two consolations. The extremist
considers his well-being to be part of the overall good. Secondly, it is only 'reluctantly'
that the extremist will forgo the opportunity to save him. Kagan's extremist is
frequently acting reluctantly or with regret or otherwise bemoaning the loss of goods
that the moderate thinks of value. I take it that this process of 'regretting the
remainder' is supposed to demonstrate that the extremist values what is lost and
considers it part of the overall good in some way. It is important to Kagan's argument
that the moderate should not be able to demonstrate that there is some further good
which is independent of the overall good. This would give the moderate the
opportunity to reason that the loss of this further good could be set against the
promotion of the overall good and thus generate the possibility of options. Kagan's
overall good must, therefore, include all moral goods. It must be comprehensive.
The overall good is also impartial in the sense that no one person's life or interests
counts for more or less than anyone else's. Kagan describes the extremist in the
Nahman example as choosing between:
19 ibid. p.58
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'three concrete goods - three individual lives- and I have chosen to save two lives
rather than simply one: those two lives are not a mere instrument to the realisation of
the greater good in this case - they constitute the greater good.'211
The moderate might find this puzzling, I suggest. The extremist had claimed that
Nahman's well-being was the very stuff of which the good consists. But he's the one
to die and the other two lives now constitute the greater good. That's just because it is
two lives rather than one, the moderate will claim. Here is the crucial difference
between the extremist and the moderate. The extremist is a maximiser first and
foremost, but he is also an impartialist in the sense that Nahman as an individual
doesn't count for any more or any less than the other two. That is why aggregating
numbers of lives delivers the greater good and it is of no consequence as to whose
lives they are. The moderate is sometimes a maximiser, but he is always exercised by
the idea that Nahman just might matter more to him than the other two. Then he
would not be able to maximise by way of counting lives. Indeed, if Nahman is his little
son and he can either save Nahman or two lives, then he ought not to maximise by
saving two lives instead of one. He ought to save Nahman as his first priority.
Kagan is insistent that the overall good cannot be contrasted with the various goods
that compose it. There may be various goods that compose the overall good, but the
overall good does not fragment in such a way that the components can be assessed
singly and then weighed or otherwise compared with the remaining totality in a
process of moral reasoning. So, for example, Nahman's father could not weigh the
value of his son's life against the value of a distinct 'overall good'.
Instead, I take it that Kagan's reasoning works like this: if two components of the
overall good are in competition, they are assessed as to their contribution to the
20 ibid.p.59
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overall good. That which makes the greater contribution indicates the act which is
required. The overall good is the common scale by which all other goods are assessed.
In the Nahman case, his father would have to weigh the contribution which his son's
life makes to the overall good and compare it with the contribution the two other lives
would make to the overall good.
We would normally assume there to be some kind of ranking of goods in that case. In
the Nahman example as Kagan frames it, we are comparing like with like except for
the quantity. We can save one life rather than two, so two is a greater contribution to
the overall good. On my version, Nahman's father appears to rank his son's life as
more valuable than the other two. This ranking might be justified to him in the simple
human way that the value of his son's life to him as a parent is a very high value
indeed, outstripping the value of any number of strangers' lives. Or it might be
justified in a more impartial way, by suggesting that the value to the overall good of a
parent so regarding the value of a child's life again outstrips the value of saving the
lives of strangers. In any event, some ranking of goods in terms of their contribution
to the overall good will be required on Kagan's account.
As I interpret Kagan, in addition to insisting that the overall good is comprehensive
and impartial, he takes it for granted that the overall good will have some form of
master-value against which the component goods can be assessed as to their
contribution. It is the method of assessing the contribution of the component goods to
the master-value that is the bar to supererogation, rather than the selection and nature
of the component goods. If what I am required to do is determined by how much
contribution it makes to the welfare of others, which is Kagan's implicit master-value,
then many optional acts in ordinary morality will be forbidden and many
supererogatory acts will be required.
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When Kagan says that 'disagreements over the contents of the overall good does not
in itself call into question the existence of a pro tanto reason to promote the good',21
he is right. The moderate who attempts to criticise Kagan because he does not want
to lose certain goods from the set which may be promoted is misdirecting his fire. It is
the structure, rather than the content of Kagan's overall good which is the stumbling
block to optional acts and supererogation. Kagan has a teleological structure of value,
assuming that whatever the good is, it is that which must be promoted.22
I shall be developing this argument about the nature of the good in Chapter 7 and
putting forward a view which relies on plural values, rather than one overall good;
where values can be compared against each other, rather than against a master value.
Nonetheless, Kagan assumes that his moderate opponent will rely for his source of
criticism on the issue ofmissing goods, which will constitute the source of the cost to
be paid if the agent performs a supererogatory act.
2.6 Which goods might the moderate consider to be subjective?
In the final part of his argument against options, Kagan suggests that if the moderate
is to justify agent-relative reasons he must isolate some special subjective values
generating that type of reason which are distinct from the agent-neutral reasons which
stem from the objective overall good. These are likely to be values which incorporate
that weighting or bias in favour of the agent's interest which is inherent in an
agent-relative reason. They are connected with the appeal to cost, because if the
moderate is forced to give up these values, he will suffer from a loss of interest in that
21 ibid. p.64
??
Both the idea of a master-value and the suggestion that Kagan's structure of value is teleological
come from Scanlon (2000).
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the bias in his favour will have been taken away. Kagan suggests that the moderate
can propose the following types of subjective goods:
i) Perfectionist goods
The moderate claims that there is value in retaining opera, ballet, flower-gazing and,
beautiful music, even if this is at the expense of some people starving. Without these
values, the world would not be an ideal world. Something would be missing. It is not
clear to me that why Kagan thinks that the moderate necessarily thinks that they form
part of the subjective set of goods, but it is clear that Kagan will not allow them in the
objective viewpoint. This is because perfectionist goods are not maximally productive
and are resource inefficient, according to Kagan, and so they cannot form part of the
objective viewpoint and therefore part of the overall good.2 ' So despite his disclaimer
above, Kagan does in fact have some conditions on the content of the overall good,
although his position is not entirely clear. Kagan does not provide an adequate
response to the argument in favour of classifying these goods as subjective, except to
say that the extremist, who has to disallow them, regrets the passing of these goods
and that there may be an argument for maintaining some kind of archive (a Museum
ofHow to Have Fun?) until an ideal world is restored.
Kagan is also a little disingenuous, emphasising the contrast of 'expensive' and
'luxurious' goods with the basic needs of the poor and hungry. Perfectionist values
need not of course involve expense or luxury, as his flower-gazing example
recognises. This is a slightly more serious point than first might be thought. The way
in which flower-gazing might be luxurious is that it permits an agent pleasurable
77
The argument for retaining these goods even in the light of great human need is Susan Wolfs.
Wolf (1982).
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time-off from 'harder' moral duties such as working for the relief of world poverty.
Thus it might be that Kagan is suggesting that the reasons generated from the
objective overall good necessarily result in a demand that we never rest from
promoting the good if there are still basic needs to be met.
Kagan does allow that:
'it might be that a greater contribution to overall good would be made by promoting
the arts than by diverting those resources to famine relief. (A pluralist theory of the
good might give the existence of art considerable value in its own right; or it might be
that art simply pays its way in terms of its overall contribution to human
well-being).'24
Many moderates do think this a possibility, but it is important to remember that
winning the maximising battles will not help the moderate justify options. For if
perfectionist goods can sometimes win the contest of promoting the overall good,
then they are presumably legitimate basic goods and part of the overall good after all.
Sometimes this happens. Recall the fierce battles for art funding that regularly ensue
in the face of cut-backs from the government. Even when a direct comparison is made
with lives that could be saved if funds were directed to health services, art impresarios
and administrators hold firm, convinced that a world without art is an unacceptable
world.
Kagan has said earlier that he does not need to be precise about the contents of the
overall good, although he has in fact specified two components, the well-being of
individuals and the satisfaction of their interests. He has admitted that there may be
other components and, although he initially appears to disallow perfectionist goods,
this last comment allows for some doubt on the matter. If he did allow perfectionist
24 Kagan (1989) p.359
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values to be part of the overall good, it would take the steam out of the moderate's
argument. We know, however, from the general tenor of his discussion that Kagan
does not want to allow perfectionist goods into the overall good. To be generous to
him, this is because his project to support the extremist stems genuinely from a belief
that, given world poverty, morality should be principally concerned with the
well-being of everyone and this will require those of us with excess resources to
sacrifice them. Being less kind, if he did allow them in to the overall good (and allow
them to win out sometimes) then his extremist would not have such an exciting story
about the demandingness ofmorality to tell.
The moderate has his problems with perfectionist values too. If he thinks they stand
outside the overall good but still within morality, he has to find an argument to
support this. It is easier to suggest that they stand outside morality altogether,
although they can be weighed against moral values and are somehow morally
acceptable. This would allow the moderate agent some form of option and the
possibility of supererogation. If the moderate chose the perfectionist value over the
moral value, he would be making a morally legitimate choice. If he chose the moral
over the perfectionist value he would supererogate, because his chosen act would
have some moral worth that the alternative permissible act would not.
The fact that goods can be introduced or left out of Kagan's overall good according to
whether we are in an ideal or non-ideal world suggests that there is a hidden
precedence already at work in his overall good. In other words, he takes it for granted
that basic welfare for everyone always takes precedence over every other good, until
presumably a certain level of welfare is reached. At that stage, the component
perfectionist and other non-welfarist goods will presumably come into their own and
compete for contributions to the overall good. Until that happens, the fact that these
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other goods are components of the overall good is merely theoretical, because they
can never win the reasoning process.
ii) Directly valued objects and persons
Kagan groups a diffuse set of values together, attributing the source of the argument
that these sorts of values stand outside an objective viewpoint to Bernard Williams.
These include the value of depth of commitment to a project, such that if we give up
that project to promote the greater good then something of moral value has been lost.
Kagan also includes in this set of values any which the agent 'directly' values. Having
this sort of direct attachment is one which we value highly, according to the
moderate, and the objective viewpoint cannot deal adequately with this. Kagan
challenges the notion that valuing an object or person directly means that an agent
would be unwilling to sacrifice them. He suggests that the agent might be willing to
exchange them. He gives two examples where exchange is supposed to show that
valuing directly does not mean that an agent is not prepared to make a sacrifice:
'First, if an agent cannot save all three of his children, he might be willing to choose
between saving only one or saving two-although he will obviously be greatly
distressed at the need to choose at all. Second, a painter with direct attachments to
several of her own works might agree to part with a directly valued painting still in
her studio if this is the only way to regain a previously sold painting that she values
even more.
What these examples suggest is that when an agent cannot retain all of the objects
that he values directly, he may be willing to consider exchanges'.2"1
Kagan imagines that these examples show that the agent's willingness to sacrifice does
not indicate that the object was not valued directly after all. He concludes that 'the
extremist can plausibly suggest that an agent might be willing to sacrifice the objects
2^ ibid, p.366
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that he values directly so that others gain'. So the extremist can concede the
importance of valuing objects directly and yet deny that the moderate needs to retain
the subjective viewpoint to deal with them. Directly valued objects can take their
place along with perfectionist values in the overall good and take part in the
maximising battle. I am unconvinced by Kagan's argument about exchange. The point
about the parent and painter is that they both have to sacrifice someone or something
that they value directly in an exchange, but the result of the exchange is to benefit
them. It is not the same as giving a directly valued object up for someone else with no
benefit to oneself, which is what the extremist demands. That is precisely the point
about these sorts of values.
iii) Values of Love and Friendship
Perhaps Kagan was uneasy with his parent example when discussing directly valued
objects and persons. It certainly does not seem to be the case that a parent who is
willing to choose two out of three children to be saved will be prepared to make the
sacrifice of one child to meet the needs of the overall good, perhaps by using that
child's organs to save many other children's lives. Kagan is forced to consider direct
attachments of love and friendship as candidates for subjective values which the
overall good cannot adequately capture. He accurately characterises the moderate's
position:
'To treat all persons equally, never bestowing any favours, never departing from the
indifference implicit in the pursuit of the good - this is to love no one at all.'26
26 ibid. p. 367
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Kagan then asks whether willingness to favour is an essential part of love or
friendship. His response is that it is not obvious that this is so. Kagan paints an
extraordinary (to me, at least) picture of:
'an individual who shapes and carries out a life plan with an eye to promoting the
good such a person may well have room, (my italics) and perhaps the need, for
partners in his undertakings. But 'partnership' may be too weak a term to describe the
relationships that can develop: they may be friendships; and they may be more.' 27
His contention is that the moderate has not shown that love cannot be impartial. This
is weak. If Kagan needs to rule out love and friendship as candidates for the
subjective viewpoint, he must do better than this. Scanlon points out that people who
value friendship will be primarily concerned with doing things that are involved in
being a good friend. They will think that they ought to be loyal to their friends and not
betray them, for example. But the reasons they have for doing this are not directed to
the goal of'promoting friendship' because friendship is a good, objective value to have
in the world (although they might also think that true). They are reasons connected
explicitly with the specific friendship in question.28
Of course, Kagan could point to the lives of those who are dedicated to the poor and
needy; those who are apparently living out the life of the extremist. Lives such as
those of Annalena Tonelli who worked alone in Somalia, not even part of a religious
order or aid organisation. Such people often do not have time or the inclination for
particular personal relationships. Their lives are subsumed by the project of the overall
good and they are content to live directed solely by such impartiality. If some people
can do it, the extremist might say, why can't it be demanded of us all? The answer
from the moderate is that whilst we might admire such people and think their actions
27 ibid.p.368
28 Scanlon (2000) pp.88-89
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supererogatory, we do not think that it is desirable that we all live that way, for two
reasons. Firstly, it would be to miss the chance of a fully rounded human life beyond
the call of morality. (We have already seen this type of argument in the moderate's
support for perfectionist and project values). Secondly and more importantly, without
love and friendship some impartial aspects ofmorality will be missed.29
It is easy to dismiss Kagan's comments on love and friendship as not just unrealistic,
but in some way unhuman, as if they have missed the very point of love. His thoughts
could be developed, however, so that they do fit in with our normal conception of
love and still bear a relation to the promotion of the greater good. We might draw on
some thoughts from the Judaeo-Christian tradition. God is said to love us all 'equally'
and the analogy with human relationships is that God loves each one of us
individually, 'as his children'. We are to try to be like God, so we should try to love
everyone as our brother. Would this not result in the kind of love that Kagan has in
mind, and certainly in the promotion of an impartial greater good?
Nonetheless, I conclude that the moderate has the better of this argument and it could
allow him to argue that there are some values which fall outside the overall good and
are subjective. The moderate still has a number of problems remaining, however, if he
wishes to use the partiality generated by these subjective values to justify the optional
nature of supererogatory acts. Although he now has support for subjective values and
thus a bulwark against always promoting the greater, impartial good, he has
considerable work to do to make the justification for the optional nature of
1Q
For the suggestion that personal relationships help with the pursuit of the impartial side of
morality see Elizabeth Ashford (2000) who suggests that 'it is only in the context of a loving personal
relationship that our concern for a person is sufficiently intense to mirror the moral importance of
how another person's life goes. The impartial moral point of view, again, simply holds that everyone
else's life shares the same importance.' pp436-437.
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supererogation work. I now turn to the problem of how the moderate can construct a
reasoning process which will support options..
2.7 The pro tanto reason
Even though Kagan thinks they cannot be justified, he claims there is nothing
incoherent in the idea of moral options. He says:
'the basic structure of an option is relatively simple: there will be an option with
regard to a given reaction provided that there is neither a morally decisive reason
which supports that reaction nor a morally decisive reason which opposes that
reason.'30
We should note straightaway that Kagan defines the structure of an option in terms
of the moral reasoning process. It is true that any coherent theory of supererogation
will have to be able to explain the reasoning process that surrounds the
supererogatory act, but that is not all that could be behind the structure of an option. I
shall be arguing in my proposal that the nature and the structure of the good is also
important and might imply a different form of reasoning process from that put
forward by Kagan.
Kagan thinks that the moderate agrees with the extremist that it is morally required
that we do all that we can to promote (in fact to maximise) the overall good. Kagan
frames this as a pro tanto reason; a reason that is always part of the moderate's
reasoning process. The pro tanto reason is the embodiment of the maximising
principle in reason form. However the moderate also admits the existence of options
and constraints which sometimes allow the maximising principle to be modified and
the pro tanto reason to be defeated in the process of deciding what to do. Examples
30 Kagan (1989) p.381-2.
61
of options might include the possibility to put one's own projects or interests (but note
that these need not be .se//:interests) before the maximising principle. Examples of
constraints might include the prohibition on doing harm to any one individual or
indeed the balancing of the preservation of one's own life against the overall good. In
other words, the moderate would allow for some sacrifices to be 'too much' to
demand. Kagan explains the moderate's position by saying that an appeal to the cost
to the agent of some act may be sufficient to destroy the demands of the maximising
principle.
When Gianna Molla gave up her life for her unborn child that might well produce the
best overall consequences, but the degree of sacrifice would have allowed her to put
aside the maximising principle without failing to act rightly. The degree of sacrifice
would also allow the moderate to recognise supererogatory acts as those carried out
by agents who accepted the sacrifices, such as Gianna. The moderate would have to
explain why some people were able to perform supererogatory acts whilst others were
excused, when presumably the reasoning process was the same in both cases.
2.8 The countervailing considerations to the pro tanto reason
In the second part of Kagan's argument, we saw that the moderate would have to
produce countervailing considerations to the pro tanto reason to promote the overall
good if he was to have a chance of generating options. Kagan's suggestion is that the
only way of doing this is for the moderate to endorse a set of subjective values. This
will generate the countervailing considerations, or subjective reasons, which will vie
with the pro tanto reason. Kagan says of these reasons:
'They give the agent greater reason to promote his interests than would be yielded
strictly on the basis of the objective importance of those interests. They are, in effect,
additional reasons that an agent has for promoting his interests. Second, these
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subjective reasons are agent-relative. Each agent has a reason to promote his
interests; he does not have similar reason to promote the interests of others (i.e.
others in whom he does not independently take an interest). Of course, each person
does have some reason to promote the interests of others: the pro tanto reason to
promote the good. Since that reason-an objective reason-is generated for all agents,
regardless of their particular interests, it is an agent-neutral one. But the subjective
reasons we are now considering give each agent further reason to promote his own
interests (whatever they may be) as distinct from the interests of others. Thus, for any
given agent and any given state of affairs, whether that agent has one of these further
reasons for promoting that state of affairs will depend on the interests of that
particular agent. The obtaining of specific reasons of this sort will therefore vary from
individual to individual; such reasons are, in short, agent-relative.'31
Returning to the Nahman example, we saw there that under Kagan's interpretation of
the impartiality of the objective good, it might be part of the objective good that all
parents protect their children and so Nahman might be specially chosen to be saved by
his father, as one of the two who may be saved. There the maximising principle was
not infringed, but Nahman's life was recognised as the special responsibility of his
parents. The agent-relative reasons generated by the subjective value of parental love
do something more, however. They give Nahman's parents reasons to favour him over
and above other lives, so that if they are in a position where they can either save many
lives or his alone, then they can save him alone. Now the maximising principle is
infringed. Agent-relative reasons give agents permission to weight or to bias their
interests more heavily than the structure of the overall good allows. The moderate's
intention in justifying the optional nature of supererogatory acts is to find
countervailing considerations to the pro tanto reason to promote the good.
Agent-relative reasons look like a promising first step in that process.
The moderate still has work to do. He must justify the existence of agent-relative
reasons and then explain why they do not always generate a requirement. Kagan
claims that agent-relative reasons are justified by the moderate because without them
31 ibid. p.334
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he would have to make big sacrifices in the face of the maximising principle.
Nahman's parents might have to lose their son and save many other lives instead. That
is too much for them to bear, claims the moderate, and he 'appeals to cost'.
2.9 Kagan's process of moral reasoning
Ifwe bring together four ofKagan's points:
(i) You are required to maximise the good. Any less than the maximum is a forbidden
act.
(ii) The only good is an impartial good. Any good that stems from a form of partiality
or subjective good is not allowed.
(iii) Cost cannot justify the optional nature of the supererogatory act.
(iv) There are no moral holidays.
then it will not be possible for the moderate to explain the process of moral reasoning
behind optional acts such as those of supererogation. Kagan describes the process like
this:
'An option permits the agent to pursue his interests rather than sacrifice them for the
greater good. But it does not require him to pursue his interests; he may, if he
chooses, make the sacrifice. So if the moderate is genuinely to defend an option it
must not be the case that the promotion of the good is opposed by a morally decisive
reason. Of course, it is not that there can be no reason whatsoever for the agent to
pursue his interests; but if it is to suit the moderate's purposes, this reason cannot be a
morally decisive one.
This, then, is the moderate's dilemma. If he claims that subjective reasons can be
morally decisive, then he preserves the suggested defence of constraints, but
64
undermines the defence of options. Yet if he claims instead that subjective reasons
cannot generally be morally decisive, then he preserves the defence of options, but
abandons the suggested defence of constraints.' 32
In addition to agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, Kagan distinguishes two
related types of reason; the 'patient-protecting' reason, which is a reason to do good
for someone other than the agent, and the 'agent-protecting' reason which is a reason
for the agent to promote his self-interests. Agent-protecting reasons are frequently
used by the moderate both to establish a constraint in morality and to establish
options; so, for example, Joe does not have to go into the burning building to effect a
rescue because he wants to protect his own life and health, even though it is the best
act available to him.
Kagan's first step is to allow the moderate to separate the lines of explanation for
constraints and options so that the moderate does not have to justify both constraints
and options by appeal to agent-protecting reasons. (From the above quotation we can
see that Kagan thinks using this appeal for both options and constraints leads to an
inconsistency. 1 do not discuss this point here, because Kagan is happy to conduct the
attack on options even allowing for the existence of constraints).
Kagan then sets up the reasoning structure surrounding options like this. Firstly, he
claims that the moderate will hold that the agent-protecting reasons will not in all
cases be morally decisive. That must be right. In the case of supererogation, the agent
is free to perform the act or not. If Joe goes into the burning building, he has decided
that protecting his own life and health is not a decisive reason to act. So on Kagan's
reasoning structure, sometimes the agent-protecting reasons are decisive, sometimes
not. The reason against which they have to be weighed is the pro tanto reason to
32 ibid. p.372
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promote the good.33 Sometimes the agent-protecting reasons will not be morally
decisive and this is because they have been outweighed by the pro tanto reason to
promote the good. Kagan suggests that this is how the moderate would want to
describe a case where promoting the good does not cost the agent very much. And
that seems like a good description of many required acts. If I can save the life of the
drowning child by throwing the life-belt next to me, then I surely ought to. The gap
between the value of the child's life and the extra effort required by me to reach out
my hand and throw the life-belt is typically too big for the moderate to consider that
there are any heavily weighing agent-protecting reasons why I should not do this.
(But see Chapter 5, where I discuss rescue cases).
Kagan describes a case of supererogation specifically in order to support his view
that agent-protecting reasons are always outweighed by the pro tanto reason to
promote the good. We regard it as morally meritorious, he says, if we sacrifice our
agent-protecting reasons in favour of the pro tanto reason to promote the good. We
would not do so if the agent-protecting reasons were morally decisive against the
reason in favour of the general good. If that were so, supererogatory acts would be
plain wrong. So it seems that in cases where in ordinary morality we fail to perform
the supererogatory act something has gone wrong with our reasoning process, unless
we can find a way of explaining how agent-protecting reasons are sometimes morally
decisive without the supererogatory act being forbidden.
Kagan suggests two solutions to the moderate's problem. The first is to say that the
pro tanto reason and agent-protecting reasons are evenly balanced so that there is no
"5
Although interestingly, Kagan says this: '..in many cases, (my italics) the only relevant opposing
reason [to agent-protecting reasons] will be the pro tanto reason to promote the good.' p.373 This
leaves open the possibility that there could at least be some cases where agent-protecting reasons are
not weighed against the pro tanto reason, but perhaps against other agent-protecting reasons.
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question of outweighing. Kagan concludes that such occurrences would be rare and
thus the idea of evenly balanced reasons would not provide an account of options. He
demonstrates the implausibility of evenly balanced reasons as a justification by means
of a financial model:
'Suppose .that by making a certain sacrifice - say, $500 - I could save an innocent
stranger from undergoing a great deal of physical pain. And let us assume, in
accordance with the moderate's suggestion, that the subjective reason which opposes
my thus sacrificing my interests is of exactly the same weight as the objective reason
which supports my helping the stranger. Here neither reason outweighs the other, and
so there is an option. But now consider a slight variation of the case, in which the cost
of helping the stranger will be $750 rather than $500, and the pain to the stranger will
be somewhat less than in the original case. Here, presumably, the subjective reason
will be somewhat stronger, and the objective reason somewhat weaker. So if the
original two reasons were of exactly the same weight, in this new case the subjective
reason must outweigh the objective reason. Yet here too, obviously, the moderate
thinks that I have an option...'34
Kagan's suggestion that 'it seems likely that exact ties could be nothing more than
extremely rare accidents' does not stand up on the basis of this example. This is partly
to do with the unsatisfactory account that he has given of reasons generally. Kagan
uses his maximising principle 'always promote the general good' as a reason on one
side of the decision process. The principle is identical with the reason. Any reasons
that appear on the other side of the weighing process must therefore defeat the
principle. Since Kagan is proposing a single principle morality, there can never be a
reason which defeats the maximising principle.
Further, in the case of the financial example above, the fact that the moderate will
change his decision when the cost to him goes down and the benefit to the stranger
goes up and that this might happen on the basis of very small intervals of change does
not prove that ties in the weighing of reasons are rare. It might be true that there is a
34 Kagan (1989) pp.374-375
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specific point on the line which represents the ratio of the cost to the agent over the
benefit to the stranger at which the balance in reasons changes. There is nothing to
say that the weighing of reasons should be directly fixed to one point, however. We
can imagine that there is a stretch of the line where the agent sees the ratio as
'balancing' the good to the other person, such that he might either perform the
supererogatory act or not. They are roughly equal. However, there will be other
stretches of the line, where performance of the act is required or where the
performance of the act is truly heroic.
If we are to suggest to the moderate that balancing of reasons would be rare, we
might just as well suggest that the maximiser would only rarely face the prospect of
two possible acts of equal value. Leaving aside my comments on Kagan's financial
model, it is not clear to me how we can say that either of these two occurrences
would be rare. They seem rare in any example with numerical values, because they are
given an artificial preciseness, but this preciseness is not characteristic of most moral
reasons. Indeed, we could say that the possibility of widespread and common
supererogatory acts suggests the opposite - that there are many occasions when the
agent has evenly balanced reasons which allow him either to perform the
supererogatory act or not. Whether the agent is justified in calling those reasons even
or whether he is justified in measuring them against each other are separate issues
from the idea of rarity of preciseness which Kagan makes the issue here.
However, here is an argument that the moderate should consider before he appeals to
the acceptability of the idea of tied reasons as a basis for solving the reason problem
of supererogation. That is, if the reasons for performing an act are evenly balanced,
one ought to assume that it is a matter of moral indifference as to whether one
performs the act or not. But this is not the case with supererogation. It is morally
more valuable to perform the supererogatory act. The Betterness characteristic tells
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us this. So let us concede that Kagan is right that balanced reasons will not support
the case for options, not on his argument but because we want to highlight that there
is something special about the moral worth of supererogation.
Kagan's second suggestion to the moderate who wishes to establish options is that the
moderate could claim that certain types of reasons are incomparable with regard to
strength. Specifically, agent-protecting reasons could be compared between
themselves for strength, as could reasons relating to the pro tanto reason for
promoting the good, but the two types of reasons could never be compared. But this
will not do either for the moderate, says Kagan. This is because the moderate
sometimes appears to rely on comparing these two types of reason for determining
right action:
'when enough good is at stake, and the cost to the agent sufficiently low (although not
necessarily negligible), the agent is indeed required to promote the good. In such
cases, the pro tanto reason to promote the good is morally decisive, that is, in those
cases it is able to outweigh the relevant agent-protecting reason; so the two kinds of
reason can, at least sometimes, be compared.'3"'
I shall be arguing that appealing to cost is not at issue in supererogation. If I am right
about that, then I am free to tell a different story about reasons. It could be that the
agent never weighs reasons in the way that Kagan suggests. Or, it could be that some
reasons can be weighed against each other but not against other types of reason. I
shall also be free to develop that line if I am able to tell a different story from Kagan
about the nature and structure of the good. I must do all of this and still maintain that
the agent sometimes grounds a requirement on the pro tanto reason to promote the
good; a point where I am in agreement with Kagan.
35 ibid. p.375
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What characterises Kagan's arguments is that his pro tanto reason is identical with his
maximising principle in morality. The problem for the moderate is not strictly that it
can never be outweighed (although this would be true on Kagan's view of morality
nonetheless); rather it is that the moderate sometimes seems to appeal to it and
sometimes not and it is hard to see how the moderate can maintain this apparently
inconsistent position.
The solution for the moderate is to explain that he has more than one good that must
be promoted. However, these goods are not divided into an objective and subjective
set in the manner in which Kagan suggests. Sometimes reasons relating to the
promotion of different goods could be incomparable. I develop these points as part of
my proposal in Chapter 7.
2.10 Conclusion
I conclude that Kagan's attack on supererogatory acts is not fatal. It relies on a
mistaken view about what the moderate must show in order to justify supererogatory
acts.
The moderate does not need to appeal to cost and to a set of subjective goods to
construct an argument. I shall be arguing that the moderate can appeal to a pluralist
notion of the good with many components that may be measured against each other in
a number of different ways. This should give him the opportunity to explain the
reasoning process behind supererogation. But first we still need to deal with the
elementary point in Kagan's theory that the extremist is a maximiser and the moderate
is not. On an simple intuitive basis, it is tempting to think that where a moral theory
demands maximisation then there can be no supererogation and that it is the
maximising principle rather than the structure of the good that stops the possibility of
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supererogatory acts. 1 turn now to whether a maximising theory can allow for
supererogation.
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Chapter 3 Does a maximising theory always rule out the
supererogatory?
3.1 Maximising and the Bettemess Characteristic
Must we always do our best? Supererogatory acts are sometimes thought of as the
reaching the pinnacle of moral achievement. But is it right to assume that a
supererogatory act means that the agent has done his best? Many theorists write about
supererogation as though that were the case. I have suggested that supererogatory
acts do not necessarily have to be the best that we can do. Instead, they represent an
improvement in moral worth on a morally permissible alternative, as my Betterness
characteristic indicates.1 My view is based on simple examples which show that we
consider that it is supererogatory to perform an act which is less than the best. Joe
enters a burning building where there are two children to save. He only manages to
save one and is still a hero, because he need not have attempted any rescue at all. This
is still less than the best he might have done, which is to have saved both children.2
Whether one considers a supererogatory act to be the best an agent can do or just
better than an alternative, a theory such as Kagan's which requires maximising the
good poses problems for supererogation. The implication for supererogation under
such a theory is that one can never perform a supererogatory act because one will
' Many theorists discuss supererogation as though it involves performing the best that we can do.
despite clear examples that intuitive supererogatory acts are not always so. Paul McNamara (1996)
refers to this characterisation as the 'Optimific Thesis' and has a number of references to
philosophers who endorse it as well as a providing an example to show that it is not characteristic of
all supererogatory actions. McNamara suggests that viewing supererogatory acts in this way leads to
a distortion of the notion of the supererogatory.
2 The detail of the examples is all-important here. There is also a sense in which once the hero has
embarked on his risky course of action, he is obliged to do all that he can to achieve what he has set
out to do. although he was not obliged to act initially at all. If Joe was able to rescue the second child,
but 'just didn't feel like it', then he is open to criticism on that point even though he was not obliged
to enter the building at all.
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always be required to do one's best. There is no act which is better than the
permissible alternative, because the only permissible act is the act which maximises
the good and that is required, never optional.3 You must always do your best or face
performing a forbidden act. However, some maximising theories could have
modifications which would allow for supererogation.
For example, maximisation may not be required on the basis of every single act but
over a period of time or a series of actions. Or perhaps the value of the outcome
could be assessed by basing it on motives or habits. These adjustments are familiar as
modifications to consequentalist theories in general and have been a traditional way of
allowing for supererogation on an act-token basis.4 We saw that even Kagan allowed
himself to slip into something like this modified position when he talked about the
extremist structuring his life plan in order to promote the most good. Any form of
two-level assessment ofmoral worth which separates the judgement about a single act
from a judgement about some other feature which relates to the agent may suffice to
allow supererogation into the theory. This means that the agent is not required to
maximise on an act by act basis, and on any occasion that he does his act may be
considered supererogatory. However, in these cases we would still need to know why
some agents maximise on an act by act basis and others do not. All the justificatory
work that has to be done in a non-maximising theory has to be done here as well,
albeit at a different level.
Another modification would be to allow some special constraints on the agent's
actions (if his life were in danger, say). If the agent ignored these constraints in the
pursuit of maximisation his act might be classified as supererogatory. Again,
'Except for the formal exception of there being a 'tie' in maximal value. I discuss this below
^ Hare (1981) notably allows supererogation in this way.
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arguments are required to justify where the limits are placed. Here, however, I want
to consider the strongest form of maximisation in a moral theory, where to perform
less than the best is wrong on an individual act basis and where there are no
exceptions to the rule that one must always do one's best. I assume such a the theory
to be monist, like Kagan's, where there is only one good or 'master-value' which is to
be maximised, albeit that the single good contains component goods.
First, I shall deal with the point that supererogation can appear in such a theory, if
only on an apparently formal basis.
Suppose an agent is only able to perform one of two maximising acts. We assume
that the acts tie in terms of maximising the single value that constitutes the good in
the theory. He can presumably choose one to perform, and so the Optionality
characteristic is met because he will be left with another permissible act (the other
maximal act) as the alternative act unperformed. The supererogatory act is not
actually better than the unperformed act, so it fails to meet the Betterness
characteristic, but it has the same moral value, so it meets what we could term a
Betterness or Equal Value characteristic. In a maximising theory, the agent does not
have the possibility of ignoring both acts - he must do one of the two and there are no
other alternative permissible acts. In a non-maximising theory, depending on its exact
specification, the agent might have the permissible possibility of doing neither
maximising act. If he does either then he has both done his best and met the
Betterness characteristic because there was an alternative permissible act open to him
of lesser value. To classify this type of 'tied for value' act as supererogatory in a
maximising theory, is it possible to add the 'or Of Equal Value' modification to the
Betterness characteristic?
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The first objection to that modification is that, if it allows a maximising theory to
have supererogation in that manner, then we have lost an important feature of a
supererogatory act. Instead of supererogation representing special moral worth, it
looks as though it comes about as a matter of luck, when two acts tie for value. It
depends on there just happening to be at least two acts ofmaximum value available to
the agent at one time and that he is not able to perform them both. I suggest that our
intuition about the possibility of performing supererogatory acts is that they are often
available to the agent if he chooses to do them; their availability does not depend on
carefully contrived circumstances as a tie in value would suggest. There are two
responses to that objection. Firstly, supererogation is dependent on circumstances
anyway. It is always matter of moral luck that I find myself in circumstances where I
can behave supererogatorily. Secondly, given my criticisms of Kagan on this point,
perhaps 'ties for value' in a maximising theory need not be rare.
Yet making one of the tied value acts supererogatory merely because that is the one
the agent chooses to perform still doesn't feel right. The unease cannot be due to the
fact that the agent has not made a genuinely optional choice to perform a good act.
He has. But he could presumably shake a dice to choose which act to do. What seems
to be wrong with the tied value case is that for an act to be considered supererogatory
we need to know that the agent had the possibility of performing a permissible
alternative act of lesser worth. This gives us the gap of moral worth which makes the
supererogatory act special and warrants the Betterness characteristic.
It is worth noting that, if my definition insisted on a Best rather than Betterness
characteristic, then the maximising theory would be able to meet the definition in the
way I described above, which would not satisfy the normal concept of supererogation.
To avoid that problem, any definition of supererogation which incorporates a
condition that the agent must perform the best act, must also include the possibility
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that the agent has other permissible alternatives. Of course, this will then rule out the
possibility of supererogation in a maximising consequentalist theory with only one
good, since there are no other permissible alternatives. 'Best' in a definition of
supererogation must always be qualified by the condition that there are other
permissible alternatives, which gives me another reason for preferring the Betterness
characteristic, apart from the straightforward intuitive consideration that there are
supererogatory acts which are below the level of the best the agent could perform.
1 now examine a recent account of supererogation which seeks to preserve the
maximising principle whilst dealing with the problem of how to justify options in a
moral theory.
3.2 /\ proposed solution to supererogation for a maximising
consequentalist
First, I restate the two main problems which supererogation raises for moral
theorists.
The first problem is the pressure of requirement. How can it be optional to perform a
morally worthy, supererogatory act, when the alternative is a permissible but morally
less valuable act? Surely it is always better to perform the morally more valuable act,
to the extent that one might expect that a degree of requirement comes to bear on the
agent. As we have seen the problem is particularly acute for the maximising
consequentalist. Under maximising consequentalism, an agent is morally obliged to
perform the action which realises the greatest moral value out of all the options that
may present themselves to him. On Kagan's interpretation, this would leave no room
for the supererogatory act. This is not a problem for the hard line theorist who has no
concern to accommodate our intuitions about morality, but I will assume here that we
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regard our intuitions about supererogatory acts as so powerful that we wish to give a
good account of them in our theory.
The second problem is the problem of rationality and moral reasoning, as Kagan's
work has demonstrated.5 When an agent makes a decision to act, a simple view of the
procedure is that he considers a number of reasons, and having sorted and weighed
the reasons, he acts according to the balance of reasons. Commonly, the balance of
reasons favours one particular act. But the agent may find himself facing a tie, in
which case, he presumably has an option as to which act to perform.6 As we have
seen, the possibility of a tie does not necessarily help the theorist with an account of
supererogation, however. One characteristic of a supererogatory act is that it is
morally superior to other acts available to the agent. So it is not a matter of moral
indifference as to whether the agent performs the supererogatory act or not. In a
moral sense, it is better that he does.7 The structure of moral reasoning must
therefore support the Betterness characteristic without generating a moral
requirement. But the moral reasoning must also support the Optionality characteristic;
the possibility that an agent need not perform the supererogatory act but can do so if
he wishes. At the same time, neither the supererogatory act nor the permissible
alternative should be forced to be classified as irrational.
3 This worry is not confined to the maximising consequentalist. It concerns everyone who tries to
give an account of moral reasoning and supererogation in their theoiy. See Raz (1975). Dancv
(1993). There is a way of avoiding the problem completely which Portmore suggests. I discuss his
suggestion later.
6 Or he faces a dilemma, which might take a number of shapes but commonly the balance of reasons
favours performing two acts which cannot both be performed.
7 Notice that my account of supererogation doesn't require that the supererogatory act is always the
best act that one can perform - it only has to be better than an alternative morally permissible act.
Suppose we have an opportunity to perform two different acts both of which are supererogatory,
although one has much greater moral value than the other. Even if we perform the less morally
valuable supererogatory act, it is still better than the alternative which is at worst bare moral
permissibility.
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Douglas Portmore thinks that he can solve both these problems.8 Indeed, he makes
the strong claim that his is the only account of options and supererogation available to
a theorist who subscribes to a form of maximising consequentalism. He gives an
account of supererogation within the context of a maximising consequentalist theory,
albeit that the theory is a special type of consequentalism which incorporates the
notion of evaluator relativity, a form of agent relativity. He finds that within this
theory, and by using a series of claims from ordinary morality, he is also able to deal
with the problems ofboth maximisation and moral reasons.
Briefly, his solution is to explain the generating of a moral option as follows: an agent
may perform the act which he has most moral reason to do or he may perform that
act which he has 'all things considered' reason to do. Both acts are morally
permissible. If the agent performs the act which he has most moral reason to do when
the balance is in favour of the 'all things considered' reason, then the act is
supererogatory, but irrational, as it ignores the demands of the overriding 'all things
considered' reason. If he performs the act which is supported by an overriding 'all
things considered' reason, he has acted rationally and within the bounds of moral
permissibility, but not supererogatorily.
I will sketch out Portmore's solution in more detail, then argue that it is ultimately
unsuccessful and finally compare it with Kagan's approach.
3.3 Position Relative Consequentalism
Portmore's account relies on a form of consequentalism which he calls 'position
relative'. In this theory, the traditional consequentalist principle 'act always so as to
o
Portmore (2003). Portmore does not formulate the two problems as explicitly as I have done.
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maximize value' is conjoined with the idea that the value of certain states of affairs is
taken to vary depending on the position of the evaluator or agent, or 'evaluator
relativism' as Portmore terms it.9 He says:
'the resulting theory holds that agents ought always to bring about what is, from their
own individual position, the best available state of affairs'.10
Position Relative consequentalism stands in contrast to a more traditional form of
consequentalism, such as classical utilitarianism which is evaluator-neutral with
respect to the nature of the good. (Note in particular the contrast with Kagan's
'overall good' which generates agent-neutral reasons. Portmore's Position Relative
consequentalism is agent-relative on Kagan's interpretation of the term.) The
distinction between evaluator-neutral and evaluator-relative theories becomes
important when we consider that a characteristic of all consequentalist theories is that
the good is defined prior to the right.
I want to investigate whether shifting the viewpoint of the good from the impartial
spectator to the necessary partial agent will do anything to help account for
supererogation. Intuitively, it looks promising. Traditional examples of the
supererogatory act are often characterised by the agent ignoring his own interests and
sacrificing them to the general good. Joe is not concerned with his own life and limb
when he effects a rescue of children in a burning building, for example. Perhaps
Portmore's introduction of partiality will give us something like agent-relative reasons
and values from which we can generate an account of supererogation. But there are
problems.
9
Portmore acknowledges his debt to Amartyra Sen for this idea
10 Portmore (2003) p.304
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The first worry is that Position Relative consequentalism's deviation from traditional
consequentalism in the shape of evaluator relativity is not enough in itself to generate
options. Portmore gives an example which I shall develop and refer to throughout as
the Weekend Example. In this example, Portmore points out that the unvarnished
Position Relative consequentalist account of a choice of actions works like this: if I
am faced with the choice of spending the weekend finishing a philosophy article or
volunteering for charity, then if the balance of reasons from an evaluator relative
viewpoint favours finishing the article, that is what I am required to do. Volunteering
for charity is just plain wrong. (Kagan has already introduced us to this problem,
which is that if reasons stemming from a subjective set of goods outweigh the reasons
stemming from the overall good, then they generate a requirement, not an option.)
In the case of the Weekend Example, if the reasons in favour of finishing the article
are decisive, then we are forced to say that volunteering for charity is the wrong thing
to do. This looks like a counter-intuitive result for two reasons.
Firstly, we might think that an appeal to personal projects can never 'trump' a
benevolent act. My interpretation ofKagan's view was that in a non-ideal world, with
so much world poverty, personal projects would always be ranked lower than acts
which helped others. Kagan allowed that personal projects could be part of the overall
good, but they would not normally win the maximising battle and almost certainly not
in the case ofPortmore's Weekend Example. A variation of this view would be to say
that the values involved in finishing the philosophy article are not moral values at all,
but pure self-interest. The values involved in volunteering for charity are moral values,
however, because they concern the welfare of others, in particular others who are in
need. On this view, it would never be wrong to do an act with moral worth instead of
an act with none.
80
Secondly, we might think that the result looks wrong because we think that it should
be optional whether we volunteer for charity or write the article. We think that there
is something to be said both for finishing the article and volunteering for charity and
so to classify the act which was not performed as morally wrong would not be
correct. It is of course this view that Portmore supports, or at least wants to show
that he can fit into his adapted consequentalist theory, because it the view which
allows for supererogation.
Portmore's next step is to appeal to a series of claims which he suggests are held by
supporters of ordinary morality. Through these claims, acting as premises, he hopes to
be able to show that there is an argument for concluding that there are moral options
and thus supererogatory acts. He will then attempt to factor this argument into his
version of consequentalism.
3.4 Establishing options
Before discussing these claims, I want to examine Portmore's interpretation of the
conclusion that there are options in morality. He suggests that the nature of a moral
option means that an agent may give his own interests particular weight when
considering his actions. This consideration can produce either agent-favouring options
or agent-sacrificing options. That is, he may choose to give his own interests greater
weight when assessing the value of the overall state of affairs that will result from his
act (an agent-favouring option) or he may choose to sacrifice his interests in part or
entirely when making the same judgement (an agent-sacrificing option). This is an
example of the self-other asymmetry that exists in ordinary morality and is precisely
the sort of bias that Kagan does not allow in his theory.
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This outline of how to generate options certainly looks promising as an account of
supererogation, provided that:
(i) we are clear about what is meant by the agent's interests,
and
(ii) all types of supererogatory acts will fall under this type of characterisation where
the agent sacrifices his own interests
and
(iii) we can provide an adequate explanation of why this sort of option is available to
only the agent, thus answering Kagan's criticism of the bias.
Taking this last point first, there is an obvious link between this explanation and the
justification of Position Relative consequentalism. An argument against
agent-sacrificing/favouring options and against Portmore's modified consequentalism
is that there is no reason for privileging the agent in this way. We have seen that
Kagan does not believe there are any arguments for agent-favouring options.11 Given
that Portmore's account relies so heavily on it, I think that he should at least mention
the way in which support will be generated.12
As far as the first point is concerned, we saw that Kagan allowed a great deal to count
as the agent's interests, both self-interest and the interest that the agent had for others,
which for Kagan were subsumed in the overall good. Portmore restricts the agent's
interests purely to self-interest here.
'' Or indeed for agent-sacrificing options, where the sacrifice is not demanded by the promotion of
the impartial good.
12 He might for example appeal to an argument which suggests that there is such a thing as
'separateness of persons' and that this will be enough to render the self-other asymmetry which he
relies on acceptable. Although this position might be thought not to have good consequentalist
credentials. Sidgwick believed this to be the case, according to Derek Parfit (1984).
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As for the second point, it is true that a supererogatory act is frequently characterised
by an agent sacrificing his interests in favour of the good of others, interests which he
is perfectly justified in protecting or indeed favouring. However, I suggest that it
might not be true of all supererogatory acts, depending on how we wish to define a
supererogatory act. I return to this point later as an objection to Portmore's account.
3.5 The claims of ordinarymorality
Here are the claims from ordinary morality which Portmore sets out as the premises in
his argument:
'Claim 1: The mere fact that performing an act would be in the agent's self-interest
does not constitute a moral [my italics] reason for her doing so. The reason an agent
has to further her own self-interest is a non-moral reason.
Claim 2. Moral reasons do not have supreme rational authority, non-moral reasons
can and do sometimes override moral reasons. Thus non-moral reasons can be
decisive in determining what it is all things considered rational to do even when they
conflict with what the balance ofmoral reason supports doing.
Claim 3: It is always morally permissible to do what the balance of all reasons, moral
and non-moral, supports doing. That is, it is always morally permissible to do what
one has most reason to do, all things considered.
Claim 4: It is always morally permissible to do what the balance of moral reasons
supports doing. That is, it is always morally permissible to do what one has most
moral reason to do.
Claim 5: Therefore, an agent has the moral option of pursuing either what's best in
terms of her own self-interest or what's best in terms of the interests of others
whenever both (a) she has a decisive non-moral reason to do what's best in terms of
her own self-interest and (b) the balance of moral reasons supports doing what's best
in terms of the interests of others.'1'
'J Portmore (2003) p.308
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Portmore's suggestion is that ordinary morality is committed to claim 5. Claim 5 can
only be arrived at by accepting claims 1-4 and Portmore then attempts to show that
ordinary morality is also committed to these claims. Before examining this in detail,
we can see immediately how he arrives at his conclusion. By allowing non-moral
reasons to trump moral reasons on some occasions, Portmore has immediately found
a place for supererogatory acts in a way which Kagan could not. In Kagan's view,
morality is all pervasive, but Portmore has allowed a limit to morality by conceding
that there can be non-moral reasons which are related to non-moral values. Will this
be enough to give an account of the type of option that supererogation requires, and
is it a position that can be justified?
3.6 Reasons to pursue one's self-interest - is Claim 1 right?
Portmore develops Claim I - the idea that when an agent has a reason to pursue his
self-interest this is not necessarily a moral reason. He concedes that there may be
times when the agent so acting does generate a moral reason. Nonetheless, his view is
that when an agent acts in his own self interest he is acting rationally to achieve an
end that accords with a preference, but he is not necessarily acting morally. Let us flag
up the occasions when an agent might be considered to be acting morally when he
acts in his own interest with which Portmore does not deal in detail. It looks as
though there can be two cases where this is likely to be so:
i) when I have duties to myself;
ii) when the reasons that support my acting in my self-interest are to be weighed in a
reasoning process that will help me decide whether or not to perform an act of moral
worth.
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Portmore says a little about the first point. To those who think that duties to oneself
are a counterexample to Claim 1, he suggest that the sorts of duties to oneself that are
typically cited are not derivative of a moral duty to one's own interest but relate
instead to perfectionist goods, which for Portmore's purposes stand outside the moral
realm. For example, he would presumably consider that I do not have a duty to myself
to develop my talent for picking up pencils with my toes, but 1 arguably do have a
duty to myself to pursue my cooking skills. Good food might rank as a perfectionist
good, but picking up pencils with my toes will not (unless the small amusement value
to others counts). He goes on to suggest that duties to oneself give out in that 'people
may permissibly neglect ...those [talents] that have no potential for benefiting anyone
besides their possessor'.14 Portmore's suggestion is that duties to oneself in fact bear
no relation to self-interest, but instead return right to the heart of morality as being
'other-centred'; we do not count as duties to oneself those which would not have a use
for others.
What of duties of self-care and self-respect, which are made much of in certain
moralities and specifically religious faiths or the ideal of Kantian moral perfection?
These are not related to the welfare or benefit of others, but are directed at the simple
idea of giving oneself the value that is due as a person.I;> Portmore's rejection of
duties to oneself would leave out the possibility of certain supererogatory acts which
involve the extension of this duty, such as the example of Evelyn Glennie, the deaf
percussionist who has developed her talents to a very high standard.
14 ibid. p. 314
1 s
Kagan (1989) is forced to consider the possibility of duties to oneself, pp 212-215. He does not
reject it outright. This is because self-interest constitutes part of morality for Kagan. It is part of the
overall good. They do not offer the possibilities of options in his theory, though. If reasons stemming
from duties to oneself triumph in the battle ofmoral reasons, then they are required. If they lose, they
are not duties on that occasion, but are forbidden.
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I suggest that there is a second case where an agent might be considered to be acting
morally when acting in his own self interest which is not explicitly considered by
Portmore. Indeed, his whole argument assumes that these cases do not exist. In his
argument for his version of consequentalism, Portmore gives us the Weekend
Example, where the agent considers that he has reasons to write his article rather than
to volunteer for charity. The reasons to write the article appear as reasons in the
agent's own interest and thus according to Portmore are not moral reasons. They
cannot be, because he is going to use that fact to be able to generate an option
between writing the article and volunteering for charity. But what precisely are the set
of reasons under consideration?
The reasoning might go on the one hand like this: I must write my article this
weekend because it is very important to my career - this certainly looks like a clear
case of a non-moral reason related to the agent's self-interest. Or on the other hand: I
know I ought to write my article this weekend but I have a chance to work for charity
and other people's lives are more important than my career. We must at least consider
it possible that what Portmore takes to be a non-moral reason might be part of a
weighing process prior to a decision about a moral act, whereby the reason acts
primarily as an excuse or justification not to perform that moral act and only
secondarily as a reason in one's own interest. When such reasons are part of this
decision process, I suggest that they do not escape some moral flavouring. In ordinary
morality, we check that these non-moral reasons do not infringe a moral constraint, so
that they are at the very least morally 'vetted'.16
16 Scanlon's contractualism has to deal with the same point. There, non-moral reasons can
sometimes ground a reasonable rejection of a principle, making it morally wrong to act in a certain
way. The term 'reasonable' does quite a bit of work in Scanlon's theory. It would not be reasonable
to pursue my project of planning a bank robbery in lieu ofworking for charity, however committed I
was to the project. Some antecedent moral vetting of the non-moral reason takes place before it can
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It is critical to Portmore's account that self-interest counts as a non-moral value, and
yet he concedes that sometimes it might be moral. However, Portmore does not tell
us how we are to distinguish between occasions when self-interest is to be considered
moral and when not.17
3.7 The other claims in ordinarymorality
Claim 2 is that moral reasons do not have supreme rational authority. Non-moral
reasons may override moral reasons in deciding what it is rational to do. We would
normally expect a rider here to say that non-moral reasons can override moral reasons
provided they do not infringe any moral constraints. Otherwise Claim 2 could allow
us act rationally, but immorally. Kagan makes the point that the justification of
constraints and options are linked, and here is an example of this happening. We can
only put a limit on morality and thus generate options provided we put a constraint on
when the limit applies. So non-moral reasons can trump moral reasons, but only
provided they do not infringe a constraint. Hence Portmore's Claim 3.
Claim 4, that it is always morally permissible to do what one has moral reason to do is
self-evident.
be put in contention with a moral reason. See Ridge (2001) p.476. Portmore needs something like the
'reasonableness' filter.
17
Establishing a distinction between at least two types of reason or value is a popular way of
accounting for options and supererogation in particular. Rawls (1971) suggests that this is how he
would account for supererogation. Where the circumstances of justice do not apply and there is
extreme scarcity of primary goods, then Rawls' prinicples of justice are not applicable but acts of
goodness are still recognised and would be in certain conditions supererogatory. Similarly, Rawls
suggests that there are areas of goodness which cannot be reached by the principles of justice, again
giving scope for supererogatory acts.
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These four premises are presumed to be jointly necessary and sufficient to produce
the conclusion that embraces options, stated by Portmore as:
'an agent has the moral option of pursuing either what's best in terms of her own
self-interest or what's best in terms of the interests of others whenever both (a) she
has a decisive non-moral reason to do what's best in terms of her own self-interest and
(b) the balance ofmoral reasons supports her doing what's best in terms of others'. 18
There is no difficulty in agreeing that Portmore's argument goes through, provided we
are happy with:
(i) the distinction he draws between moral and non-moral reasons. One suspicion is
that Portmore has made the job of accounting for options easy for himself by merely
stipulating rather than arguing for such a categorisation of reasons;
(ii) the suggestion that Position Relative consequentalism can deal with this account
of reasons;
(iii) Portmore's concept of a moral requirement; always act as to maximise value.
Given his project, I think that we must accept this point.
Taking (ii) first; Portmore tells us that evaluator relativity only allows us to estimate
value from one position, namely ours, the agent's. We are not allowed to switch back
and forth between evaluator relativity and evaluator neutrality (which gives us the
traditional viewpoint of the consequentalist; the impartial spectator). But his account
of moral reasons looks as though his adjusted version of consequentalism does just
that; the agent either sees the circumstances surrounding him through the evaluator
relative perspective, which in a normal case of supererogation might provide the 'all
'8 Portmore (2003) p.308
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things considered reasons' not to perform the act, or the agent sees the circumstances
through the evaluator neutral viewpoint, choosing to sacrifice his own self-interest,
and he therefore performs the supererogatory act.
There is a more pressing worry concerning (i). What does Portmore say about this
split of reasons into the moral and the non-moral? He tells us that a moral reason is
nothing more than one which generates a moral requirement, in the absence of
countervailing reasons. Given that Portmore's definition of a moral requirement must
be something like 'act always so as to maximise value' we need to know more about
what he counts as 'value' in the moral case. Then we will know more about the nature
of a moral reason. Since Portmore tells us little about what a non-moral reason is, we
must presume that it is a simple reason for acting which does not aim at any of the
moral values. (Otherwise it would then turn into a moral reason).
3.8 Problems with Portmore's account of reasons
Portmore makes a distinction between two types of reason which will allow us to
generate moral options. He ought, therefore, to say something about either the
connection that these reasons have to how a moral requirement is generated or how
the reasons are connected with the values they bring into play. A deontologist might
be able to deal with it purely through the realm of right action, but because a
consequentalist is committed to the good being prior to the right it looks as though
the real key to giving an account of options within consequentalism cannot lie purely
in the realm of right action but must also say something substantial about its theory of
the good.
So, if it is morally permissible to act on the balance of either moral or non-moral
reasons, but it is morally required by the theory that we maximise value, it seems that
89
we have two types of value (at least) in play, that promoted by moral reasons and that
promoted by non-moral reasons. This means that the Portmore consequentalist is
sometimes maximising non-moral value and sometimes maximising moral value. There
might be no problem with this, except that it does seem to need a special theory of the
good to support it. For example, what sort of non-moral values can be maximised at
the expense ofmoral values?19
Portmore says little about this. He claims that we should conceive of consequentalism:
'in such a way that it tells us both what one has most moral reason to do and what one
has most all-things-considered reason to do I suggest... that we take
consequentalism to be the view according to which all reasons for action derive from
the value of the states of affairs that the acts produce1. 20
Portmore has no choice but to make his consequentalism cover all reasons for
actions. Otherwise it will not be possible to compare all-things-considered reasons,
which include moral and other types of reason, with purely moral reasons and to come
to a decision about right and permissible actions. Of course, this is not a worry in
itself and there is a sense in which every moral theory, and specifically traditional
consequentalism, does this anyway. But there is a slight difference. The traditional
form of consequentalism scans all reasons for actions and sorts them into moral and
non-moral categories, according to whether they bear on the value or values which
'9 Portmore's separation of reasons into the moral and the non-moral is reminiscent of Susan Wolfs
approach to supererogation. (Wolf 1982). She separates goods into moral and perfectionist goods.
Her agent is allowed (in fact, positively encouraged!) to pursue perfectionist goods, yet of course he
is also permitted to venture into the moral domain. Being more active in the moral domain than
average will lead to supererogation, although on Wolfs view this is not necessarily a desirable course
of action. She recognises the problem I raise here in connection with Portmore. When is the agent
required to enter the moral domain and when is it optional to do so? Wolf tells us we are looking for
a metainoral theory here, one which rises above morality and the pursuit of individual perfection,
and tells us when we should be in which sphere. Wolf herself is pessimistic about the possibility of
such a theory. Her suggestion is that it is impossible to escape something that looks like a moral
theory.
20 Portmore (2003) p.320
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the theory demands be maximised. (For example, utility, preference satisfaction,
welfare and so on). But what are the values that Portmore's theory wants to
maximise? All he has told us about the nature of the good is that:
(i) value must be maximised
(ii) there can be moral and non-moral value.
(iii) value can, and must, be assessed from the agent's viewpoint.
He has not told us how to distinguish between the moral and non-moral reasons
which relate to those values.
There is however a clue to a disvalue in Portmore's theory. Portmore says that
'there is tremendous agent-relative (moral) disvalue in doing harm oneself, which
outweighs even the agent-neutral (moral) disvalue in failing to prevent harm.'21
This allows Portmore to set up a constraint to deal with 'abhorrent' utilitarian
examples such as throwing a third unthreatened child on to flames which are
threatening to engulf two other children, thus maximising lives saved. Portmore thinks
it is important to incorporate a harm constraint because, if the theory does not insist
on this type of constraint, the options that his theory could generate might be wide
enough to allow an agent to commit harm in the pursuit of personal projects or, in
Portmore's more general terminology, maximising non-moral value. This echoes
Kagan's point that any theory which wants options must also put in place constraints;
otherwise the options will lead to abhorrent acts.
21 ibid. p.325
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Given that Portmore has chosen to be specific in the case of disvalue, we might have
expected more clarity in the case of value. We can take it that benevolent acts count
toward promoting moral value and that acts which favour our personal projects count
toward non-moral value. But what about acts which benefit our nearest and dearest as
opposed to strangers?
It would seem plausible that under Position Relative consequentalism all acts which
benefit our family and friends, and certainly any obligations we have to them, carry
much more moral value than acts for strangers, precisely because they are to be
evaluated from an agent-relative stance. Of course, that might depend on the agent's
personal relationships and temperament. If he happens to be the type of person who
naturally cares more about the plight of strangers than that of his own family, then
presumably more moral value is attached to the acts which relieve the needs of
strangers. Under Position Relative consequentalism, values appear to be fixed by the
agent's preferences, but disvalue is taken to be a moral absolute in the sense that it is
presumed that all agents will consider committing harm a 'tremendous disvalue'.
Portmore remains silent on the disvalue that results from an agents' failing to aid.
3.9 Portmore's Characterisation of the SupererogatoryAct
Now I want to turn to Portmore's detailed treatment of supererogatory acts. I agree
with him that two essential features of a supererogatory act are (i) it must be morally
optional in the sense of being neither obligatory nor forbidden and (ii) it must be in
some sense morally better to some other act that the agent may permissibly do
instead. These features are my Optionality and Betterness characteristics respectively.
However, later in his discussion on supererogation Portmore adds a third feature
which he takes to be central to the definition of a supererogatory act. He says 'an act
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is supererogatory only if the costs in performing it are greater than costs in
performing some other permissible alternative.'22 So cost is a necessary condition for
supererogation in Portmore.
Unlike the first two features, this does not, I believe, accord with pretheoretic
intuitions about supererogation. I might have to choose between spending the
afternoon mending my neighbour's fence or in concentrated revision for a particularly
difficult examination. It is much more 'costly' in the sense of its being a burden for me
to revise. Nonetheless, our intuitions are that helping my neighbour is supererogatory.
That is because of the value that it promotes, benevolence, over the value of the
alternative, which in this case is the furtherance ofmy self-interests in the shape ofmy
career plans. So in some cases at least what makes an act supererogatory is the type
of value I choose to promote, rather than the cost to me. Portmore might start by
suggesting that even here I have sacrificed my own interests in not revising for the
exam. But if in fact I find it more congenial to mend my neighbour's fence, then 1
appear to have sacrificed very little. Then Portmore will claim that, because my
preference is to mend my neighbour's fence and there is no cost involved, the mending
of the fence becomes obligatory. This does not seem to meet our intuition that there
are small favours we can do which do not cost us very much and yet are still regarded
as supererogatory.
Portmore combines his view about cost being central to supererogation with the
source of his agent-centred options, namely the claim that in ordinary morality reasons
to promote my self-interest are non-moral reasons. In the case of the Weekend
example, if I have a preference for spending the weekend in voluntary work for
charity rather than working on my article, then my non-moral reasons (my preference
22ibid. p.331
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for a particular action) and my moral reasons (the assumption that working for charity
is a moral reason because it presupposes benevolence) combine to give me an 'all
things considered' reason to work for charity, as well as the balance of moral reasons
giving me the same result. This agent preference has two important consequences for
Portmore's account.
Firstly, working for charity becomes rational, since it is the result ofmy doing what 1
have reason to do 'all things considered'. Secondly, because the moral and non-moral
reasons give the same result, the act also becomes obligatory, not supererogatory. So
just changing my preferences changes the deontic state of an act from morally
permissible to morally obligatory.2' I suggest that this conflicts with our intuitions
about supererogation.
Imagine someone who is always doing good for others and enjoys it: the contented
altruist. Are his actions to be denied the status of supererogatory merely because he
happens to enjoy helping others? Does the military hero, whose life is meaningless
without the army and who enjoys every minute of putting his training into battle
practice, lose his status as hero because he thinks that his courageous acts are merely
his duty? Portmore's view does, however, fit with the phenomenology, in that agents
often claim to have been 'doing their duty' or 'doing no more than anyone else would
have done' after the event; nevertheless, this rarely stops others from acclaiming them
as saints and heroes and certainly does not lead the protagonists to demand that
others do the same, which would be the case if they were merely complying with a
moral requirement.
To further Portmore's case, recall Urmson (1958). who claimed that acts carried out by a 'mother's
natural affection' do not count as supererogatory, because, I conjectured, her desire to do the act
nullified the costs, however great, and so the act could not be supererogatory on Urmson's view.
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We can certainly imagine cases where the agent may very much desire to perform the
act but the costs as perceived by the observer are still very high. Gianna's sacrifice of
her life for her child is a good example. People do willingly and gladly risk their lives
for their loved ones (and more rarely strangers), yet we still consider such acts as
supererogatory (perhaps especially so if they act willingly).
So if an agent wants to perform an act which would otherwise be considered
supererogatory, then the cost of that act disappears, according to Portmore and the
act fails to meet his necessary condition for supererogation, namely costing more than
another permissible act. It ceases to be optional and irrational, and becomes required
and rational.
I do not agree that because cost disappears through the agent's preference then the act
ceases to be supererogatory. However, I think that Portmore has highlighted an
important point. Certain acts of supererogation appear to be required from the agent's
point of view, and this may often be the case when the agent has a desire or
preference to perform that act. The requirement is not such that the agent considers
that it is required of everyone though. 1 also believe such an act would still remain
supererogatory from the third-party viewpoint. Further, even though the onlooker
regards such an act as supererogatory, he does not regard it as irrational. I develop
this point in my proposal in Chapter 7.
Earlier, I discussed the implicit assumption by Portmore that all supererogatory acts
are the result of the agent failing to favour his interests and in fact necessarily
choosing to sacrifice them (which is why his account of supererogation comes out as
always irrational). On Portmore's account, a supererogatory act happens when an
agent chooses to perform the act with maximal moral value but not 'all things
considered' value. If the two types of reason 'tie', then the act is no longer
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supererogatory but obligatory. This is how the idea that, if an agent wants to perform
a supererogatory act, then it becomes obligatory works - the agent doesn't have
anything to sacrifice, because it is cancelled out by his preference to perform the act
and so the two types of reason either tie or the moral reasons triumph. As we have
seen, I disagree with this analysis of a supererogatory act both because I do not think
that cost need be a necessary feature of all supererogatory acts and because I do not
think it agrees with our intuitions about supererogatory acts. Even if agents really
want to perform such acts which are not in their interest we still think of them as
supererogatory and rational.
3.10 Criticisms ofPortmore's account
I discuss Portmore's account of supererogation with specific reference to the
categories of supererogatory act discussed in Chapter 1. I categorised supererogatory
acts as follows:
(i) Heroic and saintly acts.
These are acts with a highly valuable outcome and where a substantial sacrifice is
required by the agent - the typical heroic and saintly examples of supererogatory acts.
There is seldom any consideration as to whether we 'ought' to perform these or not.
They are strictly optional. Portmore's account can deal with these easily. An agent
looks as though he may choose either to favour or sacrifice his interests on these
occasions. If he sacrifices his interests (and the costs to him are huge) we will call his
act supererogatory. So Joe's rescue is supererogatory. We can agree with Portmore
that he has an 'all-things-considered reason' not to perform that act, and a moral
reason to do so. Perhaps, in cases of heroism, we are happy to go along with the
Portmore account and describe Joe's act as 'irrational', because we can see that he has
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acted so substantially against his own interests in the performance of the act (the cost
being so great with regard to something basic and central to the agent such as his
health or life or a substantial part of his wealth or life plan).
However, taking Portmore's points about agent preference into consideration, so that
the agent actually wants to perform this act, it is hard to see how such heroic acts can
become obligatory, unless they are only obligatory for that particular agent under
Position Relative consequentalism. If that is the case, this inability to universalise the
moral requirement would seem to seriously undermine the efficacy of the moral
theory. My proposal also makes use of the dual deontic aspect, whereby the agent
thinks that a supererogatory act is required, but the act is optional for others; thus I
face the same problem. I discuss this in Chapter 7.
(ii) Contrasting value cases of supererogation
I refer to supererogatory acts such as those which might arise from Portmore's
Weekend Example as 'contrasting value' cases of supererogation. This represents an
addition to my classification of supererogatory acts in Chapter 1.
In contrasting value cases of supererogation, the agent can seriously consider which
of two lines of action he could take. One description of this type of act relies on cost:
the supererogatory act does not involve him in being a hero, but it involves a degree
of sacrifice. Another description says that this sort of example is about a contrast and
comparison between different types of value.
I prefer the latter description; although Portmore talks about cost, it seems that he
too sees it as an example of contrasting value. In his case, the distinction is between
moral and non-moral value. My concern with Portmore's account in these cases is that
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we do not know enough about his distinction between moral and non-moral values to
make the account work. His claim that there is enormous disvalue to the agent in
causing harm suggests that he must take on the debate about harming and aiding,
which significantly changes the structure of this type of example. Instead of its being
an example which centres round the agent's ability to sacrifice or favour his interests,
it becomes an example which asks how much harm the agent is prepared to do. To
deal with these cases of possible supererogation, Portmore would have to tell us more
about the values in his theory and those which count as moral values and those which
do not.
(iii) Favours
Finally, Portmore does not seem to be able to account for small beneficent acts which
are often seen as acts of supererogation. Small acts of kindness or forgiveness may
cost the agent very little, and it is hard to see how an account of supererogation which
relies entirely on cost can explain these. Perhaps Portmore can account for them by
suggesting that if I do a favour which costs me very little, instead of permissibly doing
something which costs me nothing at all, then just that very small difference will
satisfy the necessary condition of cost for supererogation. But in that case one of
Kagan's criticism of the appeal to cost comes to mind. If the cost is very small indeed,
what sort of notion of cost is being appealed to? Perhaps an infringement of moral
autonomy, which Kagan took to be an empty notion, and I agreed with him.
3.11 The contrast between Portmore and Kagan
In contrasting Portmore with Kagan, I draw the following conclusions.
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Portmore's account shows that maximisation is not in itself a bar to supererogation,
but there must be more than one good in the theory which can be maximised.
In Kagan's case, the overall good is comprehensive; there are no other goods which
stand outside it, not even the agent's self-interest. Therefore, maximising the overall
good in his theory is always required and, because there is only one good, maximising
can never lead to the possibility of options such as supererogatory acts. Kagan's
attack on supererogation is two-fold. Firstly, he attempts to argue for an all-inclusive
overall good, so that there is no competing good which can form the source of
reasons to compete with the pro tanto reason to maximise the good. In this attempt,
he seeks to show that the moderate cannot justify separating out perfectionist and
other types of good from the overall good. I rejected his claim at least as far as certain
values connected to love, friendship and therefore partiality were concerned.
Secondly, Kagan suggests that there is no adequate justification for limiting
promotion of the overall good to less than the maximum. He rules out cost in this
regard. Therefore, maximisation is the effective bar to supererogation in his theory. I
shall be arguing against Kagan both in respect of his attempt to establish a single good
in morality and in respect of his suggestion that cost is the only justification for
limiting the promotion of a moral good.
Portmore, on the other hand, allows two sets of values to be maximised; those
generated by moral reasons and those generated by 'all things considered' reasons,
which are composed of the moral reasons and the non-moral reasons connected to the
agent's self-interest. Maximising 'all things considered' reasons leads to required and
rational acts. Maximising moral reasons may, in the face of countervailing 'all things
considered' reasons, lead to supererogatory acts, but they are always irrational since
they ignore the 'all things considered' reasons. The determinant factor here is the cost
of the act. On Portmore's account, a supererogatory act is one which always costs an
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agent more than another morally permissible act. If the costs of this act disappear
because the agent wants to perform the act, then it becomes an act determined by the
'all things considered' reasons and is required and rational.
Portmore's account differs from Kagan's firstly in that it allows for more than one
good to be maximised. Secondly, it allows cost to be a justification, indeed a
necessary condition, of a supererogatory act. But note that Portmore does not need
cost to provide a limit to maximisation, as it is assumed to be used by the moderate on
Kagan's account. Portmore needs the cost factor to allow his agent the option of
pursuing and indeed maximising the 'all things considered' reasons. Although cost is
not used by Portmore in quite the way Kagan envisages that the moderate is forced to
use it, Portmore is nonetheless forced to use some kind of agent subjectivity to deploy
the notion of cost successfully to generate options. The subjectivity takes the form of
his Position Relative consequentalism, which allows the agent to contrast the 'all
things considered' reasons, in which the agent's self-interest plays an important part,
with the moral reasons, which are presumably not dependent on purely the agent's
viewpoint.
Cost and subjectivity therefore play important roles in Portmore's account, just as
Kagan suggested they would have to in any account of supererogation. The
suggestion with which I began this chapter, namely that maximisation is the complete
bar to supererogation, turns out not to be true, although it is only so when more than
one good is available to be maximised.
I have suggested that the two key problems in supererogation are to understand why
such acts are not required and to understand how they can be rational. When on
Portmore's account cost disappeared, acts which might otherwise have been
considered supererogatory became required and rational, suggesting that cost is
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indeed a major factor in supererogation. I now turn to the issue of cost and
supererogation.
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Chapter 4 Is Cost a justification for the optional nature of
supererogation?
4.1 The attraction of the appeal to Cost
The Victoria Cross was 'born in the carnage of the Crimean War'.1 The reasons for
awarding the medal stemmed partly from the fact that this was the first war to be
covered by journalists, who were able to report the appalling conditions of war.
Cholera and typhoid killed 20,000 as opposed to the 3,400 killed in battle. But the
journalists were also able to report graphically the courage and endurance of the
soldier in the face of these terrible conditions and the horrors of battle. Pressure rose
for some kind of award to be made to those soldiers who faced the horrors and
distinguished themselves.
Just before the Victoria Cross made its appearance, an attempt had been made to
distinguish particularly brave acts by non-commissioned officers and privates by
instituting the Distinguished Conduct Medal. (Commissioned officers had their own
decoration, the Order of the Bath). Before that the common soldier could have
expected a campaign medal, but 'this would be issued to every man who took part in
the war, whether he had fought bravely or not'.2 However, it was decided that there
was a need for a decoration that was open to all ranks and which reflected extreme
bravery shown in the face of the enemy in the front line. There were many such
encounters in the Crimean War.




Sergeant Henry Ramage galloped out to the assistance of a private who was
surrounded by seven Russians. The sergeant dispersed them and saved his comrade's
life. On the same day, he brought in a prisoner from the Russian line and also, when
the Heavy Brigade was covering the retreat of the Light Cavalry, lifted from his horse
a private who was badly wounded and carried him safely to the rear under heavy
cross-fire.3
This was the sort of bravery and action beyond the call of duty that merited the
Victoria Cross, which was awarded to Henry Ramage for his deeds on 25 October
1854 at the battle of Balaclava.
Military examples seem to provide clear evidence that cost is instrumental in changing
a required act into a supererogatory one. It is a soldier's duty to fight bravely, but by
awarding medals, we recognise exceptional acts of bravery. The Victoria Cross was
originally awarded for 'a signal act of valour in the presence of the enemy'. In other
words, where the soldier acted bravely beyond the bounds of duty. We can assume
that Ramage did not have to go to the rescue of the surrounded private. And seven to
one does indeed seem like a tall order. Medals are given for acts which it is assumed
were not required under duty. They are awarded for supererogatory acts; acts which
are supererogatory and optional precisely because they cost so much.
And isn't cost what comes to mind when we refuse to do something which we know is
good? It's too much to ask, we say. As Kagan emphasises, it is the reply we most
often give (in one form or another) when asked why we do not perform an act
regarded as supererogatory by ordinary morality.
From a website run by Mike Chapman: www.victoriaeross.net
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Despite the obvious attraction of the claim, I am going to disagree with the thesis that
cost to the agent is an explanation and justification for the optional nature of
supererogatory acts.4 1 therefore side with Kagan in thinking that the appeal to cost
fails as a justification for supererogation, although the conclusion that I draw from
this is quite different from his. Of course, I also disagree with Kagan when he
suggests that this is the only argument the moderate can run for such justification, so I
will be seeking justification elsewhere.
However, Kagan is right to suggest that cost initially looks like a very attractive way
of explaining why some acts are good but merely optional. We saw in Chapter 1 that
a number of definitions of supererogatory acts assumed that cost was a necessary
condition of supererogation, and that it is the degree of cost which makes an act
supererogatory rather than required.5 Portmore's account of supererogation also had
cost as a necessary feature of such acts. I discuss in this chapter why I disagree with
that view. I shall refer to those who think that cost does justify supererogation as
'appealers to cost'.
I want to identify two main problems with the proposal that cost is an explanation and
justification of supererogation.
1. Costly duties; cost is not a sufficient condition for supererogation.
The first problem is that there are duties which can cost an agent a great deal, as we
see in the case of soldiering. Queen Victoria went so far as to change the motto on
4 This is not to deny that cost is sometimes (perhaps frequently) a feature of supererogatory acts.
3 David Heyd's definition of supererogation is an exception to the more usual definitions of
supererogation which contain a reference to the degree of cost involved in the supererogatory act. My
reasons for rejecting cost are similar to his, although Heyd does not elaborate on this topic. Hevd
(1988) p. 145
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the Victoria Cross from 'for the brave' to 'for valour', in case anyone should come to
the conclusion that the only brave men in a battle were those who won the cross.
Soldiers are after all required to be brave.6 How do we differentiate between such
'hard' duties and supererogatory acts?
2. Cost-free supererogatory acts; cost is not necessary for supererogation.
The second problem is that some supererogatory acts do not cost the agent much. In
my example of a small favour, it costs me hardly anything to take in my neighbour's
parcel. Even in acts which do cost the agent a great deal, cost can sometimes be
wiped out by the agent's desires and preferences, as Portmore suggested.7 Some
agents willingly and gladly perform actions which the normal observer might consider
burdensome and costly. These agents frequently deny that such acts 'cost' them
anything.
1 shall deal with these problems in turn.
4.2 Costly duties. What happens to an appeal to cost when we compare
hard duties and supererogatory acts?
Hospital staff, social workers, even teachers are amongst those who can risk injury
and attack as a result of their jobs. Armed services personnel, firefighters, workers of
whatever kind in war zones and the police more obviously take on this level of risk.
There are therefore some 'hard' duties, where agents know that they risk severe injury
6 Urmson (1958) concedes that there are very hard duties and that we sometimes call people 'saints'
and 'heroes' when they are performing a very hard duty, which some might find too difficult.
7 Portmorc thought that this had the effect of turning the act from supererogatory into required.
however.
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or their lives as part of their required actions. How do appealers to cost explain their
claim in the face of hard duties?
They might begin their account like this. In Joe's Rescue example, if a firefighter
turns up first, he is obliged to do his best to save the children at the risk of injury or
death to him. Joe, as an ordinary agent, is under no such obligation, but if he chooses
the supererogatory option, then he freely undertakes the role at that time.
Perhaps the appealer to cost will want to make something of the fact that both agents
have chosen to risk their lives, but the way in which they make this choice is different.
In the firefighter's case, he does this through accepting his terms of employment and
job description that he enters burning buildings. (He will also receive training and
instruction on how to reduce the risks to both himself and his colleagues). Joe
informally takes up the opportunity for self sacrifice on the spot.
Objectors to the appeal to cost might say that it seems odd to make the distinction
between a supererogatory act and a required act merely because the maimer of
making this particular choice is different. We can bring the two cases even closer.
Imagine that a trained firefighter returns to work and signs his papers on the day of
the fire. Now his and Joe's acceptance of self sacrifice are separated by a matter of
hours and differ only in the manner in which they were taken up. Why isn't the
firefighter's rescue supererogatory?
Here is one possible answer the appealer to cost might give. Role duties do not count
as supererogatory because the agent has made a promise to fulfil acts which carry
these types of risk. Thus, by virtue of being a promise, they become a duty. This is
unsatisfactory, again because the two cases of the firefighter and Joe can be brought
nearer together on this basis as well. Imagine that Joe shouts out to one of the
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children in the burning building; 'Don't worry, I'll save you - I promise'. If we are to
find a difference between the two cases, it seems to be this: the firefighter has a
general obligation to take the risks described for as long as he stays in that role and on
each occasion that they arise8, whereas Joe's obligation, if it is such, lasts for that case
and that case only.
Is it possible that an agent can turn every supererogatory act into an obligation just
by promising to do it? Even if Joe calls out his promise, ordinary morality might well
regard his subsequent action as supererogatory and not required, despite his making a
promise and thus apparently taking on an obligation. The reason is that some
promises are too hard to keep; in other words, they cost the normal agent too much.
This at least is what the appealer to cost wants us to accept.
In the example of Gianna Molla, the suggestion that a promise is too hard to keep
was implicit in her elevation to sainthood. According to Pope Paul VI, Gianna had
remained 'heroically' faithful to the commitment taken on her wedding day. This
commitment, according to Catholic doctrine, establishes a partnership for life between
husband and wife, which is for the good of the spouses and also for the procreation
and education of their offspring. So Gianna Molla in saving the life of her unborn
child at the cost of her life was keeping a promise too, but the costs of keeping that
promise meant that it was deemed by the Church to be beyond what was required.
(She could have permissibly had surgery to save her life but which would have meant
the inevitable death of her child).
^ If Joe were an off-duty firefighter, we would have to say that his promise extends only to his
duty-time, but this example seems to put further pressure on the idea that there is no real distinction
between the deontic status of the 'hard' duty and Joe's act.
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There is another point related to promise-keeping. To differentiate between role duty
and non-role duty performance we can look at the moral minimum required in each
case. The firefighter, on duty and by virtue of his promise, has a substantial moral
minimum to meet. Other things being equal, he must enter the burning building and
attempt a rescue. He cannot turn away from the building because he is afraid. He must
fulfil his obligation as a trained firefighter. Joe, as either off-duty firefighter or
ordinary agent, may also have some moral minimum to meet. He might have to ring
for the fire services if he is first on the scene, for example, or help stop the traffic if
asked to by the firefighters, but he does not have to enter the building and attempt a
rescue. Using the Betterness characteristic, we can say that either the firefighter or
Joe performs supererogatorily if they do better than their respective moral minima.
The difference is that the firefighter may have to pay significantly more in terms of
cost in doing his duty than Joe because the minimum for the firefighter is higher.
An objector to the appeal to cost can suggest that we can use the idea of exceeding
the moral minimum as an explanation and justification for supererogatory acts,
without involving cost. For this to be successful, it must be clear that the moral
minimum is established without reference to cost. There are a number ofways this can
be done, but one way which is closed is using a consequentalist maximising principle
to establish the moral minimum. (So it is not surprising to find that Kagan dismisses
the idea of using a moral minimum as an alternative account to cost for the
justification of supererogatory acts). On the other hand, the creation of circumscribed
duties such as promise-keeping establishes a minimum fairly readily. However,
creating a minimum for open-ended duties such as benevolence is much harder. I
discuss this further in Chapter 6.
Those who want to appeal to cost might diffuse the problem that hard duties pose by
pointing to the fact that even those performing role duties can perform
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supererogatorily. So although in normal circumstances the firefighter's actions are
required, whereas Joe's actions would be supererogatory, there are cases where the
firefighter can perform supererogatory actions even in the course of doing his duty.
This sort of behaviour is often recognised by medal-giving in the fire service, as well
as in the military.
Objectors to the appeal to cost can point to differing intuitions in respect of whether
duties stop short in circumstances of great danger so that continuing them in the face
of extreme danger becomes supererogatory. Whilst the award of military medals, and
the Victoria Cross in particular, was welcomed by some in the military, certain
regiments held out against it, believing that it was a soldier's duty to do whatever was
expected of him. This was a common view amongst the Highland Regiments:
'The 79th Cameron Highlanders were notable in that they had no VC winners until
Sgt Donald Farmer received the award on 13 Dec 1900 during the South African
War. This apparent lack of attainment was not a matter of chance, but a part of
regimental policy and pride. In Victorian Scotland, the 79th thought that it was a
soldier's responsibility to do his duty in peace and war, that excellence was expected
and that no reward should he sought for simply getting on with the job, whatever the
dangers. '9 [my italics]
However, risking one's life when performing a role duty is often regarded as
supererogatory. The case of Lisa Potts, the nursery teacher, who defended a group of
small children from a machete attack, is one example. It was part of her duty to look
after the children in her care, but not to the extent of risking her life for them.
Likewise, the death of the head teacher Philip Lawrence, who tried to prevent a knife
fight between two boys and himself became the victim can be regarded as another
example of supererogation in the performance of role duty. This is possible because
the moral minimum in each case stopped short of a requirement to give one's life to
9Dr. Diana Henderson, The Scottish Regiments, Glasgow 1993 p. 136
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protect one's pupils. In risking or doing so, both performed better than the moral
minimum and so supererogatorily on my characterisation. Here we must assume that
it is cost which pegs where the moral minimum is.
Perhaps the appealer to cost can isolate a territory ofmoral high ground which is not
occupied by hard duties, because even such duties are not that hard. It could then be
argued that any performance which meets the other conditions for supererogation and
which warrants this degree of cost is supererogatory, whether it be a continuation of
duty or an act unrelated to duty.
Let us allow the appealer to cost the argument so far and assume he has been able to
carve out a territory of moral performance that is beyond hard duties, purely on the
grounds of cost. So his position does not conflict with the idea that there are also
'hard' duties, because what is considered supererogatory is the moral area where even
'hard' duties give out. They give out precisely because they cost the normal agent too
much, although it is accepted that some agents in some circumstances may do them,
as in the case of medal winners. The supererogation may result from doing more of
the sort of act that is a duty, as in the case of the Cameron Highlanders, who
eventually decided that the horrors of the First World War meant that they should
allow their men to be the recipients of the Victoria Cross after all. Or it might be a
supererogatory act which bears no relation to duty, such as Joe's rescue.
An objector to the appealer to cost could say that role duties do not give out at high
levels; it is only normal human motivation that does. Part of the description of
conditions for awarding the Victoria Cross refers to the 'extreme devotion to duty'
which must have been shown10. So even medal winners were after all only doing their
10 www.victoriacross. net
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duty. They are the exemplars which those in the same line of duty should be
encouraged to follow. They were able to find the right motivation to complete their
duties.
4.3 What ifmotivation for very hard acts can be made easier?
An example of Liam Murphy's demonstrates that motivation rather than the degree of
cost might be an important factor in deciding whether an act is obligatory. He gives an
example where he considers an agent would be required to give his life. This would
be a counterexample to the appealer's suggestion that 'hard' duties give out at the level
of life and limb. Murphy's example supposes that you are the only person in a position
to prevent a nuclear accident that would kill many thousands of people. If you do
what is needed, you will receive a painless but eventually fatal dose of radiation. Do
you escape in the helicopter, leaving many thousands to die, or do you, in effect
sacrifice your life?11 Muprhy says:
'While many cases of extreme sacrifice involve actions that it would be motivationally
very hard for most of us to bring ourselves to perform, I have here tried to describe a
cases where this is not necessarily so. Undistracted by the issue of motivational
difficulty, I am inclined to think it is not implausible, much less absurd, to say that you
are required to sacrifice your life in this case'.12
I think it is difficult to decide this sort of example. Ordinary moralists might still
consider the person who gave his life in this manner to have acted supererogatorily.
Certainly the example puts pressure on the agent, so that if he escapes in the
helicopter perhaps his behaviour looks rather less than honourable. It might be that
the pressure to sacrifice his life in the long term stems from the fact that he doesn't die
right away or because the numbers of lives that would be saved are so big, or perhaps
II Murphy (2000) p. 99
12 ibid. p. 100
III
from a mixture of the two. Murphy's claim is that it is because the motivation is easier.
Whatever the answer, Murphy suggests plausibly that we can come up with examples
where the motivation to survive can be distanced from the decision to act, so that we
are more ready to give up our lives for others. His example achieves this through a
time-lag, but 1 suggest it is just as convincing, if not more so, where we consider
cases of agent preference, which I discuss in more detail below.
My conclusion is that ordinary morality will often regard the loss of life or near
probability of loss of life in the pursuit of moral worth outwith role duties as
supererogatory.13 However, making the motivation easier as in Murphy's example
does appear to put pressure on the agent to perform the act, which would suggest that
is it not the cost alone that is a factor in turning an otherwise required act into an
optional, supererogatory one.
Kagan also suggests that changing the motivation of agents could result in their
seeing otherwise optional acts as required. He asks us to consider the possibility that
when agents are vividly exposed to the plight of others, rather than acknowledging it
in the abstract, then they see that they are required to help people, where previously
they might have thought that the help was optional. Famine relief agencies have made
effective use of this technique of'vividness' when bringing the needs of the poor in the
developing world to the attention of the developed world.
in
Frances Kamm (1985) also considers that an agent may sometimes have a duty to die. for
example if someone threatens to kill me unless I kill someone else. Given the ordinary morality
constraint on killing, it looks as though this constraint overrides the suggestion that no one may
demand of another that he gives his life. p. 130
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Given the varying intuitions on this point, we are still not in the position that the
appealer to cost wants which is to say that cost justifies the optional nature of
supererogatory acts.
4.4 What if the agent values something more than his own life?
The second objection to counting loss of life as a justification for supererogation is
that it is conceivable that there are goods that the agent cares about more than his
own life. In other words, there is a higher cost that the agent can pay than sacrificing
his own life. Agents might consider that it is worth dying in defence of certain
principles such as freedom or religious belief. Or they might consider that they care
more about the life of some other person than their own. It is less 'costly' for the agent
to give his life than to see his principles destroyed or someone he loves killed. These
are the greater costs. If the agent therefore sacrifices these, shouldn't his action be
supererogatory on the appealer's account? But it is harder to motivate the appeal to
cost for these kinds of acts. Whilst we might think that acts which involve loss of life
and limb in pursuit ofmoral worth are supererogatory, acts which involve this kind of
cost are less intuitively so.
For example, if I relinquish pursuit ofmy ideals (in the course of which I might have
lost my life) in favour of peace, then this might be expected to be supererogatory.
Examples might include recent attempts at peace in Northern Ireland where the
different parties have had to reach compromises, or sacrifice some of their ideals for
which they were ready to give their lives. Do we in fact consider this supererogatory
or more a matter of 'the right thing to do' and good moral judgement? It is not clear
that the high costs involved direct us toward the conclusion that they are
supererogatory. This is because there is plenty of room for disagreement about what
an agent should hold as a higher ideal than preserving his own life, and these types of
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example bring the conflict of ideals to the fore. In the case of an agent's own life,
ordinary morality assumes that we all value our own life highly. It is less connected
with contentious values or values that, although the agent might consider worth dying
for them, others regard them as misplaced in the circumstances or wrongly prioritised.
The notion of an agent's life and limb as a high cost avoids these problems.
Even if we concede the argument to the appealer to cost, the type of supererogatory
act which is covered by an appeal to the cost of life and limb is restricted to heroic
and saintly acts. It is not a satisfactory explanation and justification for the optional
nature of supererogation in general. There is nothing to stop the appealer to cost from
stipulating that this is his only allowable set of supererogatory acts, but as Kagan
points out this does not fit in with the moral phenomenology, where appeals to cost
happen at every level to justify the optional nature of acts. So the problem for the
appealer to cost is not just that there are hard duties that appear to require the same
sort of sacrifice as saintly and heroic supererogatory acts. It is that there are perfectly
ordinary duties which seem to involve the same costs as other acts which ordinary
morality regards as supererogatory.
4.5 Required and supererogatory acts with the same costs - a
development of the 'hard' duties problem for the appealer to cost
The appealer to cost faces an acute problem if he acknowledges that there are some
required acts and some supererogatory acts which have the same cost. The cost need
not be particularly high. This is a development of the problem of 'hard' duties, where
the cost for in performing such duties is very high, so high in fact that it might make
appealing to cost as a justification for not performing supererogatory acts with high
cost difficult to sustain. So the fact that there are duties with very high costs makes it
hard for the appealer to justify his appeal for heroic and saintly acts of great sacrifice.
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To add to the appealer to costs' difficulty, there are many examples of pairs of more
mundane acts in ordinary morality which have the same cost and yet where one is
required and the other supererogatory.
To demonstrate, here is an extended version of the Weekend Example. I originally
had a choice between engaging in the permissible personal project of writing my
philosophy article or working for charity. Now assume I have also promised to have
lunch with a friend. It will take me most of the day to travel to and from the place
where we have agreed to meet. The day can be spent either writing the article,
meeting my friend or working for charity. I have promised to meet my friend,
however, so I must do that rather than either of the other two. It is my duty. But the
cost of doing my duty is presumably the same as the cost that I would have incurred
in performing the supererogatory act of working for charity; namely, the damage to
my philosophy work of not getting on with that article. I must incur that cost for a
duty, but I need not do so in the case of a supererogatory act. If the cost incurred is
the same for both acts, how will the appealer explain his case that working for charity
is optional because of the cost involved?
In considering cases like this, it is hard to resist the conclusion that what is behind the
appealer's case is that a degree of cost makes an act optional only when certain goods
are involved. It might be that in ordinary morality there is a ranking of goods which
have different levels of cost 'allowable' against them, so that promoting those goods
becomes optional only when that level is reached. In the case of promise-keeping, the
level is quite high. If I make a promise to my friend to meet him for lunch, I cannot
opt out of it merely because I have something else that I would rather do, such as
writing my philosophy article, even if that work is worthwhile and part ofmy life plan.
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I can, however, decide that working on my philosophy article is a good enough reason
not to spend the time working for charity.14
Worryingly for ordinary morality, it seems that on the face of it there is more good to
be achieved through working for charity than having lunch with my friend. If both
costs are the same, why isn't working for charity required? In cases like these, the
appeal to cost looks a lot less secure than it did when the appealer suggested that Joe
was not required to rush into the burning building to effect a rescue.
The suggestion from Kagan is that ordinary morality is forced to put a constraint
based on cost on the requirement to perform benevolent acts. This is because the
possibilities of our doing good for others are endless and morality would become
impossibly demanding unless there was some form of limit in place. As I have
suggested in my discussion on hard duties above, cost is an apparently easy limit to
call on when it is high, because we frequently and understandably fail even in our
duties when there is a significant cost to us. However, when the costs of optional and
required acts are the same at a more mundane level, ordinary morality must have
recourse to another explanation as to why one act is optional and the other is
required. In my developed Weekend Example, ordinary moralists would claim that
keeping promises takes precedence over certain duties of beneficence. Where the
outcome of the beneficent act is very high, however, as it was in the case of Joe's
rescue, then the agent is permitted not to keep his promise, but where the difference
between the outcome of the beneficent act and the required act is not so great, then
keeping promises always overrides the beneficent act.
'4 This problem is highlighted by Frances Kamm (1985). She refers to it as the intransitivitv of
supererogation.
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Interpreting my developed Weekend and Joe examples according to Kagan's views
would lead to a further problem, however. Working for charity presumably means
that lives would be saved, albeit indirectly. Ordinary morality does not view the
outcome of Joe's rescue in the same light as working for charity, even if the number of
lives saved per act is the same. Both acts are optional, but the immediacy of Joe's
rescue act allows it to trump the promise-keeping, whereas the more indirect nature
of working for charity does not. Given that the eventual outcome is the same, a
consequentalist theorist such as Kagan would say that if Joe can perform his rescue
rather than keep his promise then he should also be able to work for charity rather
than keep his promise. Both acts would be required and not optional because of this.
The consequentalist need only deploy a comparison between betterness of outcome to
determine what is required. Cost is irrelevant.
Ordinary morality must do more work than simply comparing outcomes to establish
what is required and optional. In ordinary morality, Joe's rescue is optional because of
its high cost, but can be performed instead of certain duties because of its high value
outcome. Working for charity is optional because, although it costs the same as the
performance of a duty, the level at which cost operates to make a beneficent act
optional rather than required is much lower than in the case of promise-keeping. It is
also less clear that I could work for charity instead of keeping my promise because the
immediacy of the outcome is not as clear as in the rescue case. In ordinary morality,
there is a delicate ordering of precedence and stringency of acts which is a result of
combining both the cost and outcome of acts together with the notion of the good of
performing a duty which determines both when an act is optional and when it may be
performed in place of a required act.
Of course, this amounts to no more than saying that ordinary morality is not
consistently consequentalist, but also deploys deontological notions of the precedence
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of certain duties. And this is precisely Kagan's point of criticism against the moderate
or ordinary moralist. The ordinary moralist cannot explain satisfactorily how and
when he deploys consequentalist rules and rules of deontology. The suspicion is that
optional acts such as supererogatory acts are the result of inconsistencies in ordinary
morality in deploying consequentalism and deontology. Even if we concede the
ground of high cost acts to the appealer to cost, the case for claiming that
supererogatory acts are the result of inconsistency looks particularly strong when
comparing two acts of equal cost, but where one is considered optional and the other
required.
I shall now turn to the second problem which faces the appealer to cost. What of
supererogatory acts which cost the agent little or nothing at all?
4.6. Cost-free supererogation. Can the appeal to cost survive examples
of low cost supererogatory acts?
It doesn't cost me much, if anything, to do a small favour. Yet I need not do the
favour. In Chapter 2,1 described how Kagan rejected an appeal to moral autonomy as
a form of cost which might apply in these cases and I agreed with him on this point.
However, appealers to cost might suggest that although it doesn't cost me much to do
this particular favour, the consequences of doing every possible such favour would be
very damaging to me. (Think of the reams of management literature that is dedicated
to persuading managers to say 'no' to trivial requests that are made to them, because it
makes them so inefficient if they lose focus from their main objectives. Equally, the
popular life-style guides, particularly those aimed at women, are full of exhortations
to stop saying 'yes' to every favour that is asked. There is a danger you will be soaked
up by other's needs and requests, they imply.) So the costs of always doing a favour
might be great, even though one single favour might be of negligible cost.
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Yet there is a difference in the moral phenomenology in terms of the agent's response
between failing to do a favour and failing to do a heroic act which costs us life and
limb. From within ordinary morality, 1 am absolutely clear that 1 am not required to
sacrifice my life and limb in the pursuit of moral worth. I can think about examples of
people who do so with a clear conscience; admiring them certainly, but not believing
that I am required to do the same. I can read the stories of those who were awarded
the Victoria Cross and know that I would not do the same in the same circumstances.
I may not feel particularly ashamed of this. I can call the hero's act supererogatory
without believing that I would ever be required to do the same or similar.15
However, with small favours the response, again from the ordinary morality
standpoint, is different. There is a temptation to make excuses when we cannot
perform a favour. It is hard to escape the conclusion that there is some sense of
'ought' surrounding the favour, even if it is a very weak sense of ought.16
Kagan suggests that moderates might differ over the question of very small cost
supererogatory acts, some considering them required, others considering them to be
supererogatory. In any event, the appeal to cost looks hard to support in such cases.
The appealer may want to develop the argument that doing every such supererogatory
act will damage the agent's life plan, but presumably he thinks that, unlike the acts
which cost life and limb, the agent ought to perform at least some of the acts. I
discuss another way in which such acts might be justified as supererogatory in
Chapter 6.
15 Skorupski makes this point when referring to Urmson's grenade example:
'Note that falling on the grenade to save our fellows is not something we have an obligation to do on
some occasions but not all (as in Kant's conception of 'imperfect obligation'). We never have a moral
obligation to do it.' Skorupski (1999) p. 171n.21
16 See Trianoskv (1986)
119
A further problem in trying to appealing to cost comes when we consider the agent's
preferences. We have already seen in Portmore's account that when an agent actually
wanted to work for charity in the Weekend Example, the deontic status of the act
changed from supererogatory to required. In Portmore's case, this was because the
reasoning changed so that it was what the agent both had reason to do all things
considered and had moral reasons to do. But, I shall argue, such an example has
serious implications for an appeal to cost.
It is not uncommon to find saints or even heroes who when discussing their
supererogatory performance claim that not only did they not weigh the cost to
themselves, nor did they think that the acts were their duty, but they actually wanted
to perform the act and it was no burden to them. In these cases what are we to count
as cost? Perhaps the appealer to cost might try to claim that if the saint or hero has
paid or risked the cost of life and limb, as is often the case, then we can ignore the
preferences of the agent. We could claim that no one had a right to demand that cost
from the agent and the fact that they chose to sacrifice it willingly, or not even take it
into account, does not alter the deontic status of the act. The consequences of
following this line might result in having to describe the act as irrational, as in
Portmore's case.
But now consider the case where other costs are paid by the agent, and yet they
claim either not to recognise these costs or to pay them gladly and willingly.
Effectively, the 'costs' disappear because the agent's interests do not coincide with the
general perception of cost and interests. When Annalena Tonelli went to do
pioneering health work in Somalia, then it may have seemed from the observer's
viewpoint that she sacrificed her career (she was trained as both a lawyer and teacher)
and her comfortable way of life in Europe. Yet she saw it as no sacrifice at all. In fact,
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her happiness may well have depended on her pursuing her chosen course of action
and she might even have regarded herself as making a sacrifice if she did not do this.
If the costs disappear because of the agent's preferences, then we must at least
consider the possibility which Portmore suggested, namely that the deontic status of
the supererogatory act might change from optional to required. Ifwe persist in seeing
cost as justifying the optional nature of the supererogatory act then, in the above
example, Annalena would have acted supererogatorily if she had returned home and
continued her life fruitfully there, because it would have been more costly for her to
do so in the sense that she did not want to do this - an intuitively unsatisfactory
analysis of her actions, I suggest.
Recall also Urmson's example of the mother who sacrifices herself for her child 'out
of natural affection'. He disallows such acts the classification of supererogation
precisely for the reason that the agent wanted in some sense to perform the act, so
perhaps preferences changed the deontic status for Urmson too. In Gianna's case, she
was clear about what she wanted to do:
'According to family and friends she was serene but insistent throughout her
pregnancy. "If you have to choose between me and the baby, save it, I insist", she told
her husband..as the birth date approached.' 17
It is unsatisfactory to see the status of an act change merely because of the
preferences of the agent. It is quite clear that Gianna's act was not required. Helen
Watt, director of the Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics in London said this of
Gianna's act:
'7 Reported in the "The Tablet" magazine, 22 May 2004 in an article 'Gianna's choice' by Frances
Kennedy pps. 4/5.
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'In refusing a hysterectomy, Gianna Molla was going beyond the call of
duty.. .Refusing surgery to which you're entitled is heroic, but not morally required.' 18
What seems to be happening when the saint or hero is happy to carry out their
supererogatory deed is that an appealer to cost is forced to change the deontic nature
of the act from supererogatory to required, because the cost has effectively
disappeared. The preferences of the agent act so as to lower the cost to the agent to
almost nothing.19 But this often results in a counterintuitive picture of supererogatory
acts. We do not want to say, as Portmore would have to, that because Gianna was
happy with her decision it was required and not supererogatory.
The issue of agent preference makes life very difficult indeed for the appealer to cost.
If I am happy to do an act which the appealer to cost considers to be justifiably
supererogatory on account of the cost incurred by its agent, then something has gone
wrong with his account.20 The appealer can call me irrational of course, as does
Portmore, but I have suggested that we do not want to call saints, heroes and other
performers of supererogatory acts irrational. Cost is a superficial attempt at justifying
the optional nature of supererogatory acts and it has too many problems to be a
satisfactory solution. However, the problem of agent preference points us in two
other directions where we might find a more robust justification.
18 ibid.
19 This is not to say that the agent always fails to recognise the cost involved. They may even relish
the opportunity to do something difficult, although there is perhaps something suspect in the agent
who particularly loves performing difficult moral acts as opposed to engaging in intellectually or
physically challenging non-moral tasks.
20 There are not only agents who find it easier to perform moral acts which they rest of us would
find difficult. We should also consider that there are agents who find low cost moral acts difficult to
perform. Someone who has an irrational fear of germs might find it incredibly difficult to keep a
promise to their neighbour of taking in parcels when he is away, however much he wants to keep his
promise. If he overcomes his difficulty, it looks as though he is acting supererogatorily according to
the appealer to cost, although his action would normally be required if he gave an undertaking that
he would take in the parcels. This is where extending the use of the term 'praiseworthy' beyond the
supererogatory is useful. Ordinary morality could consider that such an agent had acted in a
praiseworthy fashion because of his difficulties, whilst at the same time acting in a required, rather
than supererogatory manner, and keeping his promise.
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4.7 Two other lines of justification for the optional nature of
supererogatory acts
Firstly, the fact that saints and heroes want to perform acts that are considered
difficult by the rest of us may tell us something not so much about the act but about
their character. Liam Murphy suggests that, if the cost to the agent of performing a
supererogatory act is the same as it would have been if he hadn't performed it, then
something else must be at issue.
He claims that some examples of apparent extreme sacrifice might actually involve no
such cost at all, because the hero would have died anyway. He raises the actual case
of Captain Oates and Urmson's hypothetical case of a soldier throwing himself on his
grenade to save his comrades. Murphy says:
'In both of these cases the heroic person would have died anyway; what is impressive
is thus not the size of their loss, but rather their extraordinary characters'.21
So cost is not the justification for the optionality of these acts, because big costs can
disappear not just through agent preference but because it is a cost that the agent has
to pay regardless of whether he performs the act or not. Murphy asks us to consider
why we think that Oates's behaviour was supererogatory in the sense of being better
than the alternative. On his view, it cannot be that he chooses to pay a great cost,
because he would have to pay that cost anyway. Murphy suggests that we look to
something in the character of the agent who chooses to perform a supererogatory act.
In Oates's case, presumably we look to the fact that he chose to consider the
21 Murphy (2000) p.99
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possibility of saving the lives of others through his own certain death as a feature of
his character.
There are certain sorts of people who find difficult moral acts easier to do than other
people. It is unhelpful simply to assess the deontic status of their acts. We need to
know more about the sort of person they are. If we approve of their actions, we can
perhaps point to aspects of their character, suggesting that they are moral exemplars,
and that we should be trying to emulate them. This of course is what the modern
Catholic Church is hoping to achieve in their selection of saints. Even in the case of
Gianna, one of her supporters was anxious to stress the point that it was Gianna's life,
rather than merely the manner of her death, which qualified her for sainthood:
'One man who knows the details of Gianna's life like few others, and has no doubt
about her saintliness is the Capuchin Father, Paolino Rossi. He was the Postulator of
her cause, and dislikes the emphasis on the manner of her death. "It's an error to
reduce her sainthood and her example to the last extreme gesture", he said. "It was
the culmination of a life lived with great intensity and a profound love of God and her
fellow man'.22
Where would this assessment of character leave the deontic status of the acts of saints
and heroes? If the agents wanted to perform them, then it looks as though we would
have to say that they are required, but in a weak sense. Perhaps others who do not
perform these acts are able to offer acceptable excuses for not performing them -
excuses which would not carry weight in the face of full-blooded requirement. This is
not at first glance a satisfactory answer for those who want to put supererogatory acts
into a separate class, but it has a strong intuitive appeal as a solution. I consider
99
Reported in the "The Tablet" magazine, 22 May 2004 in an article 'Gianna's choice' by Frances
Kennedy pps. 4/5.
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further the suggestion that it is character rather than acts at issue in supererogation in
Chapter 6.
The second direction that the problem of agent preference points to is to consider
whether the agent of a supererogatory act considers an act required for him but not
for others. I refer to this as the dual aspect of supererogation. It is a problem in itself,
of course, because we normally think that required acts are required for all agents and
not just some. Again, there is intuitive appeal, however. Saints and heroes frequently
suggest that they were only doing their duty in response to praise at their actions.
However, seldom, if ever, do you hear them suggest that you too should be acting
likewise. In addition, although they may think that they are doing what is required,
they are often very conscious of the loss or cost that their action involves. Here is
Gianna again in her last days speaking to her sister-in-law:
'Do you know what it means to die and leave behind four small children?'
She was conscious of the cost both to herself and to her children of her action. So
why should Gianna see her action as something she ought to do and yet everyone else
see it as optional and supererogatory? How do we square this with the
universalizablity requirement ofmorality? I discuss this further in Chapter 7.
4.8 Comparisons between Kagan's rejection of the appeal to cost and
mine.
Kagan's rejection of the appeal to cost is as follows. The moderate cannot appeal to
cost through degree alone, because the moderate does not simply appeal to very high
levels of cost in order to make them optional and not required. The moderate
frequently wants to call small cost acts such as favours optional. Therefore, the appeal
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to cost must be based on the nature of the cost that is incurred in the supererogatory
act. Kagan thinks that the moderate must be appealing to the cost of the loss of
certain values or goods when he performs a supererogatory act. Specifically, the
moderate will have to establish that there are certain goods which, because of their
nature, stand apart from the overall good which normally determines which acts are
required. It is to the loss of these subjective goods that the moderate appeals when he
appeals to the cost of performing supererogatory acts.
In this chapter, I have also pointed to the difficulties in appealing to the degree of
cost. There is a particular difficulty where two acts apparently cost the same but
where one is supererogatory and the other is required. I have argued, however, that
the most intractable problem for the appealer to cost is the issue of agent preference.
Here, even at very high levels of cost, the agent may want to perform the
supererogatory act and he does not experience cost in the sense of a loss of goods or
value of any kind, not even a special kind of subjective good in the manner that Kagan
suggests. However, agent preference does not turn the supererogatory act into a
required act in the way that Portmore suggests for two reasons. Firstly, I suggest that
the onlooker still considers such an agent's act to be supererogatory. Secondly, the
agent does not consider that his act is required for everyone.
There is a sense in which Kagan's account and mine of what the moderate has to do
next is similar. On both views, the moderate will need to establish that we can see
morality from two viewpoints. Kagan believes the moderate to be comparing the
objective goods which compose the overall good with a set of subjective goods which
for yet to be established reasons do not form part of this good. So for Kagan there are
two sets of goods to be compared to generate the optional acts of supererogation.
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I shall argue that a moderate who wants to justify supererogation believes that an
agent considers some acts required only for him and that others will see that act as
supererogatory. So I must establish how there are two viewpoints on the deontic
status of acts.
In the next chapter, I consider whether the justification of the optional nature of
supererogatory acts can rely on Kagan's idea of two sets of goods or on my specific
proposal of the idea of two viewpoints. I also consider two consequentalist accounts
which apparently avoid both the appeal to cost and the appeal to a subjective
viewpoint in their implications for supererogation.
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Chapter 5 Is a form of subjectivity necessary to justify supererogation?
5.1 Why Kagan insists that the moderate needs subjective goods
Kagan suggests that in order to justify supererogatory acts the moderate must
establish that there is a set of subjective goods which does not form part of the overall
good. The moderate was apparently forced into that position because, in his appeal to
cost, the moderate wanted to say that he experienced a loss when he was required to
promote the overall good in certain circumstances. This loss was sometimes
sufficiently severe to warrant his not promoting the overall good, although he could
still do so if he chose.
This was notably the case when the requirement to promote the overall good was
very demanding and might cost the moderate his money, health or life. The moderate
recognised that he had a reason to promote the overall good, even in these costly
circumstances, but he also experienced such a significant loss that there appeared to
be a reason not to promote the overall good. This resulted in the moderate's claiming
that promotion of the overall good in such circumstances was optional, and indeed
supererogatory.
Kagan suggested that there were no arguments available to the moderate to block
promotion of the overall good based on the degree of loss, because the moderate
would often claim that it was optional not to promote the overall good when there
was very little cost in his doing so. Instead, the moderate's only recourse was to
appeal to a set of goods which were not included in the overall good.
To recall the nature of Kagan's overall good: it included many goods, including the
agent's self interest. The overall good was also impartial, which in Kagan's terms
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meant that deciding when to promote the good could never be the result of the
agent's favouring his interests any more than another agent1. Nor could the agent
choose to sacrifice those interests, even if he was willing to. The set of subjective
goods, on the other hand, should therefore include goods which put the agent in a
privileged position with regard to their promotion. He could put greater weight on his
own interests and also choose to sacrifice them with regard to these subjective goods.
These goods will generate reasons to promote them, which will then vie with the pro
tanto reason to promote the overall good. This will offer the moderate the
opportunity of either promoting the overall good, and thus behaving supererogatorily,
or acting in a merely morally permissible fashion according to the reasons stemming
from the subjective set ofgoods.
I am assuming here that it is the promotion of the overall good that will be
supererogatory and that the subjective goods will supply reasons for the alternative
permissible act. This is how Kagan's discussion is structured. But could a
supererogatory act stem from the subjective goods with the alternative permissible act
arising from promotion of the overall good? I discuss this below at 5 .10.
On Kagan's account, the establishment of a set of subjective goods serves two
purposes for the moderate. Firstly, it offers him an opportunity to act partially either
by furthering his interests in giving them greater weight than they might have from an
impartial view or by choosing to sacrifice his own interests when the impartial view
would have ruled otherwise. Secondly, it provides him with reasons which compete
with the reason to promote the overall good and so set up the possibility of generating
an optional act such as a supererogatory act.
1 Kagan (1989) makes it clear that it is not just ,ve//-interests that are involved here.
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I do not agree with Kagan that the moderate needs to establish a set of subjective
goods to account for the optional nature of supererogation. However, my own
proposal that the agent sometimes sees acts of supererogation as required of him but
not of others will require me to say more about what form of subjectivity, if any, is
involved there. In addition, I must deal with the question of how the moral reasoning
process works in the case of supererogatory acts on my account. On Kagan's view,
this necessarily involves the establishment of subjective goods which then generate
agent-relative reasons.
In this chapter, I firstly examine how agent-relative reasons are supposed to help in
the justification of supererogation. I then discuss a consequentalist account of
supererogation which avoids the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
reasons completely and also avoids an appeal to cost. I then turn to another
consequentalist account which allows for the sort of goods which might stand outside
the overall good. I argue that this could be developed into an account of
supererogation. Finally, I discuss the form of subjectivity that my proposal will
require.
5.2 How agent-relative reasons are generated from a set of subjective
goods
Kagan suggests that the moderate needs to establish some reasons which stem from
values outside the overall good, so that these reasons can compete with the pro tcinto
reason to promote the overall good. Establishing two types of reasons which can be
compared is the first step in establishing a structure for supererogatory acts, because
each type of reason will provide the grounding for the options. (We saw that
Portmore did this by pitting moral reasons against non-moral reasons, which were
based on self-interest. Kagan insists that self-interest is part of the overall good,
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however, so this move is not available to him). Kagan suggests that the moderate
must make the distinction between agent-neutral reasons which stem from the overall
good and agent-relative reasons which stem from the subjective goods to get his
justification of the optional nature of supererogation off the ground.2
Nagel originally made the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
reasons. His proposal is that the impersonal and personal perspectives are both
necessary to a proper construal of morality. The dual perspective generates two types
of reason which can be used to decide right action. The attraction of the impersonal
perspective is understandable, claims Nagel. As agents participating in moral debate
we want our moral reasons to be accepted 'from outside'. Framing them in
impersonal terms is a natural way to do this. Nagel believes we want this acceptance
not just from others, but ourselves too. It is we who demand the impersonal
perspective in order to understand, justify and motivate our actions as moral agents.
Nagel believes that these impersonal reasons can be formed from a recognition that
there are some primary goods which everyone aims at or is entitled to. Primitive
pleasure and avoidance of pain are examples which allow us to formulate reasons that
can be affirmed from an objective standpoint. They provide us with a 'hedonistic
2 Kagan (1989) considers the possibility that the reasons which oppose the pro tanto reason to
promote the good may not necessarily be agent-relative. He says:
'Must the opposing reasons be agent-relative ones? Since, by hypothesis, these reasons can oppose
and outweigh the pro tanto reason to promote the good, the answer depends on whether or not one
can coherently maintain that a given goal lacks objective value, even though it is backed by
agent-neutral reasons. If one can maintain such a position, then the opposing reasons need not be
agent-relative ones (although they may be); if such a position cannot be maintained, however, the
opposing reasons must be agent relative', p. 76 fn 15
This sounds suitably half-hearted and nowhere else does Kagan consider that there might be
agent-neutral reasons which stem from a subjective viewpoint, so I do not consider this possibility
further.
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agent-neutral consequentalism'3 which describes a significant form of concern that we
owe to others.
Nagel argues however, that there is more to morality than impersonal reasons, and
that other types of moral reasons must be taken into account in moral deliberation.
Nagel distinguishes between two types of reasons, agent-neutral and agent-relative.
He describes the difference as follows:
The distinction between reasons that are relative to the agent and reasons that are not
is an extremely important one. If a reason can be given a general form which does not
include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason.
For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would reduce
the amount ofwretchedness in the world, then that is a neutral reason. If on the other
hand the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the person
who has it, it is an agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to
do or want something that it would be in his interest, then that is a relative reason. In
such a case, if something were in Jones's interest but contrary to Smith's, Jones would
have reason to want it to happen and Smith would have the same reason to want it
not to happen. (Both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons are objective, if they
can be understood and affirmed from outside the viewpoint of the individual who has
them).' 4
Examples of agent-relative reasons, according to Nagel, would include reasons arising
from the desires, projects and commitments of the individual agent. They would also
include reasons which arise from any special obligations that the agent has. These are
obligations such as those we owe to family and friends. Notice that Nagel refers to the
possibility of agent-relative reasons being objective, if they can be 'understood and
affirmed' from those other than the individual who has those reasons. How is Nagel's
position different from Kagan's own, on the one hand and Kagan's description of the
moderate's position, on the other?
3 Nagel (1986) p. 164
4 ibid. pp. 152-153
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Kagan asserts that any reason that stems from a good which is a component of the
overall good is an agent-neutral reason. He also told us that the overall good was
impartial in the sense that if it generated a reason for someone then it generated a
reason for everyone. On that basis, there is no difference between Kagan's reasons
which stem from the overall good and Nagel's agent-relative reasons which can be
understood and affirmed by everyone, despite Kagan's claim that reasons stemming
from the overall good are agent-neutral. I therefore have some difficulty in
understanding Kagan's use of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction in the
context ofNagel's definition. Yet it is clear that Kagan has based his terminology on
Nagel's definition.
I shall leave aside the difficulties of interpretation and proceed on the basis that Kagan
thinks that his overall good cannot generate agent-relative reasons, and that these are
necessary for an account of supererogation. They must be generated from a set of
goods which are subjective in the sense that the agent can weight his own interests in
relation to these goods out of proportion to others.
What are the implications of agent-relative reasons for a theory of supererogation?
At first sight, it looks as though an agent can appeal to agent-relative reasons as
reasons why he does not have to perform the supererogatory act. If he does perform
the supererogatory act he can appeal to agent-neutral reasons to explain why the act
has the special worth which makes it supererogatory. The agent-neutral reasons
appear to give the supererogatory act both its Moral Worth characteristic and its
Betterness characteristic. If an agent acts on agent-neutral reasons in certain
circumstances, then the good that is promoted is better than the good which is
promoted by the alternative permissible agent-relative reasons. It is presumably 'better'
because there is an implicit ranking of goods whereby any act that promotes the
overall good is better than an act which promotes a subjective good.
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This can only be the start of an account of the optional nature of a supererogatory act,
however, as merely making the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral
reasons does not of itself provide an answer. After all, as Kagan reminds us, if the
agent-relative reasons are strong enough to be morally decisive, shouldn't the act that
they support be required (and the supererogatory act forbidden)?
Nonetheless, the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons looks
as though it is a promising one for a justifying account of the optional nature of
supererogation. It makes use of the very strong appeal in ordinary morality that there
is moral worth in promoting a good 'for the world as a whole' and yet that there are
also valid reasons for not having to do this because we have goods which are specific
to us, such as personal projects and duties to families and friends to which we must
also attend.
However, Kagan's own description of the goods which make up the overall good
make the necessity of this distinction puzzling. If, for example, promoting one's
special obligations promotes the overall good, then that is what the agent is required
to do. Likewise with one's projects. So it is not that these values are ignored on
Kagan's account. If they win the maximising battle (and Kagan from time to time
suggests that they might), then the moderate cannot complain. Not only is he allowed
to write his philosophy and look after his family on Kagan's view, which according to
Nagel will be the kind of values to generate agent-relative reasons, but he will
sometimes be required to. Nonetheless, if the moderate can point to a substantial
difference between the two types of reason, he will at least have the beginning of a
justification of options. How would this distinction help in the case of supererogation?
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5.3 How does contrasting agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons
work in examples of supererogatory acts?
Here is an example of a supererogatory act which appears to rely on the sort of
distinction in reasons which Kagan thinks the moderate must make:
If Jane gives up her prospect of a comfortable life as a lawyer to campaign for and
live with the poor and persecuted people in a country governed by the violent and
corrupt, she is a heroine. Why? The explanation looks simple. She has foregone
personal safety, comfort and prosperity in order to help people to whom she has no
special obligation but who are in great need.
Jane's act fits all the characteristics of supererogation. It has moral worth because
Jane has put the good of many others above her own and acting for the greater good
is undoubtedly morally worthy. She has agent-neutral reasons to perform the
supererogatory act. It is optional. In ordinary morality, there is no particular call on
Jane, as an agent, to help these people; she has no special obligation to do so, yet she
sees that because of their need and her availability to help, good would come of her
action. No blame would attach to her if she took the other option and continued with
her career, although helping the poor is regarded as morally better than this option.
She has agent-relative reasons to pursue her career, reasons that are particular to her.
These reasons might include making full use of her talents, providing a worthy service
to her community and shaping her life in the way in which she intended when she
undertook her legal training.
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A theorist who wants to classify helping the poor in the Jane example as required
rather than supererogatory might say that these agent-relative reasons operate as
excuses, rather than justification, for her failure to take on a dangerous way of life.5
If, however, we accept Jane's reasons as fully justificatory, then we have a very
common model of the supererogatory act, whereby performing a great good is truly
optional and there is no moral failure on the part of the individual who does not
perform the act.
The theorist who is proposing this distinction between types of reason to start his
account of options still has his work to do. Why is Jane's supererogatory act better
than pursuing her career? According to my definition of supererogation it is always
the case that the supererogatory act carries more moral worth than the permissible
alternative(s); the Betterness characteristic always applies. But now the problem of
pressure of requirement starts to bite. If the agent-neutral good is better than the
agent-relative good, why isn't it required?
If the theorist makes the assumption that the agent-neutral good is necessarily better
than the agent-relative good, he has two replies to this:6
(i) It is too costly to the agent to pursue the agent-neutral good. (We saw that Kagan
considers this the only reply that the moderate can give. I agree with him that it is not
an adequate reply)
5 Even as excuses, Jane's reasons may still pass a test of moral validity, despite not having the
strength of full blown justificatory reasons. If we accept her agent relative reasons as having lower
status than normal moral reasons, we can continue to see the example as one of supererogation rather
than requirement, ifwe describe Jane's failure to do good as 'subererogatory'; in other words, she has
done something bad in not helping, but it is not necessarily subject to moral blame.
6 It may be that the theorist who makes the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
goods does not always consider that the agent-neutral good will be better than the agent-relative
good. I consider this point below at 5.10.
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(ii) The agent-neutral good is a moral good, whereas the agent-relative good is
non-moral. It is permissible to choose to pursue a non-moral good over a moral good,
but performing the moral good will then be better in a moral sense. (Portmore tries to
establish this distinction by distinguishing moral reasons from 'all things considered'
reasons. 1 argued in Chapter 3 that if the agent ignored the 'all things considered'
reasons and acted on the moral reasons, he was acting supererogatorily but also
irrationally, which was an undesirable consequence of making the distinction by
contrasting rationality and morality).
I now want to consider whether Kagan is right in suggesting that the moderate must
rely on the agent-neutral and agent-relative distinction to begin an account of
supererogatory acts, by examining an account of supererogation which explicitly
denies that distinction. If the justification of supererogation is adequate, then Kagan is
wrong. Like Kagan's, it is a consequentalist account.
5.4 Pettit's account of consequentalism and supererogation
Philip Pettit claims to show that consequentalism can accommodate all the features of
ordinary moral psychology that are maintained by many non-consequentalists in their
theory as both desirable and fixed.7 Supererogation definitely counts as one of these
features. However, Pettit still wants to maintain a consequentalist account of such
features. This rules out using a distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative
7Pettit (Baron. Pettit and Slote 1997) says he wants his consequentalist theory to maintain the idea of
human agents as sometimes acting non moralistically and usually non actuarially, in contrast to the
usual conception of consequentalism. If he can do this, it will leave much of our normal motivational
structure in place, including our desire to be partial and spontaneous. In contrast to a prescriptive
moralist like Kagan, Pettit thinks we should accept our nature and believes that there is not much
wrong with it.
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reasons to justify supererogatory acts, as Pettit considers that the agent-relative
reasons have no place in a consequentalist theory.
As I illustrated in Chapter 2, there is little or no room for supererogation on Kagan's
account. Given the precedence of values at which he hints, we are safe to assume that
in my above example Jane would be obliged to undertake her perilous new way of
life. But Pettit's account is quite different from Kagan's. It is important to remember
that he is content to let human nature and our existing motivational structures stand,
because assumptions about our fixed basic nature have often been the starting point
for the justification of agent-relative reasons and thence the justification for the failure
to perform supererogatory acts8. Pettit, however, will not follow this path.
Pettit recognises that one of the main objections to consequentalism is
'overdemandingness', which is very much in evidence when considering
supererogatory acts. A straightforward consequentalist theory, such as Kagan's
appears to require us all to be saints and heroes, when we actually want to say, in
accordance with our intuitions, that there are some actions which are good, but which
are not obligatory. Pettit's attempt at dealing with this objection is to suggest that the
best option according to consequentalist calculations is not the only option which may
be justified to others.
This is not to say that he opts for the solution of the disutility of denunciation,
whereby we can say that utility is best served if we do not denounce people for the
failure to be saints and heroes. I agree when Pettit says that this looks an
unsatisfactory solution for the consequentalist. It would be equally unsatisfactory for
many theorists who want to classify supererogatory acts separately. Typically, they do
8 See Nagel (1986) p. 204
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not want to think of supererogation as a means to an end, but as something special in
itself.
Instead of appealing to the disutility of denunciation, Pettit suggests that we look at
the decision an agent has to make in the context of others who are also faced with
that option. In Jane's case, she is not the only lawyer who could make the choice to
serve those in need; it is an option which presents itself to others in similar
circumstances. Therefore, Jane's choice may be influenced by how much others do in
respect of this choice. Pettit terms it as treating other agents as 'parametric'. He says:
'I must see myself as challenged in the demand for justification to show that the option
I choose does indeed represent the best I can do, in those circumstances, for the
promotion of the relevant values. If other agents are treated as persons who may be
engaged by any demands that engage me, however then I may see their failure to
contribute to the good as being on a par with mine and I may see myself as called
upon in the demand for justification to show that I am doing at least my bit. Whatever
shortfall has to be made up, the onus falls on those others, not on me.' 9
So in some supererogatory examples, such as that of Jane, others are equally called
upon to justify themselves for their failure to help the people she has identified as
being in need. This can legitimately affect her choice of option, according to Pettit. He
calls this assessment of choices the 'secondary' assessment which only comes into play
if the promotion of the value is not addressed to the agent alone.
In Pettit's method of escape from the overdemandingness objection, it looks as
though an agent is able to make different choices depending on whom the moral
demand is directed at. If the demand is made only on Jane (let us say her elderly
mother needs her close by and not in a foreign country), then Jane must presumably
make the straightforward 'best option' choice, because it is not a demand directed at
9 Baron. Pettit and Slote (1997) p. 165
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anyone else. If a demand, by contrast, is made on Jane and others like her to help the
poor, she is permitted to make a 'less than best' choice in consequentalist terms, using
Pettit's 'parametric' formula. She can choose to stay at home and pursue her career,
although she would have to 'do her bit' to help those whose need she had identified. If
on the other hand, she chose to go and work for the poor, this would be doing more
than she is required to do, more than her fair share, and as such would be
supererogatory. Simply, supererogation on Pettit's account is to do more than one's
fair share.
Pettit's account of supererogation avoids two features which Kagan claims are
unavoidable in a justification of supererogatory acts. Kagan claims firstly that it is
inevitable that there is an appeal to cost in the face of the overdemandingness of his
form of consequentalism. Secondly, this appeal to cost in turn leads to the necessity of
a separate set of subjective goods which will generate agent-relative reasons to
support the option not to perform the supererogatory act.
Pettit acknowledges the problem of overdemandingness in a consequentalist theory,
but solves it by an appeal to fairness, not cost. If a demand is made on an agent which
is a demand on everyone, or more than one person, then meeting that demand is only
obligatory up to the level of the agent's 'fair share'. Doing more is supererogatory.
Pettit's answer relies on the idea that the promotion of some values such as
beneficence is a shared responsibility. His agent does not have to perform the
supererogatory act and promote the agent neutral value of beneficence if they have
done their share. They are effectively excused obligation, not because of the cost to
them, but because the obligation to promote this value is shared and if they have done
their share, then the obligation has been met. If they choose to do more, that is also
acceptable, and indeed supererogatory.
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5.5 Problems with Pettit's 'fair shares' account of supererogation
Is Pettit's a satisfactory account of supererogation? I measure this in three respects.
Firstly, I consider some general worries about the use of fairness as a limit on
beneficence. Secondly, I ask whether Pettit's account meets the four characteristics of
the supererogatory act which I established in Chapter 1. Thirdly, I consider whether
all the types of supererogatory act in Chapter 1 are covered by such an account.
Is it acceptable to use fairness as a method of setting the limit for beneficent acts and
so to suggest acts which exceed that limit are supererogatory? There are two areas of
concern for theorists who want to support the idea of supererogation as a desirable
feature in morality.
The first point is that appealing to fairness in this way means that supererogatory acts
could only be a feature of a non-ideal world, and never of an ideal world.10 This is
because if everyone were doing their fair share, as in an ideal world, there would be
no 'extra' available to do and thus no opportunity to supererogate. The opportunity to
perform supererogatory acts only comes about because some people are not doing
their share in the face of a collective demand. Some theorists who see supererogation
as a desirable feature in morality, rather than a by-product of the average agent's frail
human nature, might not want to see supererogatory acts in this light. Portraying
supererogation in this light gives back the initiative to a prescriptive moralist such as
Kagan who thinks that right action should be determined by what should happen in an
ideal world, rather than accommodating for the non-compliance of agents for
whatever reason.
10 Liam Murphy has developed Pettit's idea of a fair shares morality with particular regard to the
limiting of beneficence through the concept of fairness. His account relates to a non-ideal world.
Murphy (2000).
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Secondly, we should note that using fairness as a limiting device on beneficence might
not mean that overdemandingness is curtailed. World poverty is sufficiently grave that
even merely doing one's fair share would arguably place considerably more demands
on individuals in the developed world than is currently the case. So fairness might not
limit beneficence to the extent that Kagan's moderate, say, would want.
Can fairness be applied as a limiting mechanism on beneficence, when if the agent did
more by way of beneficent acts, more lives would be saved? This is a question of
ranking of goods. Expressed in this stark way, with fairness for the individual agent
competing with the saving of lives, might make some feel uncomfortable. I return to
the more detailed implications of this objection below at 5.8. In response, we can
appeal to what is really at stake in a fair shares morality. Why should I sustain more
losses in a beneficent act than I would otherwise have to if you were complying? Why
should there not be some degree of recognition of achievement for someone who has
done his fair share in comparison to someone who has done nothing? If I have given
£10 to charity and you have given nothing, I feel ill-used if my action counts for as
little as your inactivity, even when the maximising principle dictates that I should have
given £10,000.11
11 Murphv (2000) makes this point. But against it, Elizabeth Ashford (2000) notes that in rescue
situations 'agents' complaints that a principle requiring them to help is unfair is likely to be
outweighed by the complaint of those who will die without the agents' help', p.433. I say more about
rescue cases below at 5.8
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5.6 Does Pettit's account of supererogation meet all the characteristics
of the supererogatory act?
Pettit's account is an improvement on Portmore's, in that supererogatory acts on
Pettit's view meet all my four characteristics. A supererogatory act is optional
according to Pettit, because the agent only has to do his fair share, although he is
permitted to do more. It is moral; there is no question that the additional worth
brought about by doing more than one's fair share is not moral. The supererogatory
act is better than the permissible alternative of simply doing one's bit, because more
moral worth is generated by doing more than one's fair share. Finally, there is no
suggestion that to do more than one's fair share is irrational on Pettit's account, so the
rational characteristic is also met.
5.7 Does Pettit's account deal with all types of supererogatory act?
Although supererogatory acts meet all my four characteristics on Pettit's account,
there is a problem as to the scope of supererogatory acts that it could cover. Pettit's
approach is limited to supererogatory acts which promote only those values where
there is the possibility of collective responsibility, such as beneficence. This might
cover a large number of acts which we intuitively think of as supererogatory. That is
because beneficence occupies a large slice of morality. It is also the value which is
most troublesome to the agent in that it sometimes places unwelcome demands on
him if he is forced to promote it at all times without limit. On Pettit's account, the
agent avoids the appeal to cost, which places him on a weak footing because it looks
like an excuse for not doing the supererogatory act. Instead, he can appeal to the
more robust value of fairness, which might have a place in this set of values for its
own sake and not just as an excuse for not performing a supererogatory act.
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However, some supererogatory acts do not look as though they could be accounted
for in this fashion. Gianna Molla's act of self-sacrifice is the first such example. She
was promoting the value of the sanctity of life, but it is difficult to see how in her
supererogatory act of sacrificing her life for her child she was doing more than her fair
share. There was no shared demand. As the mother about to give birth, only she was
in a position to dictate how she should act. (One possible way of developing the
notion of fairness might be to say that doing her fair share was to have surgery to save
her life and that anything beyond that was supererogatory, but then it looks as though
we have rather arbitrarily equated the ordinary morality minimum with her 'fair
share'.) On Pettit's account, because the demand is addressed solely to Gianna, her
action would be obligatory, not supererogatory.
Secondly, how would small favours be accounted for as supererogatory within a fair
share morality? If my neighbour asks me to take in his parcel, I have suggested that
we regard it as optional; it is a favour and not required. It is not especially demanding
for me to do the favour. If I do not want to do the favour it seems odd to say that I
justify this by appealing to the fair shares concept. I either do it or I don't. However,
one way in which a fair shares principle could apply to small favours is to say that we
only do our fair share of favours in terms of restricting ourselves to a certain number.
If my neighbour were always asking me to do favours, I might well consider myself
justified after performing a certain number in saying that I had done my fair share; it
was time for other neighbours to lend a hand. (Or for my neighbour to stop asking for
favours). Nonetheless, the appeal to fairness seems more difficult to apply in the case
of small favours than in the case of general beneficence. I return to the discussion of
this type of act in Chapter 6.
The third type of supererogatory act which is not handled by the fair shares approach
are acts ofmercy and forgiveness. The parents of Amy Biehl could not look to anyone
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else to share the act of forgiveness in respect of the murder of their daughter. The fact
that they did forgive might be considered supererogatory, but there is no question of
their doing more than their fair share.
5.8 Rescue cases as a counterexample to a fair shares morality
A final objection to the use of fairness as a limiting mechanism on beneficence
generally, rather than supererogatory acts in particular, comes from considering
rescue cases. Rescue cases look as though they pose a counterexample to the
collective principle of beneficence. In some cases ordinary morality considers rescue
cases as required and in others supererogatory. In either event, appealing to fair
shares in rescue cases just does not seem to work. I do not stand around the pond
with a drowning child waiting to share out the responsibility with others who are also
there. The ordinary morality response is that it is incumbent on me to act. I may not
even notice if others are there. To push the example further; if there are two children
to be saved, it would be regarded as unusual to say the least, if I rescued one but
failed to do anything for the other on the basis that it was another's responsibility.
Are rescue cases really a counterexample to a principle of collective beneficence?
Perhaps we can come up with a definition of a rescue act based on a number of
differences between such acts and those of general beneficence, which mean that they
are a different class of act.12 But is it necessary that they operate under a separate
principle from other beneficent acts?
1 1
Although Peter Unger (1996) mounts a credible attack on any attempt to do this, showing that the
features of rescue cases are all present in acts of general beneficence. Extending this point, Elizabeth
Ashford (2000) suggests that the degree of world poverty creates a constant 'emergency situation',
with the implication that there should be no deontic difference in our response to an ordinary
morality-type rescue case and the more diffuse demands of world poverty.
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Murphy is not optimistic that a collective principle of beneficence as used in Pettif s
account will serve in rescue cases. Nonetheless, he tentatively puts forward two
alternative suggestions.
Firstly, he proposes judgements about actions in rescue cases are judgements about
an agent's character rather than his actions. If an agent fails to perform the rescue in a
case where ordinary morality says that he should have done, our condemnation is a
condemnation of character rather than action.
Secondly, rescue cases might be special because the needs of the victim are
'conspicuous' to the agent in a way in which the needs of the victims of generalised
world poverty are not. However, this does not change the moral requirement on the
agent to act.
I consider the first point in the next chapter.
As far as the idea of conspicuousness is concerned, we should note first that the
maximisers such as Kagan can turn this to their advantage. As I mentioned above,
Kagan has a suggestion that we should all develop our capacity for 'vivid belief of the
sort that is at work both in rescue cases and where we have special obligations or
partiality, so that it works in every case of general benevolence. We would then be
motivated to take the actions necessary and make the sacrifices necessary to do the
amount of good for others that is required to secure their basic well-being.
Even where we have the sort of vividness of someone's plight that Kagan wants, in
some rescue cases we still are not always required to act. Ordinary morality does not
consider that Joe must enter the burning building, however vivid his perception of the
danger. If he does so, it is supererogatory. I do have to save the child drowning in the
146
pond if it is easy for me, however. Rescue cases are sometimes required, sometimes
supererogatory and it looks as though the change in status depends on something
other than the collective principle of beneficence.n
To conclude, Pettit's account is incomplete because it does not cover the full range of
supererogatory acts. In the case of Gianna's self-sacrifice, she did more than she was
required to in a way which was very different from 'doing her fair share'. 'Doing one's
fair share' is not a necessary condition for a supererogatory act, then. Equally, it is
sometimes required, rather than optional, that we do more than our fair share, as in
rescue cases, and so 'doing more than one's fair share' is not sufficient for
supererogation. In that the fair shares principle of morality turns out to be neither
necessary nor sufficient for supererogation; it falls into the same category as cost;
intuitively appealing in respect of certain supererogatory acts, but unable to deal with
the full range of such acts.
Even if Pettit's account of supererogation is only partly successful in that it cannot
deal with rescue cases, it is nonetheless interesting because it highlights the structures
of moral theory which are necessary for supererogation. Pettit's account is
consequentalist, in that the right action is determined by the good. No distinction is
required between agent-neutral and agent-relative value. Only agent-neutral values are
allowed. However, at least one of these values, namely beneficence, is a collective
value in that it is a value we all share. When we are faced with the possibility of
promoting this value, we are permitted to do either only our fair share or to
1lJ It looks as though the deciding factor as to whether I have to act in rescue cases depends on how
risky or costly it is to me. If it is easy to save the child from drowning in the pool, then I am required
to. If Joe risks his life going into the burning building, then it is optional to do so. It is precisely this
sort of example Kagan uses to demonstrate that the moderate is appealing to cost in the cases of all
optional acts. Any alternative proposal must be robust enough to stand up the sort of appeal to cost
which rescue cases appear to offer.
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supererogate by doing more of it. Kagan's claim that agent-relative reasons were
necessary for the justification of supererogatory acts is shown not to be right - and
demonstrated by a consequentalist account to boot.14
5.9 Do personal relationships and physical proximity mean that there
must be at least some subjective goods?
In Chapter 2,1 considered the list of goods which Kagan thought might be candidates
for this set of subjective goods. He thought that the moderate could not explain why
any of them should stand outside the overall good. I argued that the moderate had the
better of Kagan in his claim that partiality in the form of love and friendship stood
outside the objective viewpoint and yet merited moral status.
Supererogatory acts often appear to be a contrast between acts of partiality and acts
of impartiality, where the impartial acts are considered supererogatory and the partial
acts are considered a permissible alternative. On an ordinary morality view, it is good
that I look after my family's interests, even out of all proportion to their needs,
provided 1 am not infringing a constraint. But if I choose to look after strangers with
great need instead, that is often considered supererogatory. Ifwe do not allow for this
partiality, then I must treat my family with no greater or less concern than others, and
it may be that looking after strangers becomes required. In ordinary morality,
partiality may also bring about required acts. We have special obligations to certain
people, notably to those near and dear to us, but also to others with whom we have a
14 Kagan also mentions 'equality of distribution' as a possible component of the overall good. There
might therefore be a way of re-packaging Pettit's account to suit Kagan's account. Nonetheless. I
think that Pettit's account of supererogation is sufficiently against the spirit of Kagan's that it
adequately demonstrates that a subjective viewpoint is not necessary for some cases of
supererogation. Pcttit's account does require a distinction between situations of ideal and non-ideal
compliance, however; a contrast which Kagan alludes to, particularly in his discussion of the overall
good. On Pettit's account, supererogation takes place in a situation of non-ideal compliance.
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special relationship, such as our employees and employers, customers, colleagues and
so on.
It has been a particular criticism of consequentalism that it does not recognise this
type of partiality. More precisely, it is not that consequentalism does not recognise the
partiality that is the special obligation, but that it does not allow the overweighting
which ordinary morality gives the goods associated with this partiality.15 If this bias
can be explained and justified within a consequentalist framework, then this will be the
first step to generate supererogatory acts that rely on the distinction between the
partial goods of friendship and love and the impartial good of general beneficence.
The second step will be to explain and justify why the agent can sometimes give up
this bias in favour of the overall good, without its being required that he does so, or
without his contravening an obligation with regard to the partial goods.
Frank Jackson has developed an account which attempts both steps. He defends
consequentalism against the objection that relates to a neglect of partiality. Using my
example, if Joe enters the burning building and finds one of his children in danger and
one other person, say a well known doctor who can save many lives if he survives,
then the crude consequentalist result is that, if only one can be saved, then Joe has to
rescue the doctor at the expense of his child, thus maximising utility. The objection is
both to the result, which is wrong by ordinary moral lights, and to the thought that a
calculation of any such kind should be carried out.16 Much attention has been
15 Kagan (1989), for example, explicity allows for special obligations in his overall good, p.255 But
this does not help the moderate who has to explain and justify the type of supererogatory act where
the agent can choose between exercising his partiality and waiving it in favour of the overall good.
On Kagan's account, the partiality either creates an obligation or it doesn't.
111 In case we think that consequentalists would shrink from such a stark example. Jackson refers us
to Godwin's example of having to choose between rescuing Fenelon, a famous author and
archbishop, and a valet who happens to be the agent's father from a burning house. Godwin's
re-considered conclusion after the reception that greeted his first answer that you ought to abandon
your father is that rescuing your father is the wrong action but at the same time the action which
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devoted to how consequentalism can preserve this sort of partiality, which Jackson
terms the 'Nearest and Dearest' precedence.
The bearing on supererogation of preserving this partiality is this; supererogatory acts
are often classified as such because it seems that in performing the act, the agent has
given up partiality in favour of the greatest good. Jackson cites Mother Teresa as an
example of someone who did just that. It seemed that she had:
'the ability to carry through a demanding program of action which benefits a group of
people which, though tiny by comparison with the population of the world, is large by
comparison with the circle of family, friends, and associates that provide the principle
focus of action for most of us. They [people like Mother Teresa] do not seem to be
dependent on the kind of close personal relationships that are essential to keep most
of us from being outrageously selfish'.17
Consequentalism is a theory about action, about what we ought to do, Jackson
claims. The right action is determined by how much good is produced, and usually
there will be a number of different acts available. On a straightforward reading of
consequentalism, we have to choose the one which maximises utility. But more detail
is needed on how this happens, and this detail turns out to be important for Jackson's
support ofNearest and Dearest values.
Is the right action determined in an objective manner, retrospectively, so that we look
back at what the agent has done, agree that he maximised the good by his action and
conclude that his action was therefore the right one? Jackson rightly points out that
there is a practical, and therefore ethically relevant, problem with this. How does that
help me, the agent, find out what I have to do now? Jackson's examples point out that
there can be a lack of knowledge on the agent's part (through no fault attached to the
springs from the right character.
17 Jackson (1991) p.481
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agent) which can lead to a different action at time T1 from the action that the agent
would take with full knowledge at time T2 • Does the agent look back at his action at
time T1 and say that it was the wrong action? Or does he accept that it was the best
that he could do at the time? Jackson's argument is that we should live with a form of
subjective consequentalism; subjective in the sense that the action is taken according
to the agent's beliefs at the time of the action (but disallowing for 'culpable ignorance'
of the agent).
So for example, Joe is considering whether to rescue the children in the burning
building at great risk to himself, when a bystander calls out that he can see the fire
engine on the way. Joe considers that the best course of action is that experts should
effect the rescue and steps back to let that happen. Unfortunately it turns out that the
bystander is a hoaxer and no one has alerted the fire service. The best course of
action, with full knowledge, would have been for Joe to attempt the rescue himself,
but with his knowledge at the time he did the right thing.
Jackson's account of consequentalism relies both on the agent's state of beliefs at the
time of action, rather than a world view, and on the degree of knowledge that the
agent has at the time, as opposed to a later date. As far as an account of
supererogation goes, there could be a useful benefit from pursuing an account which
relies on this epistemological gap. It might give us a plausible answer to the puzzling
phenomenon that many people who perform heroic acts respond to acclaim by saying
that they were only doing their duty. On Jackson's account, this could be explained by
a purely epistemological gap between the agent and the observer, rather than a moral
one.
When my Balaclava hero, Henry Ramage, rode out to rescue the private surrounded
by seven Russians, the chances are he did not count them and consider that it was
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supererogatory to take on so many of the enemy. He just thought that he ought to
rescue his comrade. If it all seemed very dangerous, that was no doubt part ofwhat he
expected and he may have made little or no distinction between dangerous situations
(which he lived with on a daily basis) and very dangerous (where there is a strong
chance that he might have lost his life). To have received the award means that he was
observed by others. His action was supererogatory on their view, the 'world' view, but
only obligatory to Ramage.18
Explaining this observation as an epistemological discrepancy has the benefit of
preserving all characteristics of the supererogatory act, with one slight concern that
the act does not present itself to the agent as optional when he performs it, but I do
not see this as a major flaw. Of course, another concern is that it would not
necessarily account for all of the cases of supererogation where the agent thought it
was his duty to perform the act.
Jackson then turns this epistemological discrepancy to account in answering why we
favour those who are nearest and dearest to us. We have, he says, 'a special
epistemological status with regard to our nearest and dearest'. It is this we should
concentrate on, rather than agent-relative preference, when we seek to explain actions
which appear to favour our nearest and dearest at the expense of the greatest
impartial good. It is important to note that Jackson does not think that this means we
can sit complaisantly favouring our nearest and dearest when strangers are in greater
need. He agrees with critics that we do operate a bias in favour of our loved ones
based on value rather than the epistemological account above. Thus many
18 Another VC recipient, John Kenneally, recalls the circumstances of his own bravery: 'This was no
time for fear: a stranger, 'don't-give-a-damn' feeling takes a grip. This is something every
infantryman feels when he is constantly exposed to death in brutal and violent forms.' Arthur (2004)
p.450. The idea is that soldiers in the midst of danger do not see the situation in the same way as if
they had come to it from a safe, normal environment.
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supererogatory acts in ordinary morality which rely on contrasting impersonal and
personal goods might not pass the test on Jackson's account. They might turn out to
be required. He says:
'It is no objection to consequentalism that, according to it, we ought to do more than
we in fact do for people we hardly know. We ought to do more for people we hardly
know. We are too tribal. The suggestion is that a considerable degree of focus on our
family and friends, enough to meet the demand that our lives have a meaningful focus,
is plausibly consistent with living morally defensible lives according to
consequentalism'.19
Jackson tackles an obvious objection. If it is acceptable to focus on the needs of a
small group of people (because our epistemological limits stretch only so far) why is it
that it is usually our family and friends and not a small group of people in greater need
somewhere else? In Annalena's case, she did in fact minister to a small group of
people with very specialist needs who were not her family. Over the years she grew in
knowledge and understanding both about their way of life and the diseases and ills
which they fell prey to.
'She..became a leading expert in the treatment ofTB even though her qualifications in
health - she was a lawyer and a teacher- never extended beyond diplomas.' 20
She worked against the practice of female circumcision but 'respected the extreme
sensitivity to outsider interference in a custom endorsed by centuries of tradition'. In
other words, she behaved towards them in much the same way as we do towards
close family and friends, taking on specialist knowledge if it relates to their interests
and welfare and demonstrating sensitivity and care if we want to change or challenge
their actions. Why doesn't Jackson's form of consequentalism demand that we seek
I9 Jackson (1991) p.475
2,1 Reported in the "The Tablet" magazine. 11 October 2003 in an article 'For the love of Africa'
p. 10 by Maggie Black.
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out a small group of people to help (and in the developed world we can take it that
this will normally be a different group of people from our immediate family) and
devote ourselves to them in the way that Annalena did?
Jackson's answer to this puzzle relies on a story about human nature. In principle, we
should do what Annalena did, but we must take into account what we would be most
likely to succeed at and carry through. For most of us, that does not involve leaving
our family, travelling to a remote part of the world and learning about dangerous
diseases and unfamiliar customs. We do better at home, where our probability of
carrying through what we have to do to help our small circle has a much better chance
of success. He concludes:
'the consequentalist can plausibly explain agent relativity in terms of the role
probability plays in the recovery of what an agent ought to do from the
consequentalist's value function. The injunction to maximise expected moral
utility means that the consequentalist can accommodate our conviction that a
morally good life gives a special place to responsibilities toward a smallish group.
Which smallish group is another question, and here I argued that for most of us the
group should be chosen tribady. Because of empirical facts about our natures, that
choice decreases the chance that we will backslide'.21
Could Jackson's account be of help in determining whether the rescue cases (which
were a stumbling block for Pettit's account) could be distinguished from other acts of
more general beneficence? The physical proximity that persists in rescue cases makes
the agent more epistemologically confident. I can see the child in the pond, see the life
belt and know that I have a high prospect of success in rescuing the child all by
myself. I therefore think that I am required to. I am less confident about solving world
poverty all by myself.22 I need to share that responsibility to have a reasonable chance
21 Jackson (1991) p.481
22 In discussion. Barbara Herman suggested that there was an element of "I can., therefore.. I ought'
about certain supererogatory acts. The inability to see the effectiveness of one's contribution to world
poverty can lead to the conclusion that one is not morally obliged to do anything (much). The
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of achieving success. This might explain why in ordinary morality the agent is not
required to act in certain cases of benevolence, but according to Kagan it would not
justify his actions.
Jackson's account preserves the precedence of values which exist in ordinary morality
and can be interpreted to give a satisfactory account of supererogation within a
consequentalist theory in two ways.
Firstly, the idea of the epistemological 'gap' that might exist when a hero undertakes a
supererogatory act could explain why the agent subsequently states that he was only
doing his duty. The act is required on the agent's view but supererogatory on an
onlooker's, where the difference in deontic status is explained by an epistemological
'gap'.
Secondly, by allowing the form of partiality which stems from close personal
relationship to act as a reason for permissible acts in a consequentalist account,
Jackson could presumably make sense of any supererogatory act which relied on the
idea of privileging people other than those whom we normally favour. So although
this would not include Gianna's Sacrifice, because it is permitted but not
supererogatory to favour your family, it would include Joe's rescue as I suggested
above and also Annalena's life. Her adoption of a small group of people who were not
her family and her ability to live her life without the normal structure of relationships
was not the result of privileging the small group of people we normally expect and as
such it was exceptional and supererogatory.
immediacy of the rescue situation forces the agent to consider all possible routes to rescue and on
determining one, even a dangerous one, the agent deems that he is obliged to do more than might be
considered morally required.
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Unlike Pettit, Jackson has made a case for subjective goods within a consequentalist
theory, and this has led to the possibility of justifying supererogatory acts which
involve the contrast between reasons stemming from these subjective goods and those
which arise from promoting the overall good in Kagan's sense. According to Jackson,
we are permitted to act on the reasons which relate to the subjective goods but, on my
interpretation of his account, if we act so as to promote the overall good in these
cases then we have acted supererogatorily. However, I conclude that neither Pettit
nor Jackson's account could lead to a justification of the full range of supererogatory
acts.
5.10 Conclusion
Kagan's suggestion is that the moderate is going to have to tell a story about
subjective (or agent-relative) reasons and values, so that these can generate
permissions not to perform acts which promote objective (or agent-neutral) values.
The moderate will develop the story by explaining that if the agent chooses to
promote the objective value at the expense of the subjective value, then the cost of
losing the subjective value combined with the moral worth of the objective value will
make such an act supererogatory. The idea that a supererogatory act is one where the
agent selflessly ignores his own concerns in favour of the greater good is a very
common one - think how frequently someone like Mother Teresa is cited as an
example of a supererogatory life - but it is not the whole story.
There are examples of supererogation which do not rely on contrasting objective and
subjective values. We saw this in Pettit's account. There, the required promotion of an
agent-neutral value was limited by the idea of collective responsibility. Promoting
more of that same agent-neutral value was optional and supererogatory. So the
contrast there was between two objective values; between two agent-neutral values.
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In non-consequentalist theories, we need not insist that the values which are promoted
by the optional acts are the same or even of the same sort, such as agent-neutral. To
illustrate other types of supererogatory act, let us return to Nagel's distinction
between agent-neutral and agent-relative values. Of course, non-consequentalists may
see no need to make this distinction, but it is a convenient way of drawing out the
characteristics of different types of supererogatory act.
If we think that we have a duty to develop our talents, then such a duty might
generate agent-relative reasons. Someone who develops their talents in extraordinary
circumstances particular to them might be considered to have acted supererogatorily.
Evelyn Glennie, the Scottish musician, is a world-class percussionist despite being
profoundly deaf. It is not inconceivable that we admire her perseverance and success
in moral terms and consider what she has done supererogatory. This is because she
has developed her talent more than might have been expected. Now because there is
only one value in play, there is no problem about wondering why we call her
behaviour supererogatory. It is because there is more of the value, and specifically,
because it has gone beyond a minimum required to meet the duty to develop her
talent. Here is an example of supererogatory action where both the supererogatory act
and the permissible act are generated by agent-relative reasons.
For an example of a supererogatory act generated by subjective reasons which
contrasts with a permissible act promoting objective value, we need look no further
than Gianna's Sacrifice. Her action to save her child was partial and particular to her;
however she also had the future of her other children to consider, arguably an
agent-neutral reason on the grounds that every parent should take responsibility for
their children's welfare, as on the Pettit account. It would have permissible of her to
cite this as a reason to have a hysterectomy and lose her unborn child and save her
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own life. Many women would have taken this option. (Indeed, there has been some
controversy within the Catholic Church over Gianna's canonisation, as some consider
that it was in fact her duty to think of her other children first. This merely illustrates
the point that many supererogatory acts are finely balanced and vary according to
intuitions).
Although the most commonly cited type of supererogatory act apparently involves a
contrast between agent-neutral values and agent-relative values, as in my Jane
example, I suggest that this is not the distinction that is necessary for justifying
supererogation. As well as the contrast between agent-neutral and agent-relative
values, where promoting the agent-neutral value is supererogatory, it is possible to
think of examples of supererogatory acts where all other permutations are carried out.
Supererogatory acts and their permissible alternatives are sometimes acts of the same
type of value, where the supererogatory act represents an extension of the value. This
value can be agent-neutral as in the case of Pettit's example of beneficence, where a
fair share contribution to others' good is permissible but a greater contribution is
supererogatory. Or it can be agent-relative, as in the case of Evelyn Glennie. When
supererogatory acts arise in situations where there is a contrast between agent-neutral
and agent-relative examples, then the supererogatory act need not necessarily be the
one which promotes the agent-neutral value, as in my Jane example. The example of
Gianna shows that we sometimes consider the promotion of an agent-relative value in
the face of an agent-neutral value to be supererogatory.
Kagan suggested that the moderate must appeal to cost to justify the optional nature
of supererogatory acts and that this appeal meant that he had to seek out a separate
set of subjective goods to explain how the cost was generated. In this chapter, I have
explored the possibility of justifying certain supererogatory acts by relying on a
principle other than cost, namely Pettit's appeal to fairness. Because there was no
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appeal to cost, Pettit had no need to establish that there were subjective goods, which
would generate agent-relative reasons to contrast with the agent-neutral reasons
stemming from an objective overall good. However, although Pettit's account of
supererogation met all my four characteristics, it did not deal with all types of
supererogatory act. It failed to account for acts which did not rely on the agent facing
a collective demand, such as Gianna's sacrifice. More worryingly, given that the
account was specifically targeted at the overdemandingness of beneficence, it did not
cover a special class of beneficent acts, rescue cases.
I also put forward a consequentalist account which made special allowances for a set
of goods which Kagan considered, and rejected, as candidates for the subjective set to
which the moderate must appeal in order to justify supererogatory acts. I suggested
that these goods, love and friendship, were the best candidates for such a set of
goods. Frank Jackson argued that we could legitimately display the partiality normally
involved in love and friendship whilst still acting according to a consequentalist moral
theory. His reasons were based on the epistemological advantages that we had when
dealing with those who loved and knew well. However, if some agents decided to
step out of the circle of partiality and act towards strangers as if they were those they
loved and knew well, then this would result in supererogatory action. Jackson's
account enabled us to understand how some agents thought their actions were
required in circumstances where others thought they were supererogatory. Like
Pettit's account, my interpretation of the supererogatory under Jackson's account did
not rely on cost. However, both accounts failed to cover all types of supererogatory
act and so must be considered ultimately unsatisfactory.
In the next chapter, I consider another path which the moderate could take to justify
supererogatory action without relying on cost.
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Chapter 6 Can imperfect duties account for supererogatory acts?
6.1 A further alternative to the appeal to cost to justify the optional
nature of supererogatory acts
Pettit provided an account of supererogation which avoided an appeal to cost.'
Instead, it concentrated on the issue of fairness. In cases where the agent had an
opportunity to promote a collective value such as beneficence, then he need do no
more than his fair share. If he chose to do so, then he acted supererogatorily. The
account worked well in that acts which came out as supererogatory met all my
characteristics, but it could not be successfully applied to the full complement of
supererogatory acts as understood by ordinary morality. Rescue cases, such as Joe's
Rescue, were a particular difficulty, as were cases of individual sacrifice for partial
concerns such as Gianna's Sacrifice. Annalena's Saintly Life could be accounted for
using Pettit's model, but the issue of small favours also seemed problematic.
Jackson's account suggested that we had good epistemological reasons for favouring
small groups of people whom we knew well. We had a better chance of doing good,
because our understanding of what they needed and what we could do for them was
heightened by our proximity. For most of us, that means giving our family and friends
greater weight in our moral considerations, but for the saintly few it might mean either
choosing to operate morally across a much broader sweep of mankind, in the way that
Mother Teresa did, or selectively choosing a small group of people who could really
benefit from our help because they are sufficiently disadvantaged, in the manner of
Annalena. On my interpretation of his account, these people were acting
supererogatorily, the rest of us permissibly.
' An objector might want to suggest that fairness is merely a cover for avoiding acts which cost too
much. I am content to say that 'fairness' is a sufficiently basic principle to avoid that challenge.
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Both accounts had the benefit of not appealing to cost as a justification for
supererogatory acts, but equally they both had the failing of not covering all types of
supererogatory acts. 1 now want to examine another possibility which is open to the
moderate which does not depend on the appeal to cost.
The appeal to cost failed partly because the moderate wanted to appeal to cost as a
justification for not performing supererogatory acts when the cost was high, as in the
case of Joe's Rescue, but the comparison with duties which also cost a great deal
rendered the appeal dubious at this level. More damagingly to the case, in some
versions of the appeal to cost, when the agent wanted to perform the act, his
preference effectively dissolved the cost that might have been incurred, so that acts
which were willingly performed ceased to be supererogatory and became required. I
argued that this ran counter to our intuitions about supererogatory acts. Finally, the
appeal to cost foundered when there was little or no cost involved in the act
regardless of agent preference, as in the case of some small favours.
In the case of supererogatory acts such as small favours, it is commonly supposed that
I need not do the favour and I need have no other moral act to perform instead. On
the other hand, if I were the sort of person who never did anyone a small favour, then
I could be open to moral criticism. We 'ought' to do favours, at least occasionally.
This is rather different from examples such as Joe's Rescue, where if an agent never
performed such an act in his life he would not be open to moral criticism.
Some might say that this distinction is what defines the supererogatory act. If you
never have to perform such an act in your life and you can still avoid moral criticism,
then those acts and only those are supererogatory. The worry with this
characterisation of supererogation is that it leads back to an appeal to cost for the
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explanation and justification of supererogatory acts. If acts are supererogatory only if
they involve the risk of life and limb, then it seems that we are intuitively appealing to
cost to explain why they are not required. I argued in chapter 4 that there are
problems with an appeal to cost, even when the costs of performing acts are very
high, not least because the issue of agent preference could play an important part in
making the cost disappear even in heroic acts. I shall leave aside for now the question
of whether some kind of justification apart from cost could be made for
supererogatory acts purely for the class which involve a high risk to the agent's life. I
shall assume, along with Urmson and many others, that there are small acts of
supererogation. My task is to try to find a common ground of justification for all acts
of supererogation including small favours and the acts of saints and heroes, but
without appeal to cost.
A possible way of doing this is through an account of imperfect duties. In this chapter,
I examine whether Thomas Hill's interpretation of Kantian imperfect duties yields a
successful account of supererogation. It requires more to be said about the character
of the agent, and I discuss how an assessment of the agent's character can be
combined with an assessment of the agent's acts. A development of an account of
suberogation by Trianosky leads me to consider that it is possible to arrive at
independent assessments of the agent's motivational structure and his acts. This will
prove useful in my proposal for dealing with the two problems of requirement and
rationality in the context of supererogation.
6.2 How imperfect duties could give an account of supererogation
Although one distinction between the two types of acts can be made in terms of cost,
a small favour is also different from Joe's Rescue in another respect. Joe's Rescue is a
one-off act. With a small favour, the moral judge might want to look at the agent's
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'track record' of moral performance before pronouncing the favour supererogatory. A
category of act, the Kantian inspired 'imperfect duty', seems to fit well with these sorts
of act. If we can understand how imperfect duties work, we might be able to use this
concept in justifying supererogatory acts of the small favour kind and then investigate
whether it could be used for the other types of supererogatory act.
The suggestion that the theory of imperfect duties can help provide an interpretation
of supererogatory acts has been proposed by Thomas Hill, who considers that Kant's
moral theory would be enriched by a capability to embrace supererogation in some
form.2 His view has been opposed by Marcia Baron, who argues that the recognition
of supererogation as a separate classification of act goes against the spirit of Kant's
moral theory.2 1 first outline Hill's suggestion to see whether it can be adapted for
more general use rather than as a mere expansion of Kantian views.
Simply put, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is that perfect duties,
such as the duty to keep a promise, must be fulfilled on each occasion that they arise.
Imperfect duties, such as the duty of beneficence, leave the agent with more room for
discretion as to when to act. In Kantian terms, when performing imperfect duties the
agent adopts a general maxim to promote certain ends. He need not perform a
beneficent act on every occasion that he has the opportunity to do so. In Kantian
theory, the latitude afforded to the performance of imperfect duties is restricted by
perfect duties. One must not do anything as part of an imperfect duty that is
proscribed by a perfect duty. More specifically, the maxim to which the imperfect
duty relates must fall under the universal law and must therefore not conflict with a




'One ought to do (or avoid) x sometimes, to some extent, but never when or to a
degree contrary to principles of perfect duty'.4
So although I ought to perform favours such as taking in my neighbour's parcels, I
must not do this if it conflicts with a duty. I must not stay at home simply in order to
take in the parcels if it means that I break my promise to meet my friend for lunch.
Those of us looking for a justification of supererogatory acts might wonder whether
we can follow Kant even this short way down the path. According to Frances Kamm,
we may indeed violate a duty to perform a supererogatory act (but not to pursue a
personal goal).-"* We may take someone's car without permission to effect a great
rescue. According to Kant we may not do this.6
Even though the maxim underlying the imperfect duty might require the promotion of
a very general and open-ended value such as beneficence, the agent must still
demonstrate that he has adopted the maxim through the performance of acts which
conform to the maxim. Hill says:
'Anyone .who sincerely adopts such a principle will act accordingly, at least
sometimes, if he gets a chance. For example, if a person with the usual abilities and
4 Hill (1971) p.57
^ Kamm (1985)
() Kamm's point gives us a new and useful way of distinguishing between a small favour and Joe's
Rescue which reinforces the point that the optional nature of supererogatory acts is not to be justified
on the basis of cost. We might consider that I cannot take someone's car without permission to do a
small favour, but I could to perform Joe's Rescue. The distinction is based not on cost incurred to the
agent by performing the act but by the amount of moral worth in the act relative to the duty that is
violated. Of course, we have to be careful to explain that the amount of moral worth of the
supererogatory act is not determined by the cost borne by the agent. The moral worth of Joe's Rescue
comes about because of the lives saved, not because it costs Joe a great deal to achieve it. If we like,
we can assume that it does not cost him very much to do. Perhaps, as in the case of Gianna. he was
willing to do it to the extent that he did not experience any cost.
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opportunities did nothing to promote the happiness of others, he would thereby show
that he did not really adopt a maxim of beneficence.'7
This reinforces the intuition that, although we think taking in my neighbour's parcels is
supererogatory, we should still do some acts of this sort, otherwise we would be open
to criticism.
Hill raises the suggestion that if Kant is interpreted rigorously, then it is not the case
the we have a choice as to whether to do my neighbour a favour if the alternative act
is one of moral indifference. There the favour would be obligatory. The choice only
applies if the two possible acts both relate to an imperfect duty.
So on the Kantian view of what counts as an imperfect duty in the Weekend
Example, we can choose whether to work for charity or to write the philosophy
article, because the charity work falls under the imperfect duty of beneficence and
writing the philosophy article falls under the imperfect duty of developing one's
talents. However, we must do one of these acts. On this interpretation of imperfect
duties, we are now in the position that I discussed in chapter 3, when considering two
acts which both had maximal value. There, as here in this example of imperfect duties,
each act is optional in the sense that there is another permissible alternative which I
may do instead. In the case of the two maximal acts, the Betterness characteristic
could not be applied, because both acts were maximal and betterness was determined
by the amount of good promoted by each act. So performing one of the two
maximum acts would never be supererogatory on my account, because although it
formally met the Optionality characteristic, it failed to meet the Betterness
characteristic.
7 Hill (1971) p. 58 from Kant's Doctirne ofVirtue
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In the case of two imperfect duties, one of which must be done, we do not have the
same problem with the Betterness characteristic, because betterness is not necessarily
determined by the degree of good promoted by the act. So it might be possible to
develop an account of supererogation even if we are forced to adopt Kant's rigorous
interpretation of imperfect duties.
However, another interpretation suggests that what Kant had in mind was not the
rigour of always doing a duty, but that the adoption of indefinite maxims had to be
such that adopting and acting on one indefinite maxim did not close the way to
adopting and acting on another indefinite maxim. It is not sufficient that an agent
adopts the indefinite maxim to develop his talents if acting on this maxim always
means that he never acts on the indefinite maxim of beneficence, for example.
Hill claims further evidence in Kant for the suggestion that we should allow for 'free
time' in morality, in other words, there should be space to perform the morally
indifferent act and perhaps laze around the house a bit (however an unKantian feel
that has to it!). Kant disassociates himself from the "fantastically virtuous man", "who
admits nothing morally indifferent and strews all his steps with duties, as with
man-traps" '. 8
Yet on another occasion an impartialist view, usually espoused by consequentalists,
that the agent's interests should count no more or less than anyone else's, finds a
sympathetic echo in Kant where he suggests:
'.. it is rather that legislative reason, which includes the whole species (and so myself
with it) in its Idea of humanity as such ..., includes me, when it gives universal law, in
the duty of benevolence, according to the principle that I am equal with all others
8 Hill (1971) p. 59 from Kant's Doctrine ofVirtue
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beside me, and permits you to be benevolent to yourself under the condition of your
being benevolent to every other man as well'. 9
On this reading, lazing around the house could be interpreted as a manifestation of the
imperfect duty of benevolence towards myself as agent. We could choose between
doing a small favour (and thereby acting in accordance with the imperfect duty of
beneficence towards others) and lazing around the house (part of the imperfect duty
of beneficence towards me). But would either of these count as better than another
morally permissible act? It looks as though the Betterness characteristic could not be
fulfilled. If there is another morally permissible act, such as a morally indifferent act,
then the problem for the moderate is that he wants to consider only the small favour
as supererogatory; he certainly does not want to classify lazing around the house thus.
I return to this point below, but I accept Hill's reading of Kant that he intended there
to be a zone ofmoral indifference.
Can imperfect duties be sufficiently distinguished from perfect duties? Some theorists
have a difficulty in marking a clear distinction between the two because perfect duties
can apparently be turned into imperfect duties. Using an example from Roderick
Chisholm, if I owe you ten dollars then it is my (perfect) duty to repay you. The fact
that I may fulfil this duty by paying in cash, in any combination of notes or coin, by
cheque or that I may give you the notes in my left or right hand suggests that even a
perfect duty may be indeterminate in the same way as an imperfect duty and so the
distinction is a false one. Hill responds correctly in my view to this objection by noting
that there are two distinct types of latitude in play here, one which relates to perfect
duties and the other which relates to imperfect duties.
9 ibid.
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The first latitude is a latitude to fulfil a requirement in a number of different ways, or
as Hill puts it 'freedom to choose various ways of satisfying a principle in a situation
once we decide that the principle applies'.10 This applies to perfect duties such as the
debt repayment example. The second latitude is the latitude characteristic of imperfect
duties and is:
'freedom to choose to do x or not on a given occasion, as one pleases, even though
one knows that x is the sort of act that falls under the principle, provided that one is
already to perform acts of that sort on some other occasions'.11
This is the type of latitude that Hill has in mind to develop an account of
supererogation in Kantian theory using the concept of imperfect duties.
6.3 Hill's definition of supererogation
The relationship between supererogation and imperfect duties is not so simple that
one can say that whenever an agent performs an act in accordance with an imperfect
duty he has acted supererogatorily. As Hill points out, on Kant's scheme sometimes a
beneficent act will be obligatory if the only alternatives on that occasion are contrary
to perfect duty or if it is the last opportunity the agent has to fulfil his imperfect duty
which he has neglected on every opportunity to date. Hill thinks he can find a place
for supererogatory acts within Kant's theory in a sub-class of acts which fulfil
principles of imperfect duty. Hill's definition of a supererogatory act is an act which:
'a) is of a sort commended by a principle of (wider) imperfect duty
b) is motivated by a sense of duty (or, perhaps, respect for moral reasons)
c) is neither forbidden nor required by another, more stringent duty
10 Hill (1971) p.61
11 ibid, p.61
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d) is in a context where no alternative is required by more stringent duty and there is
at least one alternative that is neither forbidden by more stringent duty nor
commended by other principles ofwide duty
e) is done by an agent who has adopted the relevant principle of wider imperfect duty
and has often and continually acted on that principle.'12
Hill's definition is set up with the purpose of fitting it into Kant's philosophy, not for
more general purposes of defining supererogation. Nonetheless, it directs us to some
troublesome points concerning the use of imperfect duties in a general theory of
supererogation.
Firstly a). Defining which duties are imperfect as opposed to perfect is important.
Why should beneficence and developing one's talents be imperfect duties? Isn't
defining them thus merely an implicit acceptance that they are open-ended duties? If
so, then the perfect/imperfect duty distinction is a formal way of recognising the
problem of the overdemandingness of beneficence rather than a solution. I only have
to do good to others on certain, but not all, occasions precisely because if a perfect
duty were in force and I had to do good on every occasion then morality would be
impossibly demanding.
However, in response we can see that it is possible to set a minimum standard for
performance of perfect duties. Can we set a minimum standard for performance of
imperfect duties? If we could, it would tie in with our intuitions on supererogation.
Someone who does good for others on a reasonably regular basis meets moral
minimum standards, but an agent who is always doing good goes beyond the
minimum is acting supererogatorily. The difficulty is to find a formal way to express
this minimum for imperfect duties. We can't set the minimum by stipulating a number
of occasions when the agent is required to be beneficent. It is not the case that we can
12 ibid. p.71
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do a huge amount of good work for others in the early part of our life and then do
nothing thereafter. For example, an idealistic student who works in difficult
circumstances in the developing world in his year off" might consider that he has done
enough and he is required to do no more in his later years when career and family
demands become more pressing. This is clearly not the spirit of the Kantian imperfect
duty.
Turning to b). Supererogatory acts should not be dutiful acts, which Hill concedes,
but although b) appears to contradict this, the condition is specially designed to fit in
with Kant's view that an act has no moral worth unless motivated by duty. Hill does
modify the Kantianism by suggesting that acting from moral reasons would be good
enough. In ordinary morality, we might consider some acts supererogatory that are
not motivated by moral reasons provided the outcome were significant, such as saving
lives.lj
Condition c) is accepted but d) poses a difficulty. If a supererogatory act can be the
performance of an act fulfilling an imperfect duty where no stringency rules are
infringed and there is at least one alternative which does not involve the performance
of a perfect duty or imperfect duty, then under the Betterness characteristic writing
my philosophy article in the Weekend Example becomes supererogatory, as although
there is arguably a 'better' act that can be done, namely working for charity, there is an
alternative non-duty to both working for charity and writing philosophy, to laze
around the house. If I write philosophy, then I fulfil an imperfect duty to develop my
talents which is better than lazing around the house. On Hill's definition it is
1 f
Statman (1996) p. 218 points out that some good moral acts are often performed by people who
are not especially 'good' people or who would even understand or consider that they are acting from
moral reasons when they perform their courageous act. As Arthur (2004) p. 88 comments on one
recipient of the Victoria Cross; ;'it seemed that what is called "fighting spirit" and earns VC honours
in the face of the enemy can make an "unruly soldier" in more peaceful times'.
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supererogatory, which is a result that does not fit with ordinary morality intuitions.
There are two possible responses, apart from ignoring intuitions and letting the
position stand:
Firstly, we could claim that developing our talents is never a duty, not even an
imperfect one. Perhaps it falls outside morality or is, as Portmore suggested, really
subservient to a duty of serving others in that where we do consider developing
talents a duty or at least a moral issue, the sort of talents that we consider are those
which might have some benefit to others. On this reading, I may be permitted either to
write my philosophy or laze around the house rather than work for charity, since both
are morally permissible acts (in fact, morally indifferent acts ifwe consider there is no
moral value in writing philosophy). If I do work for charity then I have performed a
supererogatory act. More realistically, we might consider that developing our talents
has varying degrees of moral worth according to the talent and the circumstances,
although to regard developing our talents as supererogatory seems to require that the
moral worth of the talent be high and the circumstances special.
One possible example of this is where the agent has developed a talent to a high
degree in very difficult circumstances as in my example of Evelyn Glennie, who has
become a world class musician despite her deafness. The demanding consequentalist
might require her to develop her talents to the full, whatever her difficulties, but
ordinary morality would baulk at this and accord her some moral acclaim for her
perseverance and success. So we can find some examples of developing our talents
which could be considered supererogatory, but let us assume that the Weekend
Example is not one and therefore the problem remains.
Another response is to say that if there is more than one imperfect duty that can be
done, then we should do at least one of them, but that the label 'supererogatory' will
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only be accorded to the act relating to the imperfect duty which has the greater
content or moral worth. In the Weekend Example, this means that I must either work
for charity or write my philosophy and that lazing around the house is not permitted.
The ordinary morality position would be to regard working for charity as having
greater moral worth, although to consider the agent justified in writing his philosophy
article. This is assessed on the basis of results in a consequentalist manner. It is
assumed in ordinary morality that more overall good will come of my working for
charity than writing my philosophy (unless I am a truly great philosopher!)
Neither of these responses is in accordance with a Kantian interpretation. Firstly, Kant
regards developing our talents as an imperfect duty. Secondly, if a Kantian agent has
to choose between acting in accordance with two different imperfect duties, there is
no suggestion that the agent should choose on the basis of results of the action. We
were driven to find a response because a morally indifferent act, lazing around the
house, was an alternative permissible act, making any act in accordance with an
imperfect duty supererogatory. Hill's definition does not appear to deal with the point
that if there is the opportunity to act in accordance with more than one imperfect duty
(and there is always the possibility of performing a morally indifferent act), then
whichever act is selected will turn out on his definition to be supererogatory.
Hill's condition e) shifts the emphasis away from the feature of the single act to a
pattern of acts. As my discussion of imperfect duties has indicated there has to be
some way of assessing the agent's performance of the imperfect duty which is not
purely reliant on a single instance of carrying out the duty. Nor does the fact that an
agent might perform a certain number of acts which carry out the duty seem to be
enough. On Hill's Kantian view, and in ordinary morality, the agent whose behaviour
is supererogatory with regard to the imperfect duty of beneficence is someone who
often (but not necessarily always) helps others to a high degree. Measuring 'often' and
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'high degree' is not a simple matter - it is not the case that the agent can discharge his
duty by a short and intensive burst of beneficent acts in a few months or years, as I
noted above. Rather it does seem that, in the Kantian spirit, the agent must have taken
to heart the principle of beneficence and apply it in appropriate circumstances. I say
more about this when discussing the agent's character at 6.5 below.
6.4 Can an imperfect duties account of supererogation cover heroic
acts as well as small favours?
Despite the problems noted above, imperfect duties seem to be an attractive solution
to the problem of explaining supererogatory acts such as small favours, because they
express the type of latitude which ordinary morality accords these acts. Could heroic
acts also be covered by the concept of imperfect duties? Counted as a form of
beneficent act, there is no reason why they could not be. We might be worried that
the inclusion of heroic acts in this category would mean that we all ought to do a
heroic act at least once in our lives, and I have claimed that this is not an intuition that
we have about such acts, although it does apply to small favours and acts of
generosity.
Alternatively, including heroic acts as a generally beneficent act on a par with small
favours might just mean that the agent can choose which sort of beneficent act he
does. The temptation might be there to think that our hero can go around being pretty
mean-spirited for a good number of years, since he has a large heroic act 'under his
belt'.14 This certainly does not meet our intuitions about correct moral behaviour, let
alone supererogation.
14 There is a suggestion thai doing a really big heroic deed can mark an agent's record permanently.
Until 1920, holders of the Victoria Cross could have their award forfeited for subsequent
discreditable acts. However, after an appeal from a widow (of a bigamist VC holder!) King George V
173
If we allow heroic and saintly acts into the category of imperfect duty then
beneficence seems to have expanded to have captured every act that does good for
others which is not demanded by a perfect duty. What counts as an imperfect duty is
crucial to the success of using the structure to explain supererogation, and merely
stipulating certain duties such as beneficence and devotion to talents as imperfect
because they are open-ended seems to beg the question as to why they should be
open-ended at all. It might be suggested that small supererogatory acts are
open-ended because if we had to do them all it would make morality too intrusive in
our lives, and that the heroic acts are open-ended to give us a chance to duck out of
the really dangerous ones; in other words they might cost us too much. All ofwhich is
saying that the imperfect structure solves the problem of supererogation by merely
admitting the two ways in which morality can be too demanding, and it gives the
agent the two types of latitude he needs to avoid the overdemandingness. So far,
although the idea looks appealing, imperfect duties are not yet a satisfactory method
of providing a justification of the optional nature of supererogation within a moral
theory because we cannot say what sort of acts should be included and what
constitutes a minimum performance.
I now consider my interpretation of Hill's condition e) in his definition of
supererogation. In that condition, Hill claims that an act is only supererogatory if it is
done by an agent who has adopted the principle of imperfect duty and has acted on
revoked this and declared that 'even were a VC to be sentenced to be hanged for murder, he should
be allowed to wear the VC on (he scaffold'. Arthur (2004) p.xiii. Although holding the VC did not
right subsequent wrongs, it was considered a sufficiently great moral deed for it to be remembered as
a permanent mark on a man's moral record, unerasable even by the greatest wrong. On the more
negative side. Baron (1987) complains that superficially admirable big supererogatory deeds can lead
to a style of 'yuppie ethics'; for example giving a secretary a big present, patting oneself on the back
for such generosity, yet ignoring the more basic moral need that the secretary should really be paid
and valued more.
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that principle in the past. In other words, an act is only supererogatory if it is done by
someone who has done supererogatory acts before! I interpret that to mean that there
must be something special about the agent who performs a supererogatory act, and I
now examine whether it is the character of the agent which is at issue.
6.5 The character of the agent
Marcia Baron's criticism of Hill's account of supererogation mainly focuses on what
she sees as a misinterpretation of Kant, but it is her comments on supererogation that
are relevant here.1"' She rejects Hill's claim that imperfect duties can provide an
opportunity in Kant's theory because the emphasis in imperfect duties ought not to be
on the point that the agent need not perform acts of this sort on every occasion they
arise, as Hill suggests. Instead, the emphasis should be on the more demanding idea
that we can never say that we have done all we can to help people. Baron admits that,
even if we dismiss imperfect duties as a structure capable of explaining
supererogatory acts, we might still be able to hold on to heroic acts as a diminished
but distinct category of supererogatory acts. Here, as I have suggested, the
temptation is to fall back on the explanation for the supererogatory status of these
acts that they cost the agent too much. Baron raises the same points of criticism as I
have done in that there are many duties which cost a great deal and yet we are not
allowed to escape them. Baron refers to Pybus who suggests the following in regard
to heroic acts:
'We should not ask whether the action of throwing oneself on a grenade is beyond the
call of duty, but whether actions of a certain sort, viz., very brave ones, are beyond
the call of duty. And they are not. Clearly we cannot slide out of doing our duty by
saying that we are not brave enough. Sometimes we may be excused for a loss of
15 Baron (1987)
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nerve, but we cannot remain cowards all our lives, and use that as an acceptable
excuse for fulfilling only the basic requirements ofmorality.'16
Here Pybus and Baron distinguish heroic acts from more general acts of beneficence
because they involve the virtue of courage. I agree that this is a distinction and is
sufficient to prevent heroic acts from being thrown in with the duty of beneficence
that may be explained as supererogatory through the imperfect duty structure. Pybus'
remark that we cannot remain cowards all our lives suggests that she thinks the
intuition that we should never be required to do a heroic act is misplaced. It also
introduces the idea that the agent's character might be an important feature of even
heroic supererogatory acts as well as a necessary feature of the judgement made about
the smaller supererogatory acts. Baron picks up the point about character and
elaborates with this example:
Jill and Maria have both adopted a maxim of beneficence. They really care about the
welfare of others and take it very seriously. They have no desire to impress others by
their good actions. In other words, we are to assume that both their motivational
structures properly reflect the maxim of beneficence. Baron describes the two cases
thus:
'Jill helps others often, but she does not make the sacrifices of time and energy that
Maria makes. Maria volunteers on emergency hotlines. Jill does not turn her back on
needy people and is sensitive to the needs of others, but she does not go out of her
way to involve herself in the activities of the sort that Maria takes part in. In addition,
Jill tends not to take notice of others' needs except when she is personally acquainted
with the people in question.'17
In ordinary morality, Maria would normally thought to be behaving supererogatorily
and Jill doing her duty. But Baron suggests this is problematic ifwe think in terms of
16 Pybus(1982) p. 198
17 Baron (1987) p.258
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act classification. Which of Maria's acts will count as supererogatory? (We can
suppose that some of her actions will be exactly the same as Jill's). Rather we should
be giving special recognition to Maria's character, says Baron. This example spells out
the problems of the imperfect duty raised above, but Baron's solution has its own
problems which she acknowledges. What does it mean to give recognition to
someone's character if not through an analysis of their acts? Baron suggests that
before we describe someone as having a specially virtuous character we look not only
at their acts which we might consider to be supererogatory but also at their ordinary
actions as well so that we build up a picture of the agent's motives, aims and values.
Combining this assessment of character together with the concept of imperfect duties
might explain the structure of at least some supererogatory acts. Hill's condition e), in
which a supererogatory act 'is done by an agent who has adopted the relevant
principle of wider imperfect duty and has often and continually acted on that
principle', could be modified so that a supererogatory act 'is done by an agent whose
motives, aims and values are those of a virtuous person'. This would be in accord with
ordinary morality intuitions about small supererogatory acts. 1 judge the agent who
does a small favour to be supererogatory only if he has the right motivational
structure and attitude to doing good for others. If 1 know that he is the kind of person
who does favours for others only to ask for other rather difficult favours in return, 1
am less inclined to view his act as even morally acceptable let alone supererogatory.
The rider about the virtuous character does not sit well with the view of heroic acts,
however. I have already suggested that we may consider some acts supererogatory
when we know nothing of the agent's character; they are supererogatory in virtue of
the great outcome that has been achieved. Baron concedes this, although she says
such acts are rare. This points up an important difference between heroic and saintly
supererogatory acts. Heroic acts include a set of acts which are responses to special
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situations and require no knowledge of the agent's character and motives to be
classified as supererogatory.18 Saintly acts are those where the agent has taken a
decision to live in a certain way as a result of a particular set of character dispositions
and motives.
Baron also correctly points out that supporters of supererogation differ as to whether
they demand that an altruistic motive be present before the act can be classified as
supererogatory or not.19 For example, Heyd claims the intent must be altruistic but
the motive can be to gain fame.20 So if Joe is a self-seeking publicist and rescues the
children from the burning building, his act is supererogatory according to Heyd
provided he intended to save them, albeit that his motive was one of
self-aggrandisement. This distinction in definition might seem a small one, and
stipulative at that, until we come to examine it in the context of supererogatory acts
as imperfect duties tied to the agent's character. We either side with Baron and decide
that small supererogatory acts can be written off as duties albeit imperfect ones and
with a particular description of the agent's character as an additional condition, or we
decide that the imperfect duty model with the extra character condition succeeds in
justifying a separate classification for a set of supererogatory acts. If we demand a
certain character condition before heroic acts are considered supererogatory then we
might be able to extend the imperfect duty/character model to embrace them, thus
avoiding the need for two types of justification. If we insist on the possibility of the
1 ft
Usually the award of the VC reflected this point. However, in an exceptional case a VC was
awarded to Edward Mannock, not for the usual single deed, or group of specified deeds, but for his
entire sendee as a pilot in World War 1. He was described as being an 'outstanding example of
fearless courage, remarkable skill, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice which has never been
surpassed.1 However, it was only one aspect of his character that was in point here for Mannock was
certainly no saint, nursing an obsessive hatred of Germans and taking delight in his kills (although
he showed considerable devotion to his men). It was his consistent bravery, rather than any one
incident or a saintly character .which won him his award. Arthur (2004) p.360
19 Michael Clark (1978) pp.23 and 29 is an example of one who does.
20 Heyd (1982) p. 115 and p. 137
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heroic act without any character condition, then we are back to the uncomfortable
position of having to provide two different justifications for their optionality.
There is still something troubling about the imperfect duty/character account,
however, which might cause us to reject even this modified account. Consider Jill and
Maria again. We will consider some people virtuous even if we cannot point to any
supererogatory acts, Baron suggests, and I think she is right. There is nothing to say
that Jill is not a virtuous person. In fact, that Jill has taken to heart the good of others
and makes reasonable if not all exhaustive efforts to help those in need would
certainly seem to put her in the category of the virtuous. Rather, the example suggests
that Maria comes closer to the ideal of thefully virtuous person.
Now, however, it looks as though we have exchanged a scale of goodness of acts for
a scale of virtue of character and find ourselves in the same difficulty as far as
supererogation is concerned. Where on the scale do we decide that someone is a
person whose level of virtue tips her acts of imperfect duty into the category of the
supererogatory? This might not be insuperable. It might be sufficient to know that
there is a point on this scale, and that we might be able to say roughly where it is even
ifwe cannot spell out how we do this. How though is our position improved over that
of the theorist who thinks we can judge that an act is supererogatory by how good it
is (possibly with some combination of a cost factor) even ifwe cannot explain the full
factors and relationships behind that judgement?
6.6 Are imperfect duties a successful way of describing supererogatory
acts?
Hill's definition of supererogation using imperfect duties raised three problems.
Firstly, Hill's condition d) appeared to allow any imperfect duty performed instead of
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a morally indifferent act to be supererogatory. This might broaden the category of the
supererogatory beyond its normal usage in ordinary morality. Secondly, condition e)
ofHill's definition suggested that we would need to find something about the agent's
character or motivational structure to add to the performance of the imperfect duty
before it became supererogatory. Baron's description of how this might be done
showed that, on the face of it, working out what constituted a supererogatory
character met the same problems as trying to decide what the minimum performance
for a duty might be. Finally, if we take the imperfect duty/character route for
justifying supererogatory acts we have closed off a justification for the heroic act for
two reasons. Firstly, there are some such acts where the character of the agent is not
known to us and is irrelevant to the status of the act. Secondly, imperfect duties imply
that we ought to do such an act at some point in our lives and this is not an intuition
that is commonly shared about heroic acts (Pybus' view notwithstanding).21
There is another category of moral act, related to imperfect duties, which develops
the idea of the relationship between the deontic status of the act and the character of
the agent in a way which is useful to an understanding of supererogation. This is the
suberogatory act.
6.7 Suberogation and an assessment of the agent's motivational
structure
Theorists such as Chisholm have suggested that a category of act, the suberogatory, is
closely related to the idea of the supererogatory.22 A suberogatory act, as the
21 We might think that we can avoid this problem if we consider that we have done any act which
fulfils an imperfect duty. So as long as we have done the right amount of small favours, we are still




etymology suggests, is one which falls below the standard of the required act, but it is
not a forbidden act. It is permissible, despite its negative moral worth. To frame it in
the structure of imperfect duties, if a supererogatory act is one which an agent ought
to do sometimes but is not obliged to on every occasion, then a suberogatory act is
one which an agent ought not to do all the time, but may do on some occasions.
Above, I suggested that heroic or saintly acts could not fit into the structure of
imperfect duties, because the sort of act that fulfilled an imperfect duty was one that
an agent knew that he should perform at least on some occasions. According to our
intuitions, heroic and saintly acts are those which the agent thinks he never has to
perform in his lifetime. Suberogatory acts also mirror imperfect duties in that,
although we may permissibly perform acts of small negative worth on occasion, we
can never perform a very bad act.23 Once the act attains a certain level of negative
worth, I suggest that it will fall out of the permissible category and into the forbidden.
Thus, there is evaluative as well as deontic similarity between supererogatory and
suberogatory acts. The concept of suberogation is useful to an understanding of
supererogation because it is easier to see how an evaluation of the agent's act can be
separated from his character in the shape of his motivational structure.
Firstly, here is an example of suberogatory action.24 Someone queuing for a bus seat
stands ahead of a couple who obviously want to sit together. When she gets onto the
bus, she can choose between sitting in a single seat or in the one remaining double.
She sits in the double. She is perfectly entitled to do so, since she is ahead in the
queue of the couple. And yet there seems to be something not quite right about her
behaviour. It is not exactly wrong. We can imagine that if the queuer were challenged,
Although Chisholm (1963) tries to make the case for acts which are very bad, but not wrong to
do. I conclude that he is unsuccessful in this.
IX
Adapted from an example by Julia Driver (1992)
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she would respond with something like 'I'm within my rights -1 was first in the queue'.
It lacks something morally desirable, nonetheless.^
Suberogatory and supererogatory acts are structurally similar. Any explanation of
suberogatory action might be expected to help with an understanding of
supererogatory acts. Trianosky has developed an explanation of suberogation.26 He
begins with two examples of such acts. Firstly, refusing to forgive a debt even though
the lender knows the debtor needs the money much more than he does. Secondly, the
house seller who sells his house to the highest bidder rather than the people who need
it most, when their bid is only a few thousand dollars less. Trianosky says:
'Our shared moral convictions indicate that these are surely permissible choices. In
response to criticism, I might correctly point out, 'I had every right to do what I
did' What is objectionable in the two cases... is that the agent expresses a narrowly
legalistic attitude toward morality by asserting his rights in such cases. It is not that
what he does is wrong, considered independently of its motive; for our common-sense
principles of moral obligation are narrow and legalistic here. Nevertheless, the agent
reveals a genuinely vicious motivation in his coldly calculated insistence on what is
rightfully his'.27
There are two points to be drawn from these examples. The first is that the judgement
of the act is separated clearly from the judgement of the agent's character. Although
the agent is permitted to do the suberogatory act, the onlooker makes a negative
judgement about the agent when he does so. In discussing imperfect duties, and in
particular the examples of Jill and Maria, Marcia Baron considered it difficult to
separate the judgement of character from the act. The two for her were inextricably
In this example, if she does give up her seat, we might consider that she has done more than she
has to. If the queuer does not give up her place, her act is permissible but falls short of some standard
which allows us to say that there is some negative moral worth in her act. It is suberogatory. On the
other hand, if she does give up her seat, which she is not required to do. then she has acted
supererogatorilv. It appears that the agent faces a sort of dilemma; she must act either suberogatorily
or supererogatorily - there is no morally neutral ground to fall back on.
2^ Trianosky (1986)
27 Trianosky (1986) pp. 462-463
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linked. Trianosky is supporting the idea that deontic judgements and judgements
about an agent's character are independent of each other. They have a 'looseness of
fit'. He manages to make the distinction that Baron failed to, by distinguishing
between the accepted principles of morality and the motivational structure of the
agent.
Trianosky claims that there are two types of assessment at work when we assess an
act which is suberogatory. The first is a standard of vice which assesses the agent's
motivational structure along a continuum. At some point, the standard of vice will
indicate that the agent's shortcomings become so great as to become genuine defects,
vicious motivational flaws. The second assessment is according to the principles of
wrongdoing. It is a deontic assessment, in other words. In the case of a suberogatory
act, the principles of wrongdoing say that the act is not wrong to do. It is not wrong
to stand on your rights in the examples I have given above. Trianosky's suggestion is
that the standards of vice may vary in degree, even if the principles of wrongdoing
remain fixed. This distinction is useful when considering supererogatory acts in two
respects.
Firstly, it demonstrates that when an agent fails to do a supererogatory act such as a
heroic or saintly act - one which we have considered he need never do - his
motivational structure may demonstrate some shortcomings. It may in Trianosky's
terms fall short of the motivational structure of the fully virtuous person, but it may
display no actual vicious flaws either. Thus it is easy to understand the optional nature
of these types of acts. If I fail to be a hero or a saint, I can acknowledge my
shortcomings, without berating myself for moral failure. Nor would I expect others to
do so.
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Secondly, in the case of 'standing on one's rights', we can say that the motivational
structure of the agent was vicious, in Trianosky's terminology. In the case both of
failure to perform the heroic act and 'standing on one's rights', the agent acted morally
permissibly. In the case of the failure to perform the heroic and saintly act, however,
no further criticism of the agent is in order. In the case of the house seller, and others
like it, the onlooker is at liberty to criticise the agent's motivational structure as being
below the standard of vice which is acceptable. Trianosky suggests that the
assessment of an act according to the principles of wrongdoing is a feature of public
morality, whereas the assessment of an agent's motivational structure is related to
private morality. Thus, although we might think that there is some shortcoming or
even viciousness in an agent's motivational structure, this does not permit us as an
onlooker to push the agent's act from being permissible into the territory of
wrongdoing.
The shortcomings in the agent's motivational structure will thus range from 'merely'
shortcomings that do not merit criticism to varying degrees of 'viciousness', as
Trianosky terms it. Mere shortcomings might appear in the failure to perform a heroic
or saintly act, whereas shortcomings of a more vicious type would be made manifest
in the case of an agent who stands on his rights, as seen in the examples of
suberogatory behaviour.
Trianosky's discussion is concerned with the failure to perform a supererogatory act,
but it could be translated into an account of the performance of a supererogatory act,
by using the concepts of principles of rightdoing and standards of virtue. Would this
produce a strong enough story on which to build an account of supererogation? It
might seem that we have merely formalised the same familiar problems associated
with supererogation yet again. If I fail to do a heroic or saintly supererogatory act,
that is deemed acceptable because no one expects me to have the motivational
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structure of the hero or the saint. If I fail to do a smaller supererogatory act, then I
can be criticised, because failure to do something I could easily do shows that there is
something wrong with my motivational structure. If we can find a way of separating
deontic judgement from a type of evaluative judgement then an account of
supererogation will be made easier. Trianosky's account of wrongdoing and his
separation of private and public morality does this, but there remains the worry that
there is merely a description of the processes of ordinary morality, rather than a
justification of them. I leave this worry to one side until the next chapter and proceed
on the assumption that we can make this sort of distinction.
In the next chapter, I consider my proposal for an account of supererogatory acts
which deals with the two problems of requirement and rationality.
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Chapter 7 The dual aspect and indeterminacy of supererogation
7.1 A solution to the two problems of supererogation - the pressure of
requirement and rationality
The two problems of supererogation which I have described are these:
1. The Problem ofRequirement: Ifan act is good, why isn 't it required?
The first problem concerns the Optionality characteristic of the supererogatory act. If
an act is good, why isn't it required? How can the optional nature of the act be
justified? Appealing to cost to limit the extent of moral requirement will not succeed,
as I argued in Chapter 4. I discussed alternatives to appealing to cost in Chapter 5.
Firstly, Pettit suggested we need only do our fair share of the good - any more is
supererogatory. This is unsatisfactory in that it only works for certain types of
supererogatory act, namely where the supererogation is the result of doing more of
the same value that is required by duty. Even here, it met a serious obstacle in the
shape of rescue cases.
Secondly, Jackson argued that we are permitted to favour small groups of people
whom we know well, because we have better knowledge of their wants and needs. If
he is right, then this establishes the moral legitimacy of a set of partial goods which
can be contrasted with the normal impartial demands of morality. Supererogation
would arise when agents did not overweight the partial demands as they would be
permitted to do, but concentrated instead on the impartial demands. However, my
development of Jackson's subjective consequentalism as an account of supererogation
met the same fate as Pettit's, in that it could not deal with all types of supererogatory
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act. Not all supererogation arises as a contrast between partial and impartial demands,
with the impartial demands being supererogatory.
In Chapter 6, I explored the possibility that the concept of imperfect duties could
yield an answer to the problem of requirement, by establishing a particular kind of
latitude in action. However, it proved difficult to establish what would be
supererogatory on that basis, and even adding a rider about character of the agent did
not help. A development of the concept of imperfect duties, the category of the
suberogatory, allowed me to explore a useful suggestion by Trianosky that there may
be two judgements for every single act: one concerning the motivational structure of
the agent and the other concerning the deontic status of the act. I develop that theme
further below.
2. The Problem of Rationality: If there is a good reason not to perform the
supererogatory act, isn't it irrational to do it?
If a supererogatory act is optional, it suggests that there must be a good reason not to
perform the supererogatory act, so isn't is irrational to perform it? Equally, there must
be a good reason to perform the supererogatory act, therefore the alternative
permissible act may also be described as irrational. I have suggested that both results
are counter-intuitive. In Chapter 3,1 showed that although a maximising theory could
account for supererogation, it could do so only at the expense of supererogatory acts'
being described as irrational; an unacceptable result. The problem of rationality means
that simply establishing a separate set of goods to vie with the overall good, in the
manner of Kagan's moderate, would not be enough to establish the sort of reasoning
structure that optional acts such as the supererogatory require.
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Underlying both problems is the relationship between betterness and requirement,
expressed as a tension between the characteristics of the supererogatory act. In terms
of the first problem, if an act is better than another, why is it optional and not
required9 There is a tension between the Optionality and Betterness characteristics.
Equally, framed in terms of the second problem, if an act is better than another does
that not provide a decisive reason to perform that act? There is a tension here
between the Betterness and Rationality characteristics.
My suggested solution to the problems is in two parts. Firstly, I argue that in some
cases of supererogation, the agent considers the supererogatory act to be required for
him, but not others. The act is therefore not optional from the agent's viewpoint, but
is from the onlooker's. The agent considers that he has a morally decisive reason to
perform the act, which he sees as required for him, and so the problem of rationality
disappears, for the agent at least. I still have to explain how the onlooker sees the act
as optional. I call this part of the solution the dual aspect ofsupererogation.1
Secondly, I argue that where the agent does not consider the supererogatory act to be
required in the special way noted above, he considers his options to be
indeterminately ranked. Indeterminate ranking has the effect of allowing act A to be
better than act B in some respects and also allowing act B to be better than act A in
other respects. Thus, if an agent chooses to perform act A, he has chosen to perform
the better act. If he chooses to perform act B, then he also chosen to perform the
better act. The problem that still has to be solved here is how only one of these acts is
classed as supererogatory, whilst the other is merely permissible. I refer to this part of
the solution as the indeterminacy ofsupererogation.
* The origins of this solution came from a conversation with Barbara Herman.
188
In this Chapter, I discuss the two parts of the solution in turn and then explain how
they are linked.
7.2 The dual aspect of supererogation
In some cases of supererogation, the agent considers his act to be required. He does
not see it as an option. In Russia, where many schoolchildren were killed by terrorists
far to the south in Beslan, people in Moscow rushed to give blood to help the injured,
normally an optional act. Interviewed, they all said something similar; 'I had no
choice; I had to do this, because I had to do something'. However, my suggestion is
that in these cases the agent does not consider their act in exactly the same light as a
normal moral requirement, because it is not an act which is required for others. It is
only required for him. So the same act is both required for the agent but judged
optional for him by others.
There have been echoes of this proposal in other accounts of supererogation which I
have examined. Firstly, in Chapter 3, I noted Portmore's suggestion that, when an
agent wanted to perform an act which would otherwise be considered supererogatory,
it ceased to be optional and became required. Although I recognised the appeal of this
suggestion, I argued that the way Portmore formulated it resulted in an intuitively
unsatisfactory outcome.
Portmore considered such acts as required with no stipulation that it was not required
for all agents, and so his solution appeared to force us all to be heroes and saints in
the circumstances where agents wanted to perform such acts. The appeal of his
solution is that when agents do perform saintly and heroic deeds, it often seems to be
the case that they want to perform those deeds. I cited the example of Gianna Molla's
self-sacrifice for her unborn daughter. We know that Gianna Molla wholeheartedly
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embraced her course of action and tried to ensure that her wishes would be carried
out in the event of her being sufficiently unwell to voice them when the time came.
We also know that her act was considered optional by the Church authorities, who
would have considered morally permissible surgery which would have killed the
unborn child, but saved Gianna. Gianna saw her act as one which was required for
her, but the onlooker (and a morally rigorous onlooker in this case) saw it as optional.
Therefore Portmore's suggestion that the act changes status completely is
unsatisfactory, and needs modification so that in the cases where supererogatory acts
are required by the agent, they remain optional to others.
Portmore's change of deontic status in the case of agent preference was brought about
because he considered cost to be a necessary condition of a supererogatory act. If
cost disappeared, as it did in the case where the agent wanted to perform the act, then
such an act could not be supererogatory on his account. In Chapter 4, I rejected cost
as a necessary condition of a supererogatory act, and I am not therefore bound to
reject cost-free acts as supererogatory. I can accept that there is an element of
requirement if the agent wants to perform the act, but it is requirement for him alone.
In Chapter 5, I noted that Frank Jackson's account of consequentalism allowed for an
epistemological gap, which could also have the effect of making an otherwise
supererogatory act appear required for the agent. On this account, the agent makes
his judgement as to which act is required based on the knowledge that is available to
him. I suggested that the Balaclava hero, Henry Ramage, might not have been able to
consider all the relevant aspects of his heroic acts which enabled onlookers to classify
them as supererogatory and worthy of the VC, but instead he simply had enough
information to consider his acts as part of his duty. Although I think that this sort of
epistemological gap between agent and onlooker might account for the performance
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of some of the acts which we consider supererogatory, it is obviously not a
comprehensive solution.
In Chapter 6, 1 put forward an interpretation of a suggestion by Trianosky that there
were two standards in operation when we assessed an agent's acts. The first standard
concerns the motivational structure of the agent. The second standard is an
assessment ofwhether the act is right or wrong. In the case of supererogatory action,
it is clear that the act is always right in that it promotes moral worth. However, if an
agent fails to perform the act, he is not necessarily open to moral criticism on the basis
of the first standard. In the case of heroic and saintly deeds, for example, the agent
may manifest some shortcoming in his motivational shortcoming in not performing the
act, but the shortcoming is not sufficient to warrant criticism. In other cases of
supererogation, we may consider that the agent is justified in not performing the act,
but that he is nonetheless open to criticism if he fails to perform it, as in the cases of
the examples of'standing on one's rights'.
Trianosky attributes the assessment of an act according to the motivational structure
of the agent as being part of private morality, whilst principles of wrongdoing which
determine the purely deontic status of the act belong to public morality. He suggests
that agents often operate with these dual assessments in mind. So for example, saints
and heroes often judge their own actions much more harshly than others do, because
they have higher private standards to live up to, but they do not judge others by these
standards.2 I say more about this below in 7.8.
My proposal that an agent sees his act as required for him alone but optional for
others has the desirable result of explaining why so many agents who perform
2 Trianosky (1986) pp.467-468.
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supererogatory acts claim that they were only doing their duty, but it still preserves
the Optionality characteristic of the act. However, there are two problems.
The first is that, if the agent believes that the act is required, then he ought also to say
that the act could be demanded of others, according to the universalization
requirement ofmorality. The second problem is that if he does not believe this, (and it
seems to fit with the phenomenology that this is the case) then how does this sort of
act differ from a required act, which the agent presumably does believe can be
required of others? In other words, even though the reasoning process looks like a
normal reasoning process of weighing, with the supererogatory act coming out
required for the agent, there is some difference which we ought to be able to point to
so that we can explain the non-universalizability of the act.
Perhaps the agent is tempted to say something like 'I had to do it, but I wouldn't
dream of suggesting that you had to'. The sort of differences we might point to then
are going to be particular to the agent. When the agent performs the reasoning
process, he is factoring in something specific to him which affects the calculation. It is
in this sense that a form of subjectivity is involved in my dual aspect proposal.
On this view, if the agent performs the supererogatory act, then there are
agent-relative reasons which led him to do this. This is the opposite of the paradigm
example of the supererogatory act whereby agent-relative reasons act as reasons not
to perform the supererogatory act, which is usually represented by an act promoting
the agent-neutral good and requiring great sacrifice of agent-relative goods by the
agent. 'Agent-relative' means something slightly different in my proposal. It is
perspectival, rather like Portmore's evaluator relativity. Although it preserves the idea
that there is the possibility of a bias operating in favour of the agent, it is not a bias in
the sense that we normally think of when considering the contrast between
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agent-relative and agent-neutral. We normally consider that the agent is allowed to
overweight his interests compared with others and this provides him with a reason not
to perform the supererogatory act. Here we are considering the point that the agent
sees himself in a special position in relation to the supererogatory act compared with
others. He believes that he must perform this act, but does not see it as something that
others must do, in the sense that he could righteously turn to others and say that they
ought to do the same.
If we accept that there could be an answer along these lines, we return to the two
pressing problems that stem from this question: How do we explain that the agent
sometimes sees himself standing in a particular position in relation to an act which
means that he is required to do it but others are not? The first problem is whether and
how to universalize what the agent believes he ought to do. The second is how to
distinguish such an act from a required act.
Here is a possible answer to the first problem. To universalize is not to generalize, as
Philip Pettit reminds us:
'..if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C - these may
include the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the
like - then we assume that something similar would hold for any similarly placed
agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A
ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to
that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type
circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very
general import. It may be, for all the universalizability constraint requires, that C-type
circumstances are highly specific, so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely
to confront them'.J
3 Pettit (2000) p. 179
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Pettit's description of highly specific universalizability seems enough to answer the
first problem. Think of the sort of comment that often accompanies supererogatory
acts. The agent says, demurring at the suggestion that his act was more than required:
'You would have done the same, in my position.' This very specific form of
universalizability helps explain how the agent saw himself, and himself only, in a
particular position in relation to the act. Because of where he was and who he was,
and all the factors that make up the circumstances, he believes that he was required to
act, but not others who were not in exactly the same position.4
The dual aspect solution appears to require me to adopt two perspectives. The
personal perspective allows the agent to see why the act is required. However, he
does not see that it is required for everyone because he sees the highly specific
universalizable circumstances of the act as only applying to him. He therefore fails to
understand the requirement for all to act as he does in these circumstances. The
onlookers also fail to see that there is a universalizable requirement to act so they do
not consider that the agent was required to act. They consider his act optional and
therefore supererogatory.
The second problem concerning the distinction between a supererogatory act and a
required act, given that the agent thinks that the supererogatory act is required for
him, is solved by suggesting that the supererogatory act involves a faulty perspective
on both the agent's and onlooker's part. The distinction between a required act and a
supererogatory act is that in the case of a required act both the agent and the onlooker
can perceive the universalizable aspects of the act which make it required for the
4 Charles Fraser received his VC for saving a number of men from drowning whilst they were in
pursuit of the enemy. Asked if he could swim, he replied 'like a duck' and immediately plunged into
the river and saved the men under enemy fire. Arthur (2004). Frascr presumably thought that his
capability meant that he was specially suited for this act of bravery.
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agent and from the onlooker's viewpoint, whereas in the case of a supererogatory act
neither the agent nor the onlooker sees the universalizable aspects.
If we accept that otherwise supererogatory acts which the agent considers required
are in fact required for everyone by virtue of a highly specific form of
universalizability, then we will have lost the Optionality characteristic of
supererogatory acts. They turn out to be required after all, but the very specific
circumstances of the act means that it is very difficult or impossible for anyone other
than the agent to perceive the requirement. The act is not optional for the agent.
Further, if we accept that there is some form of highly specific universalizability at
work, then it is not in fact optional for anyone and that may seem damaging in terms
of providing a solution to the pressure of requirement problem. Effectively, if we
accept the highly specific universalizability approach to supererogation, then
supererogatory acts lose their optional characteristic and become required.
Supererogation 'disappears' at a fundamental level in morality and becomes something
of a cosmetic feature, as a result of faulty perspective.
1 shall be proposing a different answer in 7.10 below, although I acknowledge that
choosing between my solution and the one proposed above is difficult and not
clear-cut. I shall argue that, combined with a solution to the moral reasoning problem,
the dual aspect solution may yet form part of an attractive viable solution to the two
problems of supererogation I have posed.
7.3 The indeterminacy of supererogation
The reasoning process in the case of a supererogatory act must apparently not take
the form of weighing two acts and deciding that one act comes out 'better' than the
other. Otherwise, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the act which is better is
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required and acting on the alternative is both forbidden and irrational. The judgement
that an act is better than another can take two forms. It can be made either
quantitively; one act has more of a particular value than the other, so that is the act
chosen to perform. Or the judgement can be qualititive; one act promotes a value
which is always morally better than the value promoted by the alternative act. If we
proceed in this way, we find ourselves in the bind that Kagan illustrates. The act that
comes out better according to this process is surely required, not optional. This is why
efforts to establish values based on partial concerns which rival the impartial good
seem useless. If these values can be set up as moral values, then if the moral process is
carried out in this way, they either win the process and so are required, or they don't
and are forbidden. Establishing such values might help as excuses for failure to
perform the optimal act. But they certainly do not help to explain the reasoning
process behind a genuinely optional act.
To do that, we need to establish a moral reasoning process which behaves differently
in cases of supererogation. I suggest there are two paths we can follow, which when
brought together provide a solution to the two problems. Firstly, as discussed above, I
propose that the optionality of a supererogatory act is a third-party optionality and
does not figure in the reasoning process of the agent. Secondly, we can say that the
process of weighing is inappropriate in many cases of moral reasoning and
supererogatory acts in particular. I consider this second part of the solution now.
In the case of an optional act, when we deliberate and decide on the right action, act
A, we are assuming that we leave an alternative action, act B, undone, but permissibly
so. If both acts are optional, we could have performed act B and left A undone,
equally permissibly. The extra twist with supererogatory action is that one act, let us
say A, is the supererogatory act and is 'better' than act B. How do we achieve a
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structure that allows for options and meets both the Betterness and Rationality
characteristics?
I propose an answer by assuming that there are plural moral values, not just one
overall good, and that these values come from fundamentally different sources. I
develop this idea below.
7.4. The justification of plural moral values rather than a single
master-value and the implications for moral reasoning
Nagel claims that certain values are different because they have different formal
structures. He isolates five types of value which figure in 'conflict' decision making.
For my purposes some of these values also figure in the decision making that
surrounds supererogation. The values are:
i) Obligations, by which Nagel means special obligations to family, friends, colleagues
and so on.
ii) Constraints on action derived from rights which we all have; for example, the right
not to be harmed and the right to liberty
iii) Utility, meaning the effect of what one does on everyone's welfare whether or not
the components of that welfare are connected to special obligation or general rights.
Nagel has as an example the general benefits ofmedicine and education.
iv) Perfectionist values, by which Nagel means the intrinsic value of achievements or
creations apart from their value to individuals who experience or use them.
v) Commitment to one's own projects or undertakings. This is a value in addition to
whatever may have led to them in the first place. Once you have decided to climb
Everest, says Nagel by way of example, then the carrying through of that project
acquires a value distinct from the climbing of the mountain.
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Utilitarians will not agree to some or any of these values as self-standing, apart from
utility. But many theorists will agree that Nagel has said nothing contentious so far.
What matters in the case of supererogatory action is how these values are prioritised.
Nagel suggests that he sees ranking of these values as complex. He claims:
'a simpler moral conception might permit a solution in terms of a short list of clear
prohibitions and injunctions, with the balance of decision left to personal preference
or discretion'.-"'
That 'simpler moral conception' is reminiscent of Urmson's gentleman's club analogy
of morality, where what is important is to avoid breaking the rules. Having seen to
that aspect ofmorality, one can either be a passive member of the club or one can be a
'contributor' who joins committees, organises events and so on. In other words, we
can choose whether to behave in a merely permissible fashion or to supererogate. It is
easy to give wide scope to supererogation with a 'base-line' morality such as Urmson's
which concentrates on the avoidance of wrong. Nagel rightly rejects this 'simpler
conception' as he claims it will not work with such a mixed collection of values.
Nagel suggests having a system of ordering the values. But although he says that we
can point to some relative stringency rules operating between the values, these rules
do not always hold. We saw this at work in Kamm's suggestion that a supererogatory
act could sometimes be done instead of a duty, but not always. Sometimes it is not
even clear that an act is supererogatory, rather than an infringement of a duty. For
example, I have already referred to the controversy over whether Gianna should have
sacrificed herself for one child, thus effectively leaving four children motherless.
5 Nagel (1979) p. 131
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Nagel also rejects the idea of a single scale on which these values can be added,
balanced and weighed. This is what consequentialists do, and we saw in Chapter 2
that Kagan's notion of the overall good worked in this way. It is important to my
proposal of the indeterminacy of supererogation that there should not be a single scale
of value against which other values can be balanced and weighed.
In Nagel's case of five sources of value, such a scale would have to represent either
another value which takes precedence over the five we already have or one of the five
would have to be nominated as the dominant value. In utilitarianism, utility in one
shape or form is such a value. Nagel gives his reason for rejection as theoretical and
not related to his objections to theories such as utilitarianism, which for him
sometimes yield the wrong result through the single scale approach. He says:
'I do not believe that the source of value is unitary - displaying apparent multiplicity
only in its application to the world. I believe that value has fundamentally different
sources, and that they are reflected in the classification of values into types. Not all
values represent the pursuit of some single good in a variety of settings'.6
As evidence that values come in different types, he points to the formal difference
between values such as utility, which take into account the number of people affected
and perfectionist values, which do not. Nagel then goes on and marks differences
between values as to whether they are agent-relative (or agent-centred) and
agent-neutral. I do not think that it is necessary to draw these particular distinctions to
make the point that I wish to from the picture that Nagel has drawn of values. Rather,
I would take the position that Scanlon has adopted to value.
Scanlon also believes that there are plural values and that there is not one
master-value against which other values can be measured. He demonstrates that,
6 ibid. p. 132
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although it is tempting to think of 'well-being' as a master-value, there are in fact
values, both moral and non-moral, which are quite distinct from the well-being of both
ourselves and others. He says:
'Treating others fairly may make my life, and theirs, go better, but this is not my
reason for believing it to be worthwhile. Rather, it is worthwhile because it is required
by the more general value of treating others in ways that could be justified to them.
Living up to the requirements of this more general value may also make our lives
better, by making it possible for us to live in greater harmony with one another. But,
again, this possible contribution to our well-being is not the only thing, or the most
basic thing, that gives us reason to be concerned with what we owe to each other,
One more basic reason is the fact that this is part of what is required by our value as
rational creatures.'7
This passage demonstrates that there are values beyond the promotion of well-being,
both ours and others, however inclusive a notion of well-being we might hold. So
Scanlon effectively rejects Kagan's notion of the 'overall good', which was the single
master-value in his morality, and which comprised many other values but did not
allow the agent to compare these values except in the context of examining their
contribution to the master-value. Scanlon instead proposes that there are plural
values. There are some important differences between Scanlon and Nagel's views on
value, which I do not explore here. It will be sufficient for my proposal to say that in
morality we deal with plural values that are distinct and that there is no master-value
against which the values can be compared.
So how do we decide what to do when faced with a framework of plural values with
no common scale of measurement? The problem we face is that the sources of value
are plural and yet action is unitary and the justification for that action must be unitary
too. This is how Nagel concludes this particular discussion on value:
7 Scanlon (2000) p. 142/143.
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'..the fact that action must be unitary seems to imply that unless justification is also
unitary, nothing can be either right or wrong and all decisions under conflict are
arbitrary.
I believe this is wrong, but the alternative is hard to explain. Briefly, I contend that
there can be good judgement without total justification, either explicit or implicit. The
fact that one cannot say why a certain decision is the correct one, given a particular
balance of conflicting reasons, does not mean that the claim to correctness is
meaningless. Provided one has taken the process of practical justification as far as it
will go in the course of arriving at the conflict, one may be able to proceed without
further justification, but without irrationality either. What makes this possible is
judgement - essentially the faculty Aristotle described as practical wisdom..' 8
Here Nagel talks about how to proceed in the case of 'conflicting' reasons.
Supererogatory action, whilst not strictly taking the form of a dilemma, often gives
rise to a conflict for the agent as I suggested in Chapter 6. He must decide between
two courses of action. Both are permissible, of course, but if he follows one rather
than another, then some value will appear to be lost. In a theory of value such as
Nagel's, there is no common scale on which to measure the values which generate
these reasons so they cannot be compared on that greater scale. Nagel is therefore
forced back to a reasoning and decision process, originating in Aristotle, which is
more nebulous in character. Practical wisdom will tell us which is the right value to
pursue and so resolve the conflict. But in the case of supererogation, we still need to
preserve the optional nature of action and the betterness of the supererogatory act.
How will plural values help us do that?
7.5 How the deliberation process works for supererogatory action in
the case ofplural values
The natural way of thinking about moral deliberation (or so consequentialists would
have us believe) is that right thing to do will be the act which promotes either the
8 Nagel (1979) pp. 134-135
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most value or the value which has precedence in our moral theory. There is a
consequentialist bias in that the right act is determined by the good, either qualititively
or quantitively. This is how Kagan assumes moral reasoning will work, for example.
There are alternatives to this reasoning process which are available to us only when
we are working with plural values. We need to find an alternative that yields a process
surrounding supererogation that will preserve the Optionality, Rationality and
Betterness characteristics. Firstly, I shall revise my categorisation of supererogatory
acts.
In Chapter 1, I gave a categorisation of supererogatory acts based on ordinary
morality examples. The categories included heroic acts of rescue, saintly acts and
lives, favours and acts of mercy and forgiveness. In Chapter 3, I introduced the
Weekend example, which set up the possibility of supererogation occurring when an
agent was faced with promoting acts of contrasting value. I shall now provisionally
suggest that all pairs of acts where one is supererogatory and the other the permissible
alternative can be classified as one of three categories:
i) acts of contrasting moral value
ii) acts where one is a moral value but the other is one of no moral value
iii) acts where both have the same type ofmoral value
I shall first discuss the reasoning process on the assumption that we are faced with a
choice between two acts which promote different values, encompassing categories i)
and ii) above. There are three possible ways of approaching the reasoning process
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when we are working with plural values; rough equality, incommensurability and
indeterminate ranking. I discuss these in turn.
7.6 Rough equality
One possibility is to make use of the concept of 'rough equality' in the process of
reasoning. Rough equality means that we compare the two acts and their associated
values and find them to be roughly equal in choice-worthiness. This means that small
adjustments can be made either way in the amount of value promoted by either act,
but there will no change in the resulting decision that they are roughly equal. This
type of concept is particularly appealing in the context of moral decisions, where we
are rarely dealing with precise units ofmeasurement. (It also serves to emphasise why
moral examples which do use precise units ofmeasurements such as money or number
of lives saved often yield unacceptable results, as I noted in Chapter 2 when
commenting on Kagan's examples of this kind).
Here is how 'rough equality' reasoning could work to yield a satisfactory justification
of supererogation in the case of the Weekend Example. There, I had the choice of
spending the weekend working for charity or working on my philosophy article. (I left
it open as to whether working on my philosophy article was a moral value or not.)
Suppose I consider that the choice-worthiness of each of my options as to how to
spend the weekend is equal. I then learn that my deadline for my philosophy article
has been brought forward a few days. It is more pressing that I finish it. This might
influence my decision, but conceivably not. Again, suppose I learn that this will be my
last chance to work for this particular charity. The same applies. Although these
factors might tip the balance and persuade the agent to act one way or another, there
is also the possibility that, factored in with all the other concerns that he has, they do
not amount to enough to favour one option or the other. The acts remain evenly
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balanced or roughly equal from the agent's viewpoint. Let us say that 1 choose to
work for charity. Having considered that the options were roughly equal in
choice-worthiness, in what sense can working for charity be said to be better than
writing my philosophy article?
Using the idea of the dual aspect above, we could say that working for charity is
better only from the onlooker's viewpoint. It could not be described that way from the
agent's viewpoint because he sees the options as 'roughly equal' and this would rule
out the possibility of a relationship of 'better than' pertaining between the choices. In
this case though it is not a dual deontic aspect; let us assume that the onlooker also
regards the act as optional, just as the agent does, but he makes a different judgement
about the relationship between the agent's choices. However, all we have succeeded in
doing here is to push the problem of finding a reasoning process that combines the
Optionality and Betterness characteristics away from the agent, who sees both acts as
optional with one not necessarily better than the other, and onto the onlooker. I
conclude therefore that rough equality will not provide an answer to the moral
reasoning problem.
7.7 Incommensurable values
Another way of developing the story of plural values is to suggest that values are
always incommensurable. If values are incommensurable, there is no common scale
for measuring the values. So if values are incommensurable, act A could never be
inferior to act B, nor equal to it, nor superior to it. This is a necessary feature of
incommensurable values.9 But we need act A to be superior in some sense to act B if
9 See Seung and Bonevac's (1992) reference to Joseph Raz p.799
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it is the supererogatory act, otherwise it will not meet the Betterness characteristic. It
might seem that incommensurability is a non-starter.
However, we could consider the possibility that even if there is no common measure
for incommensurable values, there is still a possibility that we could rank them as to
choice-worthiness. Values could be incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be
placed on a common scale of value, but they might still be comparable in that they
could be ranked.
Two different types of ranking might be available even in the case of
incommensurable values; algorithmic and non-algorithmic. If I want to compare fishes
and rabbits as possible pets for my daughter, I have the possibility of using three (at
least) measures of value. I can compare them with regard to ease of looking after
(vl), expense of purchase and maintenance (v2) and appeal to my daughter (v3). If
fishes are superior to rabbits in each of the three value measures, then I can rank
fishes above rabbits algorithmically because we can aggregate the different readings of
the value-measures. Algorithmic ranking is the normal way to rank when values are
commensurable; that is what we do when we have a common scale to measure them
by. Ifwe assess values by how much they contribute to the overall good, then all we
have to do is to compare them on that common scale and see which is the greatest.
However, even in the case of incommensurable values, algorithmic ranking is
sometimes possible, as in the above example where fishes come ahead of rabbits on
every gauge of value, even though the gauges are incommensurable because they
cannot be measured against a common scale.
Now suppose that fishes are superior to rabbits in respect of ease of care, equal in
terms of cost of maintenance and worse in respect of appeal to my daughter - they are
not as cuddly as rabbits. There is no super-measure that can aggregate their readings.
205
We might decide to rank them nonetheless, but we would have to do this by appeal to
intuitions. Say rabbits come out at the top. This would be a positive result of
non-algorithmic ranking. If we can't rank them, we say that we have achieved a
negative result of incommensurate ranking.
Ranked incommensurable values will not help in the account of supererogation
though. If I decide that one choice is more worthy than another, even on the basis of
non-algorithmic ranking, then I am effectively saying that that choice is better than the
others, and it is morally required. Negative incommensurate ranking on the other hand
may allow me to preserve the optional characteristic, but will not allow me a way of
saying that my supererogatory act is better than my alternative permissible act
(because I have not been able to rank my choices). So incommensurability is not the
solution either.
7.8 Indeterminate rankings in the case of contrasting values
The third possibility is to make use of the concept of indeterminate ranking in the case
of plural values. Seung and Bonevac give the following definition of indeterminate
ranking:
'The ranking of A and B is indeterminate just in case it is reasonable to conclude that
A is better than B, that A is worse than B, and that A and B are of equal value' 1(1
A and B are not being compared against a particular value measure, but 'all things
considered'. In ordinary language, we can imagine ourselves saying that A is better
than B in this respect, worse in that and equal in this respect, where we name three
different values, as 1 did in the example of the fishes and rabbits above. Seung and
10 ibid. p. 802
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Bonevac make the point that this definition of indeterminate ranking is the logical
contrary of incommensurate ranking, which they define as:
The ranking of A and B is incommensurate just in case it is neither true that one is
better than the other nor true that they are of equal value'.11
As they point out, appealing to the different formulae can give different accounts of
choices. Let us use Jane's career as an example. If she chooses the career of lawyer
over that of aid worker based on the incommensurate ranking formula, she has no
reason to say that the career of lawyer is better than that of aid worker. She appears
to have no reason for her choice at all. If she chooses according to the indeterminate
ranking formula, then she can say that there is a superiority in the career of aid worker
to that of lawyer and that is the reason for her choice. The superiority will be
presumably based on the idea that she is helping others who really need her help.
However, she also has a reason to choose the career of lawyer over that of aid worker
on the indeterminate ranking formula. It too is superior, because it makes full use of
her talents and accords with her life plan. She is admirably suited to working as a
lawyer in her local community, whereas, apart from her willingness to help, she is less
suited to the role of aid worker.
The formula of indeterminate ranking therefore yields more than one right choice and
gives the opportunity of describing that choice as superior to the alternatives. How
could this be? The answer lies in understanding more about the relationship between
goals and values. Scanlon is helpful on this point, suggesting that when we adopt a
goal, 'it is not just a matter of attaching a positive value to its accomplishment and
counting this in favor of any action that would promote it'.12 He continues:
11 ibid. p.802
12 Scanlon (2000) p. 86
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'When we "adopt a goal" we normally give that goal a particular status in our lives
and our practical thinking, such as the status of a long-term career objective, or of a
whim, or of something that we want to do sometime on a vacation. That is to say, the
intentions that constitute adopting the goal specify the occasions on which it is to be
pursued, and so on.'13
This might help to understand how it is that on some occasions certain choices are
better than others in certain respects, which is just what we want to preserve the
Optionality and Betterness characteristics of the supererogatory act, and to avoid the
problems of requirement and rationality.
Above, I have considered the indeterminacy solution in relation to supererogation
which comes about as a result of comparing acts which involve different values. As I
noted in my recategorisation of supererogatory acts above, this may either involve
different moral values (category i) or a choice between an act with moral value and an
act with some other kind of value (category ii).
In my example of Jane, some moral theories might consider that it represents a choice
between two moral values. From the Kantian perspective, both helping others and
developing one's talents are moral values. On other moral views, Jane's decision to
pursue her career might be seen as a non-moral value contrasting with helping others
as a moral value. 1 do not consider that my indeterminacy solution is affected,
whichever view is taken by the moral theorist. However, if the morality allows for the
pursuance of non-moral values instead of moral values, then only the moral option
will ever be supererogatory. This maintains the Moral Worth characteristic of the
supererogatory act. On the indeterminacy view, I am then committed to saying that it
is not always better to pursue a moral value in the face of a non-moral value.
11 ibid. p86
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Although the fact that an act has moral value might contribute to its being better than
the alternative act. the indeterminacy solution also allows the alternative permissible
act to be better than the moral act in certain respects.14 This places me in a similar
position to Portmore, who allowed his agent to ignore an act with moral value and act
on 'all considered' reasons, which related to non-moral values. However, in
Portmore's case, pursuing the moral option and acting supererogatorily also meant
acting irrationally. The indeterminacy solution does not give that unsatisfactory result.
7.9 Indeterminate ranking in the case of the same value
The third category of supererogatory act on my categorisation concerns the case
where supererogation is the result of doing more of one value than we are required to
do. Will the indeterminacy solution work in these cases?
Here, the indeterminacy solution might seem to face a familiar problem. Assume that
an example of these cases is one where I have the option of pursuing an act with a
certain value and fulfilling my duty, or pursuing an act with more of the same value
and behaving supererogatorily. This seems to place us back in the territory of the
consequentialist, who will ask that if we have the choice of promoting a value to a
certain extent and promoting the same value to a greater extent, how is the latter
optional and not required? According to the indeterminacy solution, we have appealed
in the cases of contrasting value to differing respects in which one act is better than
the other. This seems plausible when one is dealing with different values, but less so
14 I do not discuss here in detail how acts can be 'better' than others, although Scanlon's suggestions
about how we treat our goals is a helpful lead. The one stipulation is that in the case of
supererogation, acts with moral value are never conclusively better than acts with non-moral value.
(Otherwise they would be required). However, theorists who acknowledge both moral and non-moral
values are then forced to recognise that, in the case of required acts, the moral act is conclusively
better; that is why it is required. They must therefore come up with a distinction between required
and supererogatory acts to explain that.
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when the difference is between the quantity of one value. Firstly, 1 consider whether
there are really any examples of supererogation which involve the same value for the
supererogatory act and the alternative permissible act.1"'
Suppose I have a duty to take care of my aunt in her daughter's absence. I see three
courses of action open to me; a) I can telephone her and check she is all right, b) I can
telephone and visit, which is better, because I know she likes to see me. c) I can not
telephone, but visit and take her out and do some shopping for her. Assuming that a)
fulfils the duty, but that b) and c) are permissible alternatives and indeed
supererogatory, then it is not just that there is the latitude to fulfil a duty in a number
of different ways, but it seems that it is possible to fulfil a duty in ways that are more
than the minimum required. In other words, one can apparently perform a duty in a
supererogatory manner. Indeed, in the case of c), I can even skip the minimum
performance of telephoning and move directly to the level of the supererogatory, as
Kamm suggested was possible.
What values are being compared in the case of the supererogatory acts b) and c)? Is it
the case that I consider them in comparison with a), the dutiful act? Or do I consider
them in comparison to other acts which I might have performed instead of the time
taken to visit and go shopping with my aunt? Perhaps I might have continued to write
my philosophy article instead. The reason that I consider merely doing the duty
acceptable might not be just that it is the duty, but that doing more involves me in the
loss of alternative activities. So the comparison when extending a duty to
supererogatory levels is still with acts of contrasting value.
15 Seung and Bonevac (1992) although not discussing supererogation explicitly would presumably
disagree. They boldly state that 'every choice is a choice between competing values', p. 809
210
What about the duty of developing one's talents? I suggested that Evelyn Glennie
can be said to have supererogated by doing more of this duty; it does not appear to be
the case that she has supererogated by doing more of a contrasting value. She has
simply done more of the value related to developing her talents than is considered
required. However, presumably she could have chosen to do something else with her
time other than the excess time devoted to her music, and it is in the sense that in this
case also the supererogatory choice can be said to be the result of competing values.
Thus, even acts of supererogation which involve doing more of a value which is
required by duty are in fact acts chosen against the background of competing values,
where the agent compares the extra which is to be done over and above the duty with
values which he might otherwise have pursued.
7.10 How the dual aspect and indeterminate ranking solutions are
linked
On my account so far, the Optionality characteristic of supererogatory acts will be
justified by the fact that there are plural values and that this frequently results in
indeterminate ranking of those values. This allows us to say both that we have an
option to pursue either of two permissible acts, and to describe one of those acts as
better than the other so that if that act is chosen then we have performed
supererogatorily. The Betterness characteristic is also thus met. The Rationality
characteristic is not infringed, provided we accept Nagel's interpretation that the
choice should be rationally acceptable, rather than required. And since any
supererogatory act will involve a moral act, then the characteristic of Moral Worth
too will be met.
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I consider that indeterminate ranking of plural values is a suitable and attractive
formula for preserving the Optionality, Rationality and Betterness characteristics of
the supererogatory act. It allows us to understand the reasoning process behind
supererogation, preserving both the optionality of choice and the ability to say that
one choice is better than another without its being required. I now consider how
plural values ranked indeterminately might combine with a dual aspect solution to
provide an overall account of supererogation.
Sometimes (perhaps very frequently) the choice of the supererogatory act will not
come about because of indeterminate rankings, as I have suggested in my proposal of
dual aspect. The act will present itself as required to the agent. Unlike a duty, he will
consider it required for him, but he will not consider himself able to demand that
others do it. The onlooker will not see it in this manner, but regard the act as optional
and better. Two questions arise. How can the agent consider an act in this light? How
does the onlooker come to this different judgement? 1 suggest that the answer lies in
an acceptance of separate private and public judgements of moral acts. Trianosky
suggested that there was this dual level of assessment in the context of suberogatory
acts, but he also makes a reference to the explanation of the behaviour of saints and
heroes:
'Any explanation ... must show how it is that saints and heroes may legitimately
evaluate their motives and conduct by a standard that is plainly harsher than that
which the rest of us recognize as legitimate in our own case. It is difficult to see how
any explanation can do this without assuming that legitimate moral standards or
principles can be private at least some of the time.'16
So Trianosky's model of two separate scales, the principles of wrongdoing and the
standards of vice, allows the agent to do this. The principles of wrongdoing form part
16Trianoskv (1986) pp.467-468
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of public morality, but the standards of vice vary from agent to agent. Saints and
heroes have higher standards than the rest of us. Importantly, these two scales are not
related in any simple way, as I described in the previous chapter. Evidence of the
looseness of fit of these two scales comes from my suggestion that there are frequent
occasions when the agent finds himself faced with the opportunity of performing
either a supererogatory act or a suberogatory act. In that instance, he has to apply his
own standards of vice or virtue and not just the principles of wrong or rightdoing
when he decides what to do.
My justification for the optional nature of supererogation rests then on my two
solutions. Firstly, I have suggested that the agent sees supererogatory action as
required by him but not by others. The requirement comes about as a result of the
demands of his private morality, rather than any universalizable moral requirement.
Onlookers see his act as optional and supererogatory. Secondly, there are some
supererogatory acts which present themselves in tandem with a permissible alternative
as a kind of conflict or quasi-dilemma to the agent. He solves this conflict by
appealing to indeterminate ranking of the values involved to decide what to do. If he
decides to behave supererogatorily, his action is rational, optional and better than the
permissible alternative in some respect. If he decides to perform the alternative
permissible act, his action is rational, optional and better than the supererogatory act
in other respects.
The two solutions are linked in the following manner. When the agent considers the
supererogatory act as required for him, he may be applying the standards of private
morality, which means that he sees it as required for him but optional for others. The
onlooker applies the standards of public morality, which means that he sees the
supererogatory act as optional and better than an alternative permissible act available
to the agent. He reconciles the option available to the agent by appeal to
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indeterminate rankings, so that the agent in the onlooker's view is not performing
irrationally.
7.11 Conclusion
I have suggested that the decision process that precedes all supererogatory acts can
be seen as a choice between competing values. The agent will make his choice on the
basis of indeterminate rankings of values. Indeterminate rankings will allow the
supererogatory act to be classed as optional, yet rationally acceptable. It will also
allow the judgement to be made that the supererogatory act is better than the morally
permissible alternative without the suggestion that it is required.
The mechanism of indeterminate rankings can only work with a form of moral
pluralism, where there are plural moral values stemming from different sources and
there is no one value which represents the common scale against which other values
are measured. It is the radically different nature of the values which sets up the
conditions for the supererogatory conflict to occur.
In other cases of supererogatory action, the agent may be very clear that his act is
required, but required only of him. In these cases, he is acting according to private
moral rules, his own standards of virtue, modelled on Trianosky's standards of vice,
which he does not consider can be applied to anyone else. The onlooker applies other
standards to the assessment of the act and sees it as supererogatory, on the basis of
the indeterminate rankings process described above.
The above solution allows me to avoid the two problems of requirement and
rationality. In the case of the dual aspect solution, the agent sees the act as required
but only for him. It remains optional as far as the onlooker, and public morality, is
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concerned. I am able to provide an explanation of the moral reasoning process that
surrounds the supererogatory act. It also means that I must reject the structure central
to consequentalism that it is the production of a single good which always determines
right action. However, I have not had recourse to developing separate subjective and
objective viewpoints in the way commonly supposed necessary for supererogation to
be explained. My acceptance of a dual aspect and separate standards in private and
public morality is of course a form of dual viewpoint. It might be thought that it relies
on the idea that public morality is not as demanding as private morality, and in that
sense I have not entirely escaped the link between supererogation and the
overdemandingness problem generated by consequentalism as outlined by Kagan. I
am not sure that the difference between public and private morality need fall back to
this position, although I have not fully explored this here. It might be that some
account of the agent's particular perception of the situation that faces him combined
with the variability of human motivation in the face of moral demands might be a
sufficient answer, which does not necessarily revert to a story about the frailty of
human motivation.
Urmson originally pointed to utilitarianism as the ideal theory to explain
supererogatory acts. The temptation to home in on the results-based normative theory
for such an explanation is clear. Supererogatory acts are all about excellent results,
after all. But since Urmson, consequentialists generally have hardened their position
against supererogatory acts, culminating in Kagan's objection to options. He thought
that the answers to the two problems of requirement and rationality were inevitably
drawn from weak and inconsistent theories about the cost that the agent had to bear
in the case of supererogation. I rejected the idea that that was the only source of an
answer to the two problems. Instead, I have argued that the nature of the good is
important in any theory which allows for supererogation. There should be no single
master-value. Instead, plural values offer the opportunity for the indeterminacy
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solution. Plural values also allow the agent's perception of a situation to differ from
that of the onlooker, so that the agent sometimes considers supererogatory action to
be required, whilst the onlooker understands the act to be optional.
Supererogation and consequentalism may not be incompatible, but the form of
consequentalism that does allow for supererogation must be sufficiently carefully
crafted to avoid the two problems of requirement and rationality. Urmson recognised
this. In his original article, he refers obliquely to the dual aspect solution that I have
proposed. 1 leave the final words to him:
'I have also been so rash as to suggest that we may look upon our duties as basic
requirements to be universally demanded as providing the only tolerable basis of
social life. The higher flights of morality can then be regarded as more positive
contributions that go beyond what is universally to be exacted; but while not exacted
publicly they are equally pressing in foro inferno on those who are not content merely
to avoid the intolerable. Whether this should be called a version of utilitarianism, as I
suggest, is a matter of small moment'.17
17 Urmson (1958) p. 73
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